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VELIKAYA N.М. Transformation of Local Self-Governance in Small and Medium Cities of Russia Through the Eyes of the Expert Community

DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.33.3.002

N.М. VELIKAYA Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, Head of the Department of Political Sociology and social technologies of the Russian State Humanitarian University (RSHU), Moscow, Russia

TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE IN SMALL AND MEDIUM CITIES OF RUSSIA THROUGH THE EYES OF THE EXPERT COMMUNITY (4)

The article, based on the results of a comprehensive sociological study, examines the features of the evolution of local self-government in small and medium-sized cities of Russia during the recent reforms of local authorities related to the implementation of Federal Law No. 131, which was accompanied by changes in the organizational forms of local self-government, enlargement of municipalities, unification and transition to the model of "city manager", and spread of the majority and mixed election system. The impact of these reforms on the effectiveness of managerial decisions and the attitude of the population to the local government is assessed. Special attention is paid to the analysis of expert interviews, which allow us to confirm the conclusion that the unification of local government models does not always meet the needs of local communities, and reform is often carried out in the interests of the regional political and managerial elite.

Key words: local government, local authorities, municipality, small and medium-size cities.

Local self-government is considered by modern science and political practice as the most important attribute of a modern democratic state, which has actualized the study of the features of its formation and development in Russia and remains relevant throughout the entire post-Soviet history of Russia. However, neither at the level of scientific discourse, nor in the political and managerial practice unified approaches to this level of power have been developed. This is due to the fact that in such a heterogeneous country as Russia, it is difficult to choose the optimal model of local self-government, which allows, on the one hand, to preserve the controllability of territories, and on the other, to ensure the most complete realization of citizens' rights to local self-government.

Considering local self-government as a specific organization of public authority and administration in a certain territory or in a settlement, the population of which directly or through the bodies it creates, independently and responsibly solves issues of local importance on the basis of its own material and financial resources [3; 1; four; 6. P. 196], we intend in this article to analyze the latest changes in political and managerial practices in small and medium-size cities of Russia. Currently, about 27 million people live in them (7), and the small and medium-size cities form the basis of the urban settlement structure in the Russian Federation (5). This article is based on expert interviews (8), the main purpose of the interview was to identify the attitude of the expert community to the ongoing reform of local self-government and its impact on the quality of life of the population.

We will not dwell on the difficult history of the formation of self-government in modern Russia. This is pretty well covered in literature. We only note that it was precisely Russia's accession to the European Charter of Local Self-Government in 1998 that required an activation of a number of administrative political reforms at the local level. Over the past 30 years, Russia has experienced at least 3 reforms of local self-government, which were determined primarily by the federal government, and not by local communities.

1. The period of liquidation of the Soviets (including local ones) after the coup of 1991 (1991-1995). At that time, in many regions of the Russian Federation local self-government did not actually exist and elections to local authorities were not held.

2. The period of initial restoration of local authority, creation of new organizational forms of local self-government and adaptation of a number of new procedures, such as elections to local authorities (1995-2003). Over the years, different models of local government were created in different regions of the Russian Federation as determined primarily by the different territorial foundations of local government [8].

3. The period of reform and unification of the LSG system (2003-2009), at that time an attempt was made to transfer public authority to the lower level, make it closer to the population and unify the organizational forms of LSGs so that they work in urban and rural communities. According to Law No. 131, two levels of local self-government were created: municipalities (urban and rural settlements) and municipal districts. A specific list of powers and sources of funding were assigned to each level. An important step was made at that time, political parties got an opportunity to participate in local elections, which generally positively affected the development of the party system.

4. The period of “counter-reform” (from 2010 to the present) associated with attempts to centralize power and reduce the powers of local self-government and its heads, manifested, inter alia, in reducing the number of municipalities where the head is elected by direct vote. Today, in accordance with Law No. 131, cities organize local government either as urban districts (independent municipalities that are not part of any other municipality), among them are: Totma, Severobaikalsk, Ust-Ilimsk, Pereslavl-Zalessky, Shuya, Sasovo, Derbent, Yelets, Kerch, Nakhodka; or as urban settlements within municipalities of a higher (district) level: Nerchinsk, Maysky, Elabuga, Kargopol, Konakovo, Korkino. Accordingly, there are some differences in the LSG model, in the role and status of various LSG officials.

