SHIR AKA NAJIBULLAH Russia's Strategy Towards Afghanistan
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.32.2.014
SHIR AKA NAJIBULLAH Post-graduate student, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Kabul, Afghanistan
RUSSIA'S STRATEGY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN
Over the past 15 years, Russia and the United States have pursued much the same goals in Afghanistan: they have sought to prevent chaos and prevent the country from turning into a safe haven for terrorists. This convergence of objectives enabled the two countries to cooperate. However, in reality, there are serious differences between them. In his article, the author analyzes the strategy of Russia in respect of Afghanistan.
Key words: Russia's policy, the unipolar system of international relations, the war in Afghanistan, the settlement of the political conflict.
The U.S. approach is based on the establishment of a strong central government in Kabul, as well as well-armed and trained security services. Meanwhile, Russia prefers to work with a number of forces, some of which openly opposing the government in Kabul. Moscow has even established contacts with the Taliban (a terrorist organization banned in Russia), thus giving legitimacy to the group, which continues to threaten the security of the Afghan government, NATO forces and the United States.
Over the past couple of years, the gap between the U.S. and Russian strategies has widened. Russia increasingly insists that the US approach does not work and that the Washington political will needed to continue the campaign in Afghanistan will soon run out. Moscow is convinced that it will have to deal with an unstable Afghanistan. This is a serious problem for Russia. However, it also provides an opportunity to undermine the U.S. positions: Russia can become an influential player.
When the U.S. entered Afghanistan in 2001 many interests of the US and Russian largely coincided. Both countries wanted to destroy al-Qaeda (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) and closely related terrorist groups and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists.
When Russian troops left Afghanistan in 1989, Moscow feared that there would be a political vacuum that would provoke the rise of extremism and the formation of terrorist threats. Moscow was suspicious of the prospect of a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan, but it tolerated American and NATO operations in the hope that they would help bring stability back to the region. Cooperation between Russia and the United States in Afghanistan reached its peak during the Obama administration, when Moscow allowed the U.S. and NATO forces to transport weapons and equipment through the Russian territory, it sold Mi-17 helicopters to American-backed Afghan forces and collaborated with the United States to reduce production of drugs and drug trafficking [2].
After a while, Russia began to gradually lose faith in the fact that the United States are ready and able to complete its mission in Afghanistan. Moscow began to develop its own strategy to protect its interests and prevent a possible collapse of the government in Kabul. Moscow has made it clear to Washington that it does not want the U.S. to quickly withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. In January 2017, Zamir Kabulov, the Russian President's special representative for Afghanistan, said that if Donald Trump “decides to withdraw the military contingent, everything would collapse [1]”.
Although Moscow supported the presence of American troops in Afghanistan, the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, which the Trump administration announced in August 2017, did not impress Moscow. From Moscow's point of view, the strategy, which implies a slight increase in the number of troops, the resumption of the fight against terrorism and the open date of the final withdrawal of troops, is almost no different from the previous strategy. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the focus on the use of force a “dead end,” and his representative said that the new strategy is almost no different from Obama's strategy, which “has not helped to improve the security situation in the country.” Russian officials also criticized the Pentagon's decision to stop buying Mi-17 for the Afghan army and replace them with the American Black Hawk helicopters, calling it an exclusively political decision that resulted from the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions.
Over the past few years, Russia has conducted a number of foreign policy maneuvers in the Middle East designed to bring it political and economic benefits and turn it into a key player in the settlement of future conflicts. Among these maneuvers, we can highlight Russia's military campaign in Syria, as well as the establishment of relations with the Egyptian government, which has already given prior consent to the use by Russia of the Egyptian air bases. Moscow's policy in Afghanistan is a continuation of this strategy, and it is not limited to ensuring stability on the ground. Russia creates its own network of contacts and means to protect Russian interests in the event of the collapse of the central government [3]. It also seeks to strengthen its position as an influential player in the region and to consolidate its reputation as an integral participant in the resolution of any global crisis.
Russia's activities in Afghanistan include business investment proposals, a diplomatic campaign, cultural programs and financial and military support for the central government, powerful forces in the North and the Taliban. Since 2016, Russia has provided the Afghan government with tens of thousands of Kalashnikov rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition. In implementing this strategy, Russia has a number of advantages over the United States. Many Russian officers, security personnel and diplomats have experience in Afghanistan that they have gained during the Soviet-Afghan war. A significant proportion of Afghan officials and military officers have been educated or trained in Russia. And the Russian government, which does not bind itself to specific values or ideology, can freely make alliances with any group that seems the most influential to it.
This flexibility allowed Russia to work with the Taliban. The Kremlin believes that this group seeks to gain control over the territories inside Afghanistan and therefore is a threat only to the Afghan government, without posing any threat outside the country. In this sense, it is very different from ISIS (a terrorist group banned in Russia), elements of which operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan and which Moscow considers a transnational group posing a threat to Central Asia and Russia.
The amount of assistance provided by Russia to the Taliban remains unknown. However, the main thing here is that Moscow has managed to establish relations with the Taliban leadership that allowed it to increase its influence and become a party to the peace talks. In November, Mohammad Atmar, national security adviser to the Afghan government, announced that talks between Moscow and the Taliban have a “significant role” [6].
Moscow has already made several attempts to contribute to the diplomatic solution of the problems. From December 2016 to April 2017, Russia held three rounds of talks with the participation of China, Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan also took part in the third round. In October 2018, Russia hosted a meeting of the contact group of the Shanghai cooperation organization on Afghanistan, which was attended by representatives of member countries, including India and Pakistan, as well as representatives of the Afghan government. Although these discussions did not bring any concrete results, Russia has achieved its main goal: it has managed to position itself as a key participant in the negotiations [4].
Moscow has also made great efforts to establish bilateral relations with other countries in the region. In 2016, Russia and Pakistan conducted their first joint military exercises and signed an agreement for Pakistan to purchase Russian Mi-35 combat helicopters. Moscow is cooperating with Iran, which is its ally in Syria, to strengthen its contacts inside Afghanistan and relations with the Taliban. Moscow's authority as a key player in Afghanistan will strengthen the confidence of its Central Asian allies in Russia's ability to ensure their security through the influence of China's trade and investment in the region.
Russia's strategy in Afghanistan includes a number of elements that are present in its successful Syrian strategy. In both countries, Russia took advantage of the weakening US position. Having held talks in Afghanistan, as it has done with the participants in the Syrian conflict, it has consolidated its role as a party to any future agreement. Moscow will be able to guarantee its influence in the long term and force the US to reconsider its role in the country. In Syria, Russia has achieved this with the help of military force, and in Afghanistan, it uses relations with the key political players, as well as its influence in the sphere of business and culture.
Afghanistan is now in such a deplorable state that Russia and the United States have plenty of reasons to cooperate. It is necessary to destroy terrorist groups, it is necessary to prepare and arm the national army, to restore the economy and infrastructure and to provide humanitarian assistance. Both Russia and the US are seeking to eliminate the threat from ISIS, whose presence in the North and East of Afghanistan continues to grow. Russia wants to tackle the problem of drug production in the country: according to a 2017 study, approximately 25% of Afghan heroin flows through Central Asia to Russia and Europe, and drug trafficking is an important source of income for the terrorist groups in Afghanistan. However, the gap between the strategies of Russia and the United States continues to grow: today the need to solve only the most serious problems – terrorism and drugs – can serve as the basis for their cooperation. Countries are able to cooperate at the tactical level – for example, to exchange data on the whereabouts of terrorists or other similar information [5].
Russia's actions in Afghanistan often run counter to American interests. Moscow's increasingly active position has given Afghan groups the opportunity to push external players against each other. This will only increase internal rivalry at a time when the stability of the country depends on the strengthening of the central government. Russia's interaction with the Taliban has given strength to this group, which has done a great deal to prevent the central government from consolidating its power. Acting in this way, Moscow hopes to simultaneously achieve two main goals: to liberate Afghanistan from terrorists that could threaten Russia and its neighbors, and to take advantage of the US retreat to secure the status of an influential world power.
REFERENCES:
1. Afghanistan: Poverty and Inequality // Site Resources / World Bank // http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-1328913542665/8436738- 1340096876009/StatPlanet.html.
2. Aidamirov А.М. Afganskiy konflikt obretayet mezhdunarodnyye masshtaby [The Afghan conflict is gaining international dimensions] // Scientific and analytical journal “Obosrevatel – Observer”. 2010. No. 2 (241) (In Russ.).
3. Kremenyuk V.А. Rossiya i SSHA vestnik posle Afganistana: sotrudnichestvo i/ili moskva sopernichestvo? [Russia and the U.S. after Afghanistan: cooperation and/or rivalry?] // USA and Canada: economy, politics, culture. 2017. No. 1 (517) (In Russ.).
4. Luzin P.А. Politika SSHA v Afganistane v kontekste vliyaniya transformatsii regional'noy tesno sistemy balansa sil [U.S. policy in Afghanistan in the context of the transformation of the regional system of balance of power] // Bulletin of Perm University. Series: History, 2015. No. 1 (28) (In Russ.).
5. Safranchuck I.А. Detsentralizatsiya okazat' Afganistana i «novyy severnyy al'yans» [Decentralization of Afghanistan and the new Northern Alliance] // Information wars. 2017. No. 3 (39) (In Russ.).
6. The Taliban // Mapping Militant Organizations / Stanford University. 28 November 2012 // http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/367.
FREDDIE AGONNODE Democracy at the Service of Foreign Policy of the Republic of South Africa
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.32.2.013
FREDDIE AGONNODE Post-graduate student, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia
DEMOCRACY AT THE SERVICE OF FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
The article examines the place and role of democracy and human rights in South Africa's foreign policy. The author analyzes the process of South Africa's foreign policy change after the fall of the apartheid regime and transition to democracy. He gives characteristics of the foreign policy under different presidents of South Africa from 1994 to 2018 and analyzes the political activities of South Africa in the area of peacekeeping and human rights on the African continent.
Key words: apartheid, foreign policy, democracy, human rights, African National Congress, South Africa, BRICS.
South African foreign policy was developed at the democratic stage under different presidents from Nelson Mandela to Jacob Zuma. South Africa has its specific features due to its unusual history. The country had experienced a number of racial conflicts for various reasons, in particular the redistribution of access to the mineral resources. After apartheid was declared national policy in 1948 South Africa was completely isolated in the international arena. Then, the national liberation struggle unfolded inside the country under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), established on January 8, 1912. The collapse of the apartheid regime was a turning point in South Africa's history. The ANC won the first general race-free elections. After the ANC came to power, the political leadership of the "new South Africa" set itself the task of changing the country's foreign policy.
The change in South Africa's foreign policy is associated with the redefinition of its role on the African continent and in the community of Nations. Since 1994, the date of the country's reintegration into the international community, South Africa, with its status as a regional power, has found itself in a changed international political, economic and social context, it faced with new regional responsibilities and the need to build a new foreign policy in which Africa holds a special place. Six points formed the basis of the new foreign policy of Pretoria: human rights, freedom and democracy, justice and respect for international law among nations, peace and internationally agreed mechanisms for the conflict resolution, the protection of Africa's interests in world affairs and the expansion of economic cooperation at both the regional and international levels [10].
Under Nelson Mandela's presidency, the country's foreign policy was guided by universal and moral principles. Since that period, the foreign policy of South Africa can be described as broadly progressive in its expression, it includes: the obligation to solve global problems (such as climate change, poverty, low level of development, the main problems in the field of health and promotion of human rights), compliance with international law and respect for international legal obligations [15]. In these two positions, it is important to note that since 1994 South Africa has been actively involved in international affairs and has made a significant contribution to various multilateral processes aimed at resolving the above problems. In addition, South Africa has taken its international obligations seriously during its foreign policy period.
The new foreign policy of South Africa has formulated a grand vision of a harmonious world and its concept is strongly influenced by what can be described as a “liberal-democratic-egalitarian structure”. Since 1994, the South African government has intended to strengthen democracy and social stability in the country, actively support the principles of democracy and respect for human rights on the African continent and in the world and promote the idea of multilateralism.
Thus, South Africa's foreign policy has changed significantly since the transition to democracy. The country's leadership defended the ideals of freedom. The political documents adopted at that time, including the Interim Constitution of 1993, focused on issues related to human rights and the struggle for peace. From 1994 to the present day, democracy and human rights have played an important role in the foreign policy concept of the ANC and, consequently, in the foreign policy of South Africa itself. The main ANC document on foreign policy of 1994 focuses on the role of democracy in the country's foreign policy. At the same time, the ANC notes that the country's foreign policy belongs to the people of South Africa. According to the leaders of the ANC, democratic South Africa will actively contribute to the achievement of democracy, peace, stability, development and mutually beneficial relations among the peoples of Africa as a whole, promote and develop pan-African solidarity: “Despite our own limitations and challenges, our goal is to make a significant contribution to peace, democracy, respect for human rights and sustainable development. These principles are fundamental to our foreign policy [4]”. The new Constitution of South Africa of December 4, 1996 clearly reflects these principles [8]. Based on this, it should be concluded that democracy is understood as an important component of South Africa's foreign policy, and the contribution of the ANC to the inclusion of human rights and democracy in foreign policy is significant. It would be quite paradoxical if the ANC, which pursued a policy of human rights within the country, would ignore it in foreign policy.