In the course of our study, we analyzed the main features of the structure of local self-government in small and medium-sized cities, especially the elections to local authorities, the results of the reform in accordance with Law No. 131 and amendments to it. Unfortunately, the reforms of local self-government often resulted in a change in the external facade of organizational forms, without touching on fundamental issues related to budgeting, with the formation of a full-fledged tax base for LSGs.

The dependence of local authorities is determined by the practice of knocking out finances from higher budgets: “If some issues are not resolved, then they go to the region, and there they raise their issues. Of course, it doesn’t always work, there is no money at the higher level either, but they resolve some problems” (Interview No. 2, Balashov).

One of the most important problems that local deputies themselves highlight is the mismatch between the powers and real capabilities of local authorities, the lack of their own tax base and, as a result, financial dependence on the higher level budgets. As one of the deputies of the Yekaterinburg City Duma noted: “What is the regional government doing? It prefers to form the revenue side of local budgets by providing financial assistance. The share of gratuitous income in recent years has grown, reaching 62%. This means that the process of establishing the independence of municipalities is replaced by the relations of the giver and the applicant ... Even those municipalities that could feed themselves pay only their managerial staff and are not interested in developing their economic potential”(3).

A significant institutional result of the reform consisted in a sharp increase in the number of municipalities and in the formation of a two-level model of local government. Not all urban settlements received the status of urban districts, which not only provides full autonomy from municipal areas, but also the concentration of revenue and expenditure powers in both urban settlements of both settlements and municipal areas. On the other hand, those cities that became part of municipal districts are faced with the situation when their priority for the year is the interests of municipal districts, especially when building relations with higher budgets. As a result, the total number of subsidized municipalities has increased.

According to experts, currently no more than 15% of local governments are able to finance at least some development. As for the majority of them, out of almost 40 powers of local authority, they have enough funds to execute seven to eight “... our municipality will always be in the role of an applicant. Relations are initially unequal .... Everything depends by and large on the availability of money from the Moscow Oblast. The more money MO has, the better it lives, the happier is the city’s population. It all depends on relations with the republic, in the sense that the less is taken away, the better. They either cut off the money for the roads or dig out half of them and then stop for the lack of money.” (Interview No. 3, Severobaykalsk).

Given the lack of money, the local authorities are delegating more and more powers to the region and finally lose interest in developing production or business and increasing the number of jobs in its territory. “Funds of municipalities flow into the budgets of higher levels, and then return to the same municipalities as inter-budget transfers. This is illogical and inefficient. Reliable tax sources should be assigned to local budgets, encouraging municipalities to work on their own revenue base.”(1).

In general, most experts adhere to the pessimistic point of view that, despite a formal increase in powers, no real capacity was added to the powers of the local authorities.

Many urban settlements faced big problems after the release of the well-known Presidential May Decrees [7], according to which the obligation was established to bring the minimum wage for workers of cultural institutions to the average level in the region. Regional authorities everywhere obliged local self-government bodies to increase accordingly the wages of employees of municipal institutions.

According to the overwhelming majority of experts, local governments have not yet become a full-fledged institutions in the system of government: “It is difficult for municipalities to breathe, they are very dependent on higher authorities” (Interview № 4, Sovetsk). More than half of the experts point out to the unsatisfactory and formal nature of the interaction between the regional and municipal levels of government: “there is a bit of bureaucratic confusion, that is an endless correspondence with no outcome.” (Interview № 4, Severobaikalsk).

In particular, attention is drawn to the fact that local government "is now fully regulated by the executive branch of the region" (Interview № 3, Shuya), and “they are built on the command principle, so all issues are resolved not at the local level, but at a higher regional or federal levels.” (Interview № 2, Shuya).

A controversial issue is the choice of a model for organizing local authorities. Law No. 131-FZ provides for three options: 1) the “mayor-council” scheme; 2) the scheme of the “city manager” with the choice of the mayor from among the deputies of the Council; 3) a “mixed” scheme, when city manager (head of administration) is appointed and the mayor (head of the city) is elected by popular vote. Starting from 2010-2011, there was a massive rejection by municipalities of mayoral elections, both in regional capitals and in cities of regional subordination.