Thus, under the Mandela administration (1994-1999), South Africa explicitly acted as a defender of human rights and democracy in Africa and beyond. As a “regional hegemon,” South Africa intends to promote these values on the African continent. This was supported by the general optimism associated with the country's transition to democracy and went well with the liberal foreign policy focused on the example of Europe and America. In his article written for Foreign Affairs in 1993, Nelson Mandela, then ANC leader and future President, outlined his vision of ANC foreign policy in “South Africa after apartheid.” His far-sighted message read: “Human rights issues are at the heart of international relations and go beyond politics to encompass the economic, social and environmental spheres; just and lasting solutions to the problems of humanity can come only through the promotion of democracy in the world; considerations of justice and respect for international law should determine relations between nations; peace is a goal to which all countries must aspire and, when that fails, mechanisms based on international consensus and non-violence must be developed ... The concerns and interests of the African continent should be reflected in all possible representations of South Africa's foreign policy ... [6]”.
During Thabo Mbeki's presidency (1999-2008), South Africa's foreign policy aspirations were focused on the African continent and manifested as public administration initiatives. Mbeki was one of the few African leaders who worked actively and effectively for the development of the continent. In addition, during his presidency, he opposed the model of the world order, which he considered outdated [12. P. 107-120]. In all respects, Thabo Mbeki was an idealist, but one of the obvious weaknesses of his idealism was that he overlooked human rights issues, especially the rights of Africans, who had suffered from dictators. It is important to note that it was during the reign of Mbeki that the idealism of the Mandela era faced problems of African solidarity, as evidenced by Mbeki's “quiet diplomacy” towards Zimbabwe headed by Robert Mugabe. Stefan Chen notes that in Mbeki's relations with Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, it seemed that South Africa's President had always postponed his decisions on human rights issues in Zimbabwe to a later period [3. P. 215-216]. Mbeki's relations with Mugabe were negatively assessed in the Western world. There, South Africa was perceived as a country that placed African solidarity above the principles of democracy and human rights. Thus, the credibility of the President of South Africa as a mediator in the tense relations between the political party ZANU PF, headed by Mugabe, and the Movement for Democratic Change, led by Morgan Zwangirai, was questioned and subjected to close scrutiny by its observers [9]. It should be concluded that, under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki South Africa clearly did not protect the rights of Africans on the continent in its foreign policy, giving priority to the African solidarity over the claims of freedom in some countries. Issues of democracy and human rights simply retreated to a less significant place in accordance with the foreign policy vision of the government of Thabo Mbeki. Based on this, it becomes obvious that the foreign policy of presidents Mandela and Mbeki differed significantly. For example, Mandela strongly opposed human rights violations by the government of Sani Abachi in Nigeria in 1995, while Mbeki chose to remain silent about similar events in Zimbabwe.
South Africa has played a crucial role in the political processes at the continental level. These include the creation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the promotion of the African Renaissance, and the transformation of the Organization of the African Union (OAU) into the African Union (AU), strengthening regional integration through the development of SADC (Southern African Development Community), peacekeeping interventions on the continent. South Africa's programme of engagement with these organizations, particularly the African Union, emphasizes the building of peace, democracy and human rights. At the policy briefing by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Alfredo Zurima Xengari suggested that with the establishment of the African Union in 2002, possibilities have arisen for an ambitious agenda in the area of democracy and human rights in the framework of the foreign and continental policy of the African countries. According to the author's recommendations, the small African states that have succeeded in protecting human rights should adopt diplomacy and external identity that promote democratic norms. And the African Union itself must develop a global partnership with the civil society and countries that have succeeded in democracy and the protection of human rights [11]. This is the only way for the Organization to maintain the trust of internal and external partners. With regard to the role of individual countries in the work of the AU, it is important to note that major powers such as South Africa, even in times of internal crisis, must advocate an agenda of human rights, democracy and good governance. By 2063, “Africa is expected to have a universal culture of good governance that reflects democratic values, gender equality, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law [1]”.
However, South Africa was not always successful in the field of peacekeeping, promotion of democracy and human rights on the continent. For example, in the 1990s, South Africa failed to persuade the governments of Angola, Mozambique and Congo to reconsider their military approach to the rebel movements in favour of a negotiated settlement and the establishment of a government of national unity. The South African government also failed to prevent the involvement of some of its SADC partners in the DRC war. But, these clearly disappointing results can be countered by the success in other cases. For example, in 1998, under the auspices of SADC and at the request of the government of Lesotho, South Africa, together with Botswana, carried out military intervention in the country, which was on the verge of a war. With the assistance of Botswana and South Africa, the situation in the country has been stabilized and political negotiations on a new Constitution and a new electoral system have begun [5]. As mandated by the African Union, South Africa has also taken a number of diplomatic steps in the Comoros, where there was a threat of a coup d'état. South Africa's intervention has contributed to the creation of a new political order and the achievement of relative stability. In 2002, during the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, the leadership of the African Union entrusted Thabo Mbeki with the role of mediator. In April 2005, following a meeting of the then President of South Africa with key political leaders of Côte d'Ivoire, significant progress was made on the country's security, elections and ongoing consultations, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the rebels into the national army. Finally, the best example of the implementation of the soft power policy by the government of South Africa is its involvement in the settlement of the conflict in Southern Sudan. Committee, appointed by the African Union to chair the Sudan reconstruction, the South African government has concluded that one of the key factors for a successful transition to peace in Sudan would be the ability of the Sudan people's liberation movement to govern the South following the peace agreement signed on 9 January 2005. In October 2018, the Deputy President of South Africa David Mabuza arrived in the Republic of Sudan as special envoy of the President Cyril Ramaphosa. At a meeting with local leaders, Mabuza said that “South Africa will continue to support South Sudan and will share its experience gained as a result of South Africa's transition to democracy [14]”.
In 2009, President Jacob Zuma opened a new phase of foreign policy in which South Africa increasingly embraced South-South cooperation and consolidated the African agenda. In this policy, economic diplomacy with rapidly developing countries is becoming increasingly valuable [7]. Thus, in 2010, South Africa's membership in BRICS became a reality. South Africa's accession to BRICS is undoubtedly regarded as an important achievement of the foreign policy of the Zuma administration. It should be noted that the attractiveness of South Africa as an ideal starting point of influence on the entire continent, or a “gateway to the continent,” as well as the need to include an African representative in the BRIC group made China to lobby for the inclusion of South Africa in this organization. In addition, joining BRIC has provided South Africa with a solid platform for success in two important areas: the establishment of South Africa as a regional leader of Tropical Africa and the ability to demand and take action to address global issues within the framework of the work of some international multilateral organizations, such as the UN or the IMF. In addition to the economic factor, and the role of the regional leader of South Africa, it is important to note that the “political quality” of the country as an example of democracy and political stability on the African continent played a role for its adoption in BRICS. If this factor was unimportant, the BRIC group could consider other African economic giants such as Nigeria or Egypt as a partner. However, the situation of stability and human rights in these countries is not yet satisfactory.
Promotion of democratic norms by the government of South Africa on the African continent has significantly improved the country's image in the world. South Africa is a member of the open Government Partnership, whose goals are in a sense complementary to the struggle for the rights of man and citizen, and democracy in general. Today, more than 20 years after gaining freedom and democracy, the goals and objectives of South Africa's foreign policy have not changed, but the conditions in which this policy is implemented have changed [2]. Understanding the trends in the development of South Africa's foreign policy requires considering the process of implementing the tasks through the prism of the country's activity in international organizations.