At the same time, the institute of a city manager repeatedly failed. For example, in the Komi Republic (where already in 2011 such a model existed in 13 municipalities, and subsequently a widespread transition to it was carried out), in recent years, several heads of administrations and regions who have been elected on a competitive basis by deputies were convicted for the abuse of authority and economic crimes (6).

We note, that the new amendments to the current legislation made the main subject of decision-making regarding the choice of the LSG model not the LSG bodies as before, but the regional authorities, which suggests that in the near future all regions will refuse to elect mayors. Of the cities in our sample, a model with a city manager exists in 13 cities: Shuya, Pyatigorsk, Nerchinsk, Nakhodka, Maysky, Konakovo, Kerch, Zheleznogorsk, Elabuga, Derbent, Vorkuta, Velikiye Luki, Balashov.

In a model that uses the institute of city manager, the main drawback is not so much the dependence of the hired manager on the City Duma and the mayor who conclude a contract with him, which is often mentioned in textbooks. Rather, it is a lack of accountability to the public, as it is often possible to make a deal with obedient deputies subsequently leading to flagrant violations of the law, corruption and embezzlement of budget funds.

Our studies show that the appointment of the head of the local administration is opposed to the principle of independence of local authorities, since in the municipal district (urban district), intra-city municipality, one third of the members of the Competition Commission are appointed by regional government bodies. The chairman and deputies of the representative body lose their real authority in connection with the transfer of control levers to the city manager, who exercises executive and administrative powers. This imbalance is often visible even on the sites of municipalities, as the sites of the administration, as a rule, are more complete, have real-time feedback from voters, etc., and the page of the Duma is often posted on the website of the city administration.

The practice of the actual appointment of the city manager in the presence of supporters of the governor in city parliaments provides for some predictability and accountability of heads of administrations to the higher level authorities. We can say that the federal and regional legislators have the opinion that the local administration should be state-controlled. Moreover, it is obvious that the heads of the local administrations who do not go through the election procedure cannot fully feel the full burden of responsibility to the population and are accountable, primarily to the employer, that is, to the representative body.

There is no doubt that the new model reduces the ability of the population to influence urban politics, and launches the process of governmentalization of local authorities in Russia, which is largely facilitated by the transition to a mixed and majority system of elections to the city legislative bodies.

It should be noted that the reforms of local self-government bodies are connected not only and not so much with a change in the organizational or territorial foundations of the LSG system, but also with the scope of their powers, with the features of budget formation and spending, with the ability to conduct independent economic, social and cultural policies in the cities. At the same time, due to a shortage of funds, the newly emerged municipalities were not able to fulfill the law requirement on the assignment to them of certain municipal property. As a result, in a number of subjects of the Russian Federation, the reverse process began aimed at unification of municipalities (in Perm and Krasnoyarsk Territories, Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Astrakhan, Vologda, Kostroma and other regions).

Constant reforms of local self-government, inconsistency of actions of regional and local authorities and contradictions in legislative regulation negatively affect the quality of power and the fulfillment by local authorities of their social obligations to the population.

In today Russian conditions, the efficiency of municipal management can be raised through the improvement of the legislative base and expansion of revenues of the local government budgets and also through further expansion of civic participation in the resolution of problems of local importance: each citizen should have broad legal and organizational capabilities for expressing and defending his position. There must be an effective system of public control from below.

NOTES:

(1) Interview with a deputy of the Bryansk City Council. The study “LSG Deputies on the problems of local government reform in the regions”. 2016. Author’s archive.

(2) Interview with the head of the Yaroslavl city settlement, Primorsky Territory. The study “LSG Deputies on the problems of local government reform in the regions”. 2016. Author’s archive.

(3) Noritsin, Alexander Nikolaevich, deputy of the Yekaterinburg City Council of the Sverdlovsk Region. The study “LSG Deputies on the problems of local government reform in the regions”. Author’s archive.

(4) When implementing the project, state support funds were used, allocated as a grant in accordance with the order of the President of the Russian Federation dated January 17, 2014 No. 11-rp and on the basis of a competition held by the ISEPS Foundation. The project was implemented from January to September 2015 and included three complementary (quantitative and qualitative) studies: desk research, media content analysis, and expert interviews. The geography of the study covered small and medium-sized cities from all federal districts of the Russian Federation.

(5) Today, there are 790 small and 155 medium-size cities in the country.

(6) Among them: former city managers Vorkuta (Anatoly Puro), Ukhta (Oleg Kazartsev), Pechory (Vasily Torlopov), Knyazhpogostsky district (Victor Popov); Syktyvkar (Roman Zenishchev), Verkhoturye (Sergey Lobusov), Novmoskovsk, Miass, Ozersk (Evgeny Tarasov, Alexandrovsk, Perm Territory (A. Migashkin), Mirny, Arkhangelsk Region (O. Smirnov). Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky (A. Alekseev), Verkhoturye, Sverdlovsk Region (Sergey Lobusov and Vladislav Fakhrislamov); Saratov (A. Prokopenko), Arzamas (I. Kiselev), Elista (O. Nokhashiev), Yevpatoria (A. Filonov).

(7) Resident population as of January 1, 2015. Official site of the Federal State Statistics Service // http://www.gks.ru/opendata/dataset/7708234640-ca-08-002.

(8) Expert interviews were conducted in the cities of Balashov (Saratov Region), Velikiye Luki (Pskov Region), Elabuga (Republic of Tatarstan), Lysva (Perm Territory), Nerchinsk (Zabaykalsky Territory, Chita Region), Novouralsk (Sverdlovsk Region), Pereslavl-Zalessky (Yaroslavl region), Severobaikalsk (Republic of Buryatia), Sovetsk (Kaliningrad region), Shuya (Ivanovo region). The experts included specialists participating in the activities of local governments: representatives of local authorities, parties and public organizations, initiative groups of citizens. A total of 60 respondents were interviewed by 6 experts in each city.

REFERENCES:

1. Garner D. Velikobritaniya: Tsentral'noye i mestnoye upravleniye [United Kingdom: Central and Local Government]. M., 1984 (In Russ.).

2. Glava administratsii Balashova podderzhal pryamyye vybory na svoyu dolzhnost' / Chetvertaya vlast' [The head of the Balashov administration supported direct elections to his post / Fourth Power] // http://www.4vsar.ru/news/38910.html (In Russ.).

3. Harlof E. Mestnyye organy vlasti v Yevrope [Local authorities in Europe]. M., 1992 (In Russ.).

4. Mestnyye i munitsipal'nyye organy upravleniya burzhuaznykh stran [Local and municipal governments of bourgeois countries]. M., 1984 (In Russ.).

5. Samoilova A.S. Institutsional'nyye usloviya realizatsii modeli siti-menedzhmenta v gorodskom upravlenii [Institutional conditions for the implementation of the city management model in urban management] // Bulletin of Tomsk State University. Philosophy. Sociology. Political science. 2010. No. 1 (9) (In Russ.).

6. Sravnitel'nyy analiz modeley mestnogo samoupravleniya v Rossii, SSHA i Zapadnoy Evrope [Comparative analysis of local government models in Russia, the USA and Western Europe]. Vladivostok, 2004 (In Russ.).

7. Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 07.05.2012 № 597 “O meropriyatiyakh po realizatsii gosudarstvennoy sotsial'noy politiki” [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 597 of 07.05.2012 “On measures for the implementation of state social policy”] // http://news.kremlin.ru/acts/15233 (In Russ.).

8. Velikaya N.M., Shishkin V.V. Mestnoye samoupravleniye: yeshche odna popytka reformy [Local government: another attempt of reforms] // Free Thought. 2003. No. 6 (In Russ.).

9. Who is siti-menedzher? Pochemu rayony i goroda kraya nachali otkazyvat'sya ot vyborov glavy administratsii [Who is the city-manager? Why districts and cities of the region began to refuse to elect heads of administrations] // ALTA-press // http://altapress.ru/story/14427 (In Russ.).

BOLTENKOVA L.F., ALEKHNOVICH S.О. To the Question of Continuity of the Russian Statehood

DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.33.3.001

L.F. BOLTENKOVA Doctor of Law, Professor, Institute of Public Administration and Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia

S.О. ALEKHNOVICH Candidate of Sciences (philosophy), Moscow, Russia

TO THE QUESTION OF CONTINUITY OF THE RUSSIAN STATEHOOD

Based on the historical experience of Russia, the article puts forward and proves the thesis that the Rurikovich period is one continuous process of building the Russian multi-ethnic state: Novgorod – Kiev, Rostov – Suzdal, Vladimir – Moscow. Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians as branches of one tree are the heirs of Ancient Rus’, which obliges them to jointly develop the Russian world.