Overall, South Africa's transition to democracy was a turning point in the country's political history. Since then, a new foreign policy has been defined, in which democracy and human rights have taken a fundamental place. Despite the internal political difficulties that South Africa has faced in the process of its development, the country adheres to the ideals of democracy and human rights, which are certainly instruments of its foreign policy. It should be concluded that the success of African countries in the area of democracy and human rights depends largely on them, as well as on the policies of the continent's leading states, such as South Africa, which should not weaken attention to human rights and democracy issues. South Africa must strengthen the ideals on which its peoples ' struggle for freedom was based.
REFERENCES:
1. AGENDA 2063. THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION. 2015 // http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf.
2. Archangelskaya А.А. YUAR: 20 let spustya. Itogi, vyvody, perspektivy South Africa: 20 years later. Outcomes, conclusions, perspectives // Asia and Africa today. 2014. No. 4 (In Russ.).
3. Chan S. Southern Africa: Old Treacheries and New Deceits. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011.
4. Foreign Policy for South Africa: Discussion document // https://www.gov.za/documents/foreign-policy-south-africa-discussion-document.
5. Garth le Père. «L'action diplomatique sud-africaine pour la paix en Afrique». Transcontinentales. 2006 // http://journals.openedition.org/transcontinentales/395.
6. L’Afrique des idées. La politique étrangère de l’Afrique du Sud: entre idéalisme et realpolitik. Rubrique Analyse Politique – Le 04 juillet 2013 // http://www.lafriquedesidees.org/la-politique-etrangere-de-lafrique-du-sud-entre-idealisme-et-realpolitik/.
7. Landsberg C. The foreign policy of the Zuma government: pursuing the national interest? South African Journal of International Affairs. 2010. № 17 (3).
8. Mulaudzi C. The politics of regionalism in Southern Africa, Institute for Global Dialogue, Occasional Paper 51. April, 2006.
9. New York Times. Lost letter raises questions about Mbeki's role in Zimbabwe. 9 June 2008 // http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/09/world/africa/09zimbabwe.html?_r=0.
10. Rob DAVIES. South African Foreign Policy Options in a Changing Global Context, Centre for Southern African Studies. Bellville, 1995.
11. SAIIA Policy Briefing 148. April 2016 // http://www.saiia.org.za/research/the-foreign-policies-of-african-states-in-the-age-of-democracy-and-human-rights/.
12. Sidiropoulos E. South African foreign policy in the post-Mbeki period. South African Journal of International Affairs. 2008. № 15 (2).
13. Site SAHO About South African History Online. Electronic resource // https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-national-congress-anc.
14. South African Government News Agency // https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/mabuza-affirms-sas-support-south-sudan-peace-talks.
15. Spence J. South Africa's foreign policy: Vision and reality. In Sidiropoulos E. (ed.) South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004. Braamfontein: SAIIA.
JU ORLINDU African Direction in the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.32.2.012
JU ORLINDU Post-graduate student working for the Master’s Degree at the Chair of theory and history of international relations, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Guinea-Bissau
AFRICAN DIRECTION IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
In his article, the author attempts to scientifically analyze and understand the problems of cooperation between Russia and the countries of the African continent in the diplomatic, economic, trade, ideological and other areas of cooperation. The construction of relations between the USSR and the countries of the African continent began after the end of the WW2 and was caused, first of all, by the need to find allies in various parts of the planet. In the postwar years and until 1990, cooperation developed most actively, in several directions at once. Specialists from the USSR were engaged in the training of the local people, building of factories and the economy as a whole, social security and resolution of the regional disputes, etc. But, unfortunately, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and to the present day, cooperation has not been restored to the previous level, primarily due to the fact that the vacant niches were occupied by the Western countries.
Key words: African countries, USSR, Russian Federation, education, cooperation, economy, ideology.
Until the mid-1950s, Africa occupied no place in the USSR foreign affairs agenda. First of all, this was due to the fact that previously the Soviet Union was engaged in the post-war reconstruction of the country, the development of the nuclear project and other defense projects, which significantly limited its financial and other resources. In addition, until the 50s, many African countries remained colonies.
The growing cold war between the USSR and the USA, the two major powers, forced the Soviet Union to expand its spheres of influence primarily due to the need to have allies in different parts of the world, as well as to spread its own ideology in different regions of the world [1].
The destruction of the colonial system in Africa was considered by the USSR as a transformation of these countries from colonies into a vulnerable place of the world imperialism. In the 1950s, this trend forced the USSR leadership to deploy national liberation movements in the African countries and turn them into a part of the world revolutionary process. The leaders of these countries were perceived by the leadership of the USSR as allies in the struggle against imperialism, regardless of their political orientation and attitude to the Marxist-Leninist ideology.
K. Nkrumah wrote that “the Soviet Union supports the independence of African countries by virtue of the very nature of its state and constitution.”
It was very logical, since the USSR had no colonial past and its constituting republics, first of all, the Central Asian republics were its full members and in fact were in many ways subsidized from Moscow. The USSR pursued in its Asian republics a policy of industrialization, built enterprises, schools and hospitals, and engaged in the development of these territories and their unification into a single industrial complex of the Soviet state [3. P. 54-69].
Western countries, on the contrary, largely pursued a policy of genocide in the colonies that belonged to them, engaged in blatant robbery, organized internecine wars, took out available resources, etc. In addition, the people of Africa remembered the slave trade, when people were loaded into ships and transported to the metropolises as a free labor force, kept in inhuman conditions.
In view of the above factors, cooperation and interaction with the USSR seemed to many of them to be a logical choice on the road to freedom, democracy and industrial development of their countries with the help of powerful technological support and assistance from the USSR. The leaders of the Soviet state were opponents of neocolonialism.
The USSR did not seek any special privileges or rights in African countries or in other parts of the world, did not claim the wealth of the African countries and did not attempt to appropriate the minerals or hydrocarbons, which were later found and developed in such countries as Egypt, Sudan, Angola and others. That is why the policy of the Soviet Union met with complete understanding and response from the local population, as well as from many government leaders.
The rapid post-war economic growth of the USSR, as well as the socio-economic basis that was laid by the leaders of the Soviet state at home have become very attractive for the African countries, that have just gained independence from their metropolises.
Consequently, the USSR declared that its main slogan in Africa was anti-imperialist direction based on decolonization, as well as the need to recognize the rights of African peoples to national liberation and their struggle against the fascist aggression, carried out in the 30s of XX century. The main factor in the formation of the liberation movements in African countries was the end of the Second World War and the defeat of the fascist Germany by the USSR by. This led to a sharp weakening of the “imperialist forces” on the African continent [4. P. 37-43].
After the establishment of the United Nations - the UN, at the initiative of the USSR, the foreign affairs agencies from the UN tribunes lobbied the draft UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. To this end, for the development of the Declaration, a Committee of Ten was established, comprising India, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Iraq, Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic (UAR), Morocco and Ethiopia.
The position of the USSR and its intransigence with colonialism had a significant impact on the position of “neutral countries.” This served as a powerful incentive for African leaders to reject the original draft resolution, which contained only the general principles of decolonization, without any substantial specifics. On November 28, 1960, the leaders of African countries introduced for the UN discussion a more radical draft declaration on the independence of colonial countries and peoples, which, by its principles and essence was very close to a similar project proposed by the USSR. As a result of the vote, the project proposed by the Afro-Asian side was adopted without specifying dates for granting independence.
The USSR was building its policy in Africa on the principle of equality, both in the political and in the socio-economic spheres. The Soviet Union opposed the attempts of the imperialist countries to transform the African continent into a region of military-political confrontation. The USSR proclaimed the principles of the absence of racism, fight against backwardness, poverty and apartheid on the continent. It was also declared that the imperialist countries were trying to justify the killing of Africans by the struggle with the Soviet Union [5. P. 157-186].
The year 1960 went down in history as the “Year of Africa”, because in that year 17 independent states appeared on the world map. But the “cold war” imposed by the countries of the West and, above all, the USA, left its imprint on the cooperation with the newly formed states.
The split of the world community into two opposing camps forced the leadership of the USSR and the USA to build not only defense policy inside their countries, but also to acquire as many allies as possible all over the planet. It can be concluded that the interaction with the African countries was built primarily on an allianment basis. The USSR developed long-term programs of interaction with the African countries and formed the necessary regulatory framework.
The USSR established cultural and scientific cooperation with the countries of Africa and provided for the exchange of experience in the field of science and technology, interaction between scientists, students, researchers, specialists, etc. Under the programs of scientific exchange, African scientists were invited to improve their skills at the Soviet research centers. Substantial assistance was given in the preparation of students, contacts were established between research libraries and other research institutions, there was mutual recognition of diplomas of higher educational, scientific degrees, etc. [6].
After some time, such cooperation became an integrated and streamlined mechanism based on the development of appropriate programs and regulatory support. This led to the mutual understanding between peoples and the development of cultural interaction, which allowed to reduce internal tensions between African countries, a remnant of the colonial past.
In those historical conditions, there was an urgent need to train qualified specialists in all branches of scientific knowledge, with which educational programs and universities of the USSR successfully coped, taking African students to study, and also sending their teachers to various countries to work there.
The Soviet representatives also actively studied in African countries. First of all, they studied local history, languages, mentality, peculiarities of the past political system, traditions and customs, culture, etc. It was necessary, first of all, to help specialists from the Soviet Union to adapt favorably in the local environment and level out possible misunderstandings and conflicts with the local population [9. P. 613-622].
At that time, such branch as “Soviet African studies” was developed, which is still one of the important components of modern historical science. African studies examines the issues associated with the peculiarities of the socio-economic development of the African countries, specifics of their political organization, the consequences of colonialism, the formation of national policies, etc. Soviet specialists obtained an invaluable experience of cooperation and interaction, which can be used at present.
The Soviet Union had a significant influence on the formation of the modern intelligentsia in African countries, who were supposed to be supporters of socialist ideology in these territories. These people received a really high-quality Soviet education, allowing them to bring benefits to their homeland. Many of those students still have fond memories of the USSR, retaining them throughout their lives.
From 1957 to 1990, the USSR helped to train more than 400,000 qualified specialists from African countries. 15 African countries received significant assistance in building their own educational systems, as well as in the direct construction of secondary special and higher educational institutions [11].
Thus, it can be said that the USSR made a decisive contribution to the development of the African countries, primarily by defeating fascist Germany, which made it possible to remove the shackles of colonialism.
Later, until 1990, the policy of the USSR towards African states was, by and large, stable, but during the period of perestroika and further on, from the moment of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation began to change dramatically. In the first half of the 90s, there was a collapse of relations with African states. The Russian Federation not only withdrew its troops from the GDR, but also left the countries with which it was connected by the warmest friendly relations that had previously been the scene of confrontation between the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA.
Curtailing interests around the world was presented as a lack of further need for confrontation with the United States and Western countries. With the destruction of the USSR, the leadership of Russia pinned hopes on the fact that the new Russia will join the world capitalist community on the principles of equal membership and mutually beneficial cooperation. But in reality, everything turned out differently. NATO began an active policy of moving eastward, right up to the borders of Russia, as well as destabilizing the political situation in the North Caucasus.
In the new realities, the main task of the country's leadership was to prevent the “parade of sovereignties” and the break of Russia as a patchwork quilt to smaller states, contrary to the policies of many “appanage princes" eager to separate their territories from Russia, as the sole owners. This might have led to the final elimination of the Russian statehood and the establishment of a unipolar world.
The countries of Africa took the collapse of the USSR extremely negatively. First of all because they had lost a single center that ensured peace, tranquility and prosperity in their land. In addition, African countries were losing a source of material and military-political assistance. Moreover, many were worried about a return to the colonial past, since it was the position of the USSR that allowed African states to free themselves from colonialism.
The withdrawal of the USSR from Africa also caused certain concerns among African government leaders about the policies of the United States and Western countries regarding their countries. And the result was not long in coming. With the tacit consent of the United States, France and Belgium provoked the genocide in Rwanda, during which from April 8 to July 14, 1994, about a million inhabitants were killed. The Belgian military planned the Hutu tribal aggression against the Tutsi tribe by inciting propaganda through the media, and also provided military and political support for the mass genocide.
The Belgium and the United Nations military left Rwanda at the height of the genocide leaving the warring tribes alone. The United States and the United Nations have chosen not to intervene in this situation. As a result of this bloodshed, at least 10,000 people died daily. After that, Rwanda for a long time plunged into chaos and destruction. Massive diseases, the HIV epidemic, etc., have left a long lasting mark on Rwanda’s history and have set back its development for several decades.
Of course, if the USSR were present on the continent and had the same influence, there could be no act of such a genocide. In connection with the above, it can be concluded that the withdrawal of the USSR from Africa turned into a tragedy for many states almost immediately in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet state.
After analyzing the 1993 foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation it can be concluded that the country's leadership was not interested in preserving and further developing relations with African states. Africa was in the ninth place out of ten in the list of interests of the Russian Federation on the world stage.
That document stated that it was necessary to develop relations with those African countries that may be sales markets for the Russian products and those that may become its suppliers of raw materials. Nothing was said about the former ideological, socio-economic or political cooperation. The foreign policy strategy has changed radically, the ideological component was not to be extended to any other country, but it was also prohibited within the Russian Federation, as is clear from its main law, the Constitution [7. P. 14-37].