Key words: continuity, statehood, Ancient Rus’, Russian World, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine.

The element of continuity in the history of Russia is not accidental, not ideologically invented, not a propaganda trick. Even the October Revolution of 1917, the centenary of which was marked in 2017 and which is still perceived differently in the society, does not exclude continuity. Actually, the present-day Russia does exist, exists in connection with and due to continuity. By changing forms, it retains her inner self. And the variability of forms is an improvement, so to speak, of the possibilities for the manifestation of the historical essence of Russia. In answering this question, we will use the methodology of two books [1. P. 317; 3. P. 239]. The second of them, as we see, was published back in 1984, when it was not customary to write about the continuity. A more widespread view was that of Soviet Russia (USSR) as a state radically different from the Imperial Russia, as a state that destroyed its former foundations.

The first of these books was also published after the “upheavals,” but it was directed against the Revolution of October 1917. Nevertheless, the through thought of both books: Russia was, is and will be one essence in different forms.

The issue identified in the title of the topic arose in connection with the events in Ukraine (2014-2019). Who would have thought ten years ago that the Russian people would have to prove the unity of the destinies of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, which are, by and large, the successors of Ancient Rus’. That’s how history was perceived, until Ukraine began to prove the opposite, accusing Russia of “stealing” history from Ukraine, appropriating Vladimir the Baptist, Yaroslav the Wise, other prominent Russian princes and then writers. A number of Ukrainian politicians, at the suggestion of some Ukrainian "historians", believe Russia, to be the Horde, alluding to the Tatar Golden Horde. In Russia, no one denies the influence of the Golden Horde on our History, but we note that the Golden Horde is in the past, and Russia exists today and it has a future, because it does not betray its past, does not renounce it. The Russian people, realizing the multi-ethnic nature of their state, do not renounce their Russian-Slavic roots, do not try to erase from their history the fact of the arrival of the Varangians-Russians, who gave impetus to the development of Slavic, (with their coming) Russian-Slavic history. Russia recognizes the continuity of the development of its history, starting with fixed (hence, provable) facts. And what was or was not before is the subject of scientific hypotheses at best or fabrications, falsifications in the worst case.

So what is the continuity of the history of Russia? It should be said that the questions of continuity in Russian history were more widely studied in the second half of the 20th century abroad than in the USSR. Western Sovietologists were interested in the idea of the existence of the imperial spirit in the USSR, camouflaged as internationalism. The American Sovietologist Toronto Anderson in 1967 published a book “Russian Political Thought”, in which he argued that since Rurik's time, Russians have been guided by several basic theories. These theories boil down to fencing off from the West and striving for universalism. In this case, the objection is not so much against the thesis as against the “backup” to it: the denial of the processes in the history of Russia that took place in Europe to show that Russia is not Europe. And what Anderson calls the line of continuity “several basic theories from Rurik”, then this, in our opinion, is covered by the concept of “regularity”. There is, as you know, a universal pattern in the development of individual states. Each state arises for some reasons and it faces some tasks. If it copes with its tasks, then it exists. Russia has existed since the 9th century and its tasks are a separate issue. It seems to us that our Fatherland – Russia has very difficult tasks: to contribute, if not guarantee, and to preserve the diversity of the world, humanism, humanity, and justice. And at the same time, promote development towards community of peoples: diversity in unity. If Rurik was guided by these ideas, when coming to the Novgorodians at their request, then why not follow his ideas. He really did not limit himself to staying with the Novgorod administration, but appointed his governors to other cities, following the existing opportunities, that is, rooted the Russian element in the new territory. In other words, he laid the foundations of the Russian world. The one who follows these principles does not betray the story, but continues it. This “one who” is Russia. We have nothing to repent of. This historical stubbornness of Russia causes hatred among its competitors. Moreover, the object of hatred is the Russian people as the core of Russia. It has been so at all times. Only the degree of hatred grew, depending on the state of affairs in Russia. When Russia is weak, there is less hatred, even love for it appears, and strong Russia gives rise to a burning desire to destroy the Russians. I do not want to, but I have to remember the Pole Brzezinski, Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security (now deceased, but his work lives on) with not a kind word. Nesterov F.F. describes such an episode recorded by the West German magazine Spiegel. Listening at a closed meeting on the use of nuclear forces, he suddenly interrupted the speaker and shouted: “No, no, no! I did not mean all Soviet citizens. I only meant Russians” [3. P. 7]. It is interesting how nuclear weapons can be used to destroy only Russians. However, during the time of the USSR, they thought apparently about Russia (the RSFSR). Other republics were allegedly not Russian.