The main principles of the new Russia’s foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR with regard to the African states were as follows:
– strengthening the security of the Russian Federation;
– ensuring the earliest transition of the Russian Federation to a market economy, through the development of trade relations with African countries;
– successful integration of the Russian Federation into the world community, including the development of cooperation with African countries;
– readiness of the Russian Federation to maintain stability at the global level, preventing and resolving both internal and external conflicts.
In fact, there has been a shift in the vector of interaction with the countries of the West and the United States in the ideological, political, trade and economic spheres. As a result, the countries of the West and the United States received significant levers of influence on the countries of Africa, which previously carried out close cooperation with the USSR.
Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war and the arms race, there was no need to spend huge sums on military budgets. And the countries of Africa hoped that in view of this, even greater funds would be allocated for their development. However, this did not happen, since the reduction of the military budget occurred only in the new Russia and the former Soviet republics. The United States did not reduce its military budget and only increased it in all the following years [8. P. 8-25].
But the countries of the West and the USA, nevertheless, changed their attitude towards some African countries. Many regimes that were considered authoritarian were burdensome in the new realities and the ideals of democracy declared by the Western countries were contrary to the political attitudes of the authoritarian African leaders. Therefore, due to the lack of inter-bloc confrontation, these regimes have lost their relevance and their financing has ceased to be justified. As a result, the leaders of authoritarian states were invited to join the democratization process, especially given that in many African states all the necessary conditions have already matured.
However, in the second half of the 90s, the leadership of the new Russia came to realize and understand the fact that a unipolar world poses a danger to all human development. The ruling elites have an understanding that the loss of allies around the world has led to the fact that Russia has lost its ability to influence the world situation.
The first direction on the path of reorientation to a multipolar world structure and its own national interests, different from the interests of the Western countries and the United States, was the 1994 Concept of Russian policy in Africa. That Concept emphasized that Russia was objectively interested in cooperation with African countries in the framework of joint strengthening of global security. The development of political contacts and interaction at various levels was envisaged to implement such strategy [10. P. 54-59].
In addition, the Concept encouraged cooperation of certain regions of the Russian Federation with the African continent. Various non-state forms of cooperation, such as the development of entrepreneurship and private business, received encouragement.
Further on, the Foreign Policy Concept adopted in the 2000s mentioned cooperation with the African countries on the periphery, ahead of only Latin American countries. Only a few sentences in the whole Concept were devoted to the cooperation with African countries, stressing the necessity to develop cooperation in the sphere of settling military conflicts, as well as connecting the Russian Federation to economic processes on the African continent.
The document also drew attention to the economic backwardness of the African continent, having large economic potential, rich in natural resources, it also pointed to the possibility of influencing the outcome of the UN vote when solving international issues.
The next concept of the Russian foreign policy was approved by decree of the President D.A. Medvedev on July 15, 2008. In it, Africa was still in the penultimate place, being ahead of only the countries of Latin America. The document noted that the Russian Federation and African countries need to develop cooperation in the settlement of regional conflicts, as well as developing political interaction in order to connect the Russian Federation withg the economic processes in the region.
The 2013 Concept of the Russian foreign policy puts Africa on the last place in the list of national foreign policy interests, even after the Latin American countries. The concept proposes to focus on “improving political dialogue and promoting mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation, the assistance to the settlement and prevention of regional conflicts and crisis situations in Africa. An important part of this direction is the development of partnership relations with the African Union and subregional organizations [2].”
Such foreign policy in respect of the African states has several causes. First, the leadership of the Russian Federation is fully aware that since the collapse of the USSR, more than 20 years ago, other countries, primarily the United States, the EU member states, China and others have long ago gained influence on the African continent. It is quite difficult for the Russian Federation in its present economic and political realities to push them off the African political arena. Secondly, the Russian Federation does not receive proposals on mutually beneficial cooperation from the African states.
But, in recent years, the government of the Russian Federation began to pay more and more attention to the African countries. There was a dialogue between the BRIC group and the Republic of South Africa. Russia is looking for new partners from the non-Western countries to develop mutually beneficial trade cooperation and is ready to allow products from certain African countries into its market. In 2009, when the President of the Russian Federation D.А. Medvedev toured Africa (Nigeria, Angola, Egypt and Namibia), he voiced the thesis that the cooperation with the African countries was overdue. The relations of the Russian Federation with many African states have not been interrupted since the collapse of the USSR and have decades of active interaction in various fields.
At present, the Russian Federation is attempting to regain its lost influence, if not in all, then at least in some African countries that was lost after the collapse of the USSR. First of all, this is cooperation in the development of important sectors of the economy in which the Russian Federation has a competitive advantage over leading world powers. For this end, debts of some African states, worth more than US$ 20 billion were written off.
The countries of Africa and the Russian Federation have objective prerequisites for the development of a multilateral cooperation. First of all, their positions on strengthening global security, expanding economic cooperation, providing humanitarian assistance and other issues coincide. The leaders of African countries realize that the modern world order should be multipolar and without an active participation of the Russian Federation the stability of the regional system in terms of economy and security will be incomplete.
Thus, it can be stated that in real geopolitical and economic realities the Russian Federation is building a foreign policy strategy in Africa with the account for historical and economic realities. The relationships on the continent have shifted from ideological confrontation to the mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields.
REFERENCES:
1. Aziya i Afrika v sovremennoy mirovoy politike. Sbornik statey / Otv. red. D.B. Malysheva, A.A. Rogozhin [Asia and Africa in modern world politics. Collection of articles / Edited by. D.B. Malysheva, A.A. Rogozhin]. M.: IMEMO RAN, 2012.
2. Afrika: okruzhayushchaya sreda i chelovek (narastaniye sotsio-ekologicheskogo krizisa) / Otv. red. i ruk. avtorskogo kollektiva V.I. Gusarov [Africa: the environment and the man (increase of socio-ecological crisis) / Executive editor and head of the group of authors V.I. Gusarov]. Moscow: Institute of African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013.
3. Bogaturov A.D. Tri pokoleniya vneshnepoliticheskikh doktrin Rossii [Three generations of foreign policy doctrines of Russia] // International processes. 2007. Vol. 5. No. 13.
4. Borisov I.S. Evolyutsiya vneshney politiki SSSR i RF na afrikanskom napravlenii v kontse 80-kh – nachale 90-kh godov // Novaya rol' Rossii v mire i Afrike (po materialam mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii na temu «Rossiya i novoye mezhdunarodnoye partnerstvo dlya Afriki», aprel' 1994 g.) [The evolution of the foreign policy of the USSR and the Russian Federation in the African direction in the late 80s - early 90s // New role of Russia in the world and Africa (according to the materials of the international conference "Russia and a new international partnership for Africa", April 1994)]. M.: In-t of Africa, 1995.
5. Vysotskaya N.I. Raspad SSSR i yego vliyaniye na Afriku // Novaya rol' Rossii v mire i Afrike (po materialam mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii na temu «Rossiya i novoye mezhdunarodnoye partnerstvo dlya Afriki», aprel' 1994 g.) [The collapse of the USSR and its impact on Africa // New role of Russia in the world and Africa (according to the materials of the international conference “Russia and a new international partnership for Africa”, April 1994)]. M.: In-t of Africa, 1995.
6. Gromyko An.A. Vneshnepoliticheskiy kurs Sovetskogo Soyuza i Afrika. Doklad na sovetsko-afrikanskoy nauchno-politicheskoy konferentsii «Za mir i sotsial'nyy progress». Moskva, 13-16 oktyabrya 1981 g. [Foreign policy of the Soviet Union and Africa. Report at the Soviet-African scientific and political conference “For peace and social progress.” Moscow, October 13-16, 1981]. M.: INION, 1981.
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9. Mazov S.V. Kvame Frensis Nvia Kofi Nkruma // Istoriya Afriki v biografiyakh / Pod obshch. red. A. Davidsona [Kwame Francis Nvia Kofi Nkrumah // The History of Africa in Biographies / Edited by A. Davidson]. M.: Russian State Humanities University, 2012.
10. Sokova Z.N. Byurokratiya Zapadnoy Afriki v postkolonial'nyy period: ideyno-politicheskiye oriyentatsii [West African bureaucracy in the postcolonial period: ideological and political orientations] // Bulletin of Tyumen State University. 2012. No. 2.
11. Shvedov A.A. Nezavisimaya Afrika: vneshnepoliticheskiye problemy, diplomaticheskaya bor'ba / Pod obshch. red. i s predisl. An.A. Gromyko [Independent Africa: foreign policy problems, diplomatic struggle / Edited by and with the foreword of An.A. Gromyko]. M.: Politizdat, 1983.
KONG DEKUN The Concept of Greater Eurasian Partnership and “One Belt and One Road” Initiative
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.32.2.011
KONG DEKUN Post-graduate student at the Chair of political sciences of the Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russiа
THE CONCEPT OF GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND “ONE BELT AND ONE ROAD”INITIATIVE
Today, the world is in the midst of a tremendous change. The concept of the “Great Eurasian Partnership” is an attempt by Russia to go beyond the framework of traditional foreign policy thinking focused on the USA and the West, the result of a breakthrough, as well as a diplomatic direction, a strategy of economic development in the new conditions. Connecting the concept with the initiative of international cooperation “One Belt and One Road” is one of the key factors for its implementation.
Key words: “Great Eurasian Partnership”, “One Belt and One Road”, conjugation of strategies, Sino-Russian relations.
Today the world is in the midst of colossal changes: the rise of China, the recovering economy of Russia, the depletion of the potential of the liberal model of development of the West, the imbalance and inequality in development. All this leads to the establishment of relations between the major powers and the reorganization of the world order. Developed countries need new and more favorable rules for themselves, since the old global economic rules can no longer meet the needs of developed countries.The globalization participants demand a fairer and more rational trade order and are actively involved in creating a new global economic order. Competition between developed countries, the United States and Europe, as well as new powers, such as China and Russia, are inevitable. Countries and regions have their own plans for responding to the current situation. The concept of the “Great Eurasian Partnership” and “One Belt and One Road” are the initiatives of international cooperation proposed by Russia and China to respond to changes in the international economic situation in the new environment.
The works of Russian and foreign authors [1; 4; 10], published in recent years, cover a wide range of issues in this subject area.
1.1. The initiative “One Belt and One Road”: the China concept of international cooperation.
In September – October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the “One Belt and One Road” International Cooperation Initiative. In recent years, this initiative has been adopted and supported by an increasing number of countries and international organizations. The initiative of international cooperation “One Belt and One Road” has different internal meanings not only for China, but also for international partners.
The “One Belt and One Road” Initiative is very important for China. China's reform and opening up policy has entered a new era, it is necessary to promote economic and social development with new methods. In addition, it is necessary to coordinate economic, political, cultural, social and eco-civilizational construction. Firstly, “One Belt and One Road” based on openness refers to the economic and social development of the country and the region. From the point of view of the world economy, the concept is based on the country and regions and is aimed at the resolution of social and economic problems. Secondly, after 40 years of reform and opening up, China’s economy is largely integrated into the global and regional economies, rapprochement with the global economy has been achieved, synchronous development with the regional economies and synergetic development became the main principle [9].
For the world community, “The Belt and One Road” is an initiative of international cooperation released by China. The main starting point is promotion of regional economic development by strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries and regions in the areas of construction of infrastructure, production capacities, progressive facilitation of trade and creation of development opportunities and conditions for China and its partners. The main principle of cooperation is mutual benefit, common development and common prosperity. The main method of implementing joint projects is joint consultations, joint construction and joint use.
To this end, it is necessary to strengthen political communication between the governments and close contacts between people. It is worth noting that the Chinese government, standing up for the joint construction of the “One Belt and One Road,” fully takes into account the interests of its partners and does not pursue maximization of personal interests, striving for mutual benefit. China does not unilaterally sell goods and production facilities to its partners by building “Belt and Road,” but is seeking a bilateral campaign to sell Chinese goods, technologies and capital to foreign countries, moreover, it welcomes and creates conditions for attracting foreign capital, technologies, goods and services to China. China is ready to share its development experience with the countries of the world, but will not interfere in their public affairs, will not export social systems or development models, will not impose them on others. We will promote the construction of “One Belt and One Road,” thus we will not repeat the old strategies. In this regard, “The Belt and the Road” initiative is understood, accepted and supported by an increasing number of countries, the number of participants is increasing daily.
1. The concept of the “Great Eurasian Partnership” is a new strategy for responding to the global change in Russia.
The October Revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union were two greatest events of the 20th century. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused fundamental changes in the geopolitical situation in the world.
A prerequisite for the revival of Russia is the implementation of integration in the post-Soviet space. After many difficulties, in 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union received an official launch and achieved concrete results in the process of implementing the integration of the post-Soviet space. The world economic environment is difficult to imagine without the development of Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union within the framework of economic globalization. The developed countries stand for the development of new economic rules that are beneficial for them, but Russia is excluded from the list of drafters. As a former power, Russia cannot accept the reality of such exclusion.
A large Eurasian partnership is an important concept of cooperation put forward by Russia in the new situation, which can be called a joint initiative. This concept was first proposed by a Russian scientist Sergey Karaganov in an interview published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta under the title “Chinese wind blows into our sails” on May 31, 2015 [3]. Karaganov made it clear that China and Russia are creating a new community – Greater Eurasia, in order to define a new type of partnership between China and Russia and interpret the content of Greater Eurasia. This bold idea did not attract the attention of the scientific community at the beginning, because for Russia the most important thing is to realize an economic integration of the post-Soviet space. The so-called post-Soviet space, often called the Eurasia, can only be “Eurasia in the narrow sense.”
In December 2015, in his message on the situation in the country, President Vladimir Putin noted: “I propose, together with colleagues from the Eurasian Economic Union, to begin consultations with the members of the SCO and ASEAN, as well as with the states that join the SCO, on the formation of a possible economic partnership [5]. In May 2016, during the meeting of the heads of the delegations participating in the Russia-ASEAN summit, Vladimir Putin said: “it is necessary to create in perspective a common free trade zone between the Eurasian Union and ASEAN as a whole.” Another promising area of regional economic integration could be the conjunction of the Eurasian Economic Union, the ASEAN Community, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Silk Road Economic Belt [8]. Also the Sochi Declaration, signed at the same time, clearly stated: “Consider the possibility of mutually beneficial cooperation between ASEAN, the EAEU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)” and “the prospects for creating a comprehensive free trade zone between the EAEU and ASEAN [6]”.
If the successful activity of the Eurasian Economic Union, headed by Russia, opens up the process of Euro-Asian integration, the proposal to create a relationship of a large Eurasian partnership indicates that the Russian economic and diplomatic strategy to “turn to the East” has already been formed. It should be noted that the so-called “turn to the East” is not just a turn to China, Japan and South Korea, it focuses on the entire Asia-Pacific region and focuses on cooperation with China, ASEAN countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member countries. Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union are jointly developing cooperation with countries and regions of the Asia-Pacific region.
2. Chinese-Russian cooperation aimed at conjunction goes to a new economic partnership.
It was China that was the first to respond to the Russian initiative “The Great Eurasian Partnership.” The Joint Statement [7] noted: “Russia and China are in favor of creating a Eurasian comprehensive partnership based on the principles of openness, transparency and consideration of mutual interests, including the possible involvement of the member countries of the EAEU, SCO and ASEAN. In this regard, the heads of state instructed the governments of the two countries to work through the competent agencies and propose measures to implement this initiative in order to facilitate the deepening of integration processes in the region”.
We focus on several important principles: 1. The basis for creating the Eurasian partnership is openness, transparency and consideration for mutual interests. 2. The main participants in the initial period are China-Russia, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the ASEAN member states. 3. The goal of the Eurasian Partnership is to deepen regional integration.
Thus, both countries will seek further expansion of bilateral trade exchanges, devoting themselves to creating a fairer, more transparent and convenient trading and investment environment for joint promotion of regional economic development.
Cooperation between China and Russia in the process of building a Eurasian economic partnership determines the perspective of this process. Chinese and Russian scientists and experts reached a consensus on some basic principles in the consultation process on the Eurasian partnership (or the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” or the “Eurasian Economic Partnership”), namely: sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for the country's development options, respect for the national cultural traditions, tolerance, mutual learning and mutual benefit.
According to the consensus reached and the “One Belt and One Road” principle, the future Eurasian Economic Partnership will follow the rules of the multilateral trade of the World Trade Organization and will facilitate trade and investments; strengthen the construction of transport infrastructure, create regional cross-border transport corridors; strengthen energy cooperation and environmental protection; promote the development of agricultural cooperation; explore cooperation in the field of scientific and technological innovation. The construction of the Eurasian economic partnership should also be based on the principle of mutual cooperation, joint construction and joint use. The results of the consultations should ensure growth and motivation for the development of the countries and regions. Only in this way can countries achieve mutual benefit, common development and mutual prosperity.
In the process of establishing or forming an economic partnership, the development of interfacing strategies between China and Russia is a key element. China and Russia, the Eurasian Economic Union and ASEAN are three important economies. The development of a combination of strategies between China and the Eurasian Economic Union, led by Russia, will lead to the creation of a Eurasian economic partnership. This is due not only to the fact that China is more likely to negotiate and discuss partnership issues with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. The creation of a Eurasian economic partnership cannot go smoothly, there may be unexpected difficulties and unforeseen problems.
First, Russia is concerned that China’s vast economy will influence the integration process of the Eurasian Economic Union, the competitiveness of the Chinese goods will put an enormous economic pressure on the economy of the Eurasian Economic Union and delay the speed of cooperation between the two sides. After the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, controversies between China and India, India and Pakistan may force internal cooperation and advisory mechanisms to face the challenge. In recent years, negotiations between China and Russia, as well as between China and the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the creation of a free trade zone have been very difficult. However, there are favorable conditions for establishing a Eurasian economic partnership between China and Russia. First, Russia recognizes the importance and indispensability of China’s participation. These two countries have sufficient aspirations and wisdom in this regard. Secondly, the economic complementarity between China and Russia is very strong, including the complementarity of resources, markets, technology, product structure, etc. This complementarity can be a huge potential for the mutually beneficial cooperation. Thirdly, China and Russia have perfect mechanisms for consultations and meetings.
Fourthly, there are points of convergence between the development strategies of the two countries, especially in terms of developing regional strategies, such as the development of the Russian Far East and the revival of China's Dongbei.
Since the beginning of 2014, thanks to the development of energy strategies of the two countries, Russia has become the largest importer of oil to China. China has made significant progress in diversifying energy imports. Russia has successfully opened the Asia-Pacific energy market: in the area of regional cooperation, Russia was somewhat worried that the construction of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” would affect the prospects of the Siberian railway. Now Primorye-1 and Primorye-2 make the transport infrastructure of the Russian Far East an important link in the Asia-Pacific region, increase Russia's influence on the economic development of the Asia-Pacific region, and at the same time provide new ideas for the development of the Far East.
Thus, the existing political and economic relations between China and the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, the level of business cooperation between China and the ASEAN countries, the reality of cooperation between Russia and the ASEAN countries make us believe in the prospect of the conjugation of “One Belt and One Road” with the Eurasian partnership. The implementation of the integration of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (Eurasian Partnership, Eurasian Economic Partnership) with the initiative “One Belt and One Road” is quite possible. The most important part of this process is the Sino-Russian negotiations on the Eurasian economic partnership.
REFERENCES:
1. Abramova O.D. Sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Kitaya v usloviyakh realizatsii proyekta «Ekonomicheskiy poyas Shelkovogo puti» [Cooperation of Russia and China in the implementation of the project “Economic Belt of the Silk Road”] // Eurasian Union: Issues of International Relations. 2017. No. 3 (In Russ.).
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5. Poslaniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Message from the President] of the Russian Federation dated 12/03/2015, b/n. December 3, 2015 // http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40542 (In Russ.).
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7. «Sovmestnoye zayavleniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki» [“Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China”]. 25 June 2016 // http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5100 (In Russ.).
8. Vladimir Putin prinyal uchastiye vo vstreche s predstavitelyami Delovogo foruma Rossiya – ASEAN [Vladimir Putin took part in a meeting with representatives of the Russia-ASEAN Business Forum]. 20 May 2016 // http://putinnews.ru/main/3275-Vladimir-Putin-prinjal-uchastie.html (In Russ.).
9. Vystupleniye Si TSzin'pina na sobranii 40-letiya politiki reformy i otkrytiya [Speech by Xi Jinping at the 40th anniversary meeting of the reform and opening policy]. 18 December 2018 // http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2018-12/18/c_1123872025.htm (In Russ.).
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