At present, Russia is associated with Russians, therefore all “love” is directed at it (sanctions, NATO's approach to borders, etc.). This is partly why in a number of former Soviet republics there is a denial of Russianness. The denial of Russianness today is the denial of its past, which means the law of continuity. No less strange are the actions in relation to the monuments of the Soviet era, starting with V.I. Lenin, who introduced the principle of self-determination of the peoples of Russia.

It should be noted that Lenin, plunging into the revolution, believed in the strength and energy of the people. And he believed in historical regularity, in the “fate” of Russia. Otherwise, he would not “get involved” in the struggle. It is worth recalling that Soviet Russia, devastated by war and famine, isolated from the sources of raw materials, fuel and bread, “squeezed” to the size of a Great Russian ethnic core, found strength to survive in a civil war and defeat the intervention of 14 world powers. What was it? Mystery? V.I. Lenin said: “Two years ago, when the imperialist war was still in full swing, the uprising of the Russian proletariat, its conquest of state power seemed to all supporters of the bourgeoisie in Russia, to the masses of the people and, perhaps, most of the workers in other countries, a bold but hopeless attempt. It seemed then that the world imperialism was such a huge, invincible force that the workers of a backward country, making an attempt to rebel against it, acted like madmen ...”

“No one two years ago believed that Russia, a country ravaged by a 4-year-old imperialist war, could withstand another two years of civil war. And, probably, if we were asked at the end of October 1917 whether we could withstand two years of civil war against the world bourgeoisie, I don’t know how many of us would answer in the affirmative. But events showed that the energy developed by the working-peasant masses turned out to be greater than expected the people who carried out the October Revolution” [2. P. 118]. One would like to say: here it is, hidden energy! Here it is, the “deep people!” (1).

Let us pay attention to the fact that even the people who headed the revolution, at first, did not assume that a civil war would develop on such a scale, and secondly, they did not realize the presence in the masses of such energy, such a charge that overcame all the obstacles that stood in the way of the revolution.

Only he, who does not understand anything in the laws of History, can lament over the events of October 1917 and, as a result, the birth of relatively independent republics, members of the USSR. But we repeat, the Revolution does not deny continuity. No Soviet historian started the history of the USSR from 1922. Take up any textbook on the History of State and Law of the USSR, it consists of two parts. The first part is the Old Russian State until the Revolution. The second part is the Revolution and the subsequent construction of the state. There was a lot of criticism of the pre-Soviet period, which is natural, since the Revolution changed many principles and forms, but Russian history and Russian statehood were not denied and most importantly the participation in this History of the Russian people: the Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians was not denied either. It was proceeded from this when an alliance of equal republics was created. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation also did not reject either the imperial or the Soviet period. Although there were people among the liberals eager to do it, but the political leadership of Russia took the position of common sense. Russia officially declared itself the successor of the USSR, having assumed all its obligations, including general debts. By the way, let’s note that in 2017 Russia paid off its last debt. Meanwhile, expenses were incurred not only in the interests of Russia, but also in the interests of other republics of the Union. There were, of course, among scientists nuances in relation to their History of the Soviet period: ill-conceived criticism bordering lies. Not all are united in the evaluation of the Revolution even 100 years after it. This is natural given the scale of the catastrophe caused by the outside interference in the internal affairs of our country. Many families still have not healed the wounds of losses. Another 200-300 years will pass and the Russians will still have different views about the events of October 2017. As our contemporaries calmly discuss the figure of Ivan the Terrible, they will just as calmly view 1917. In this case, it must be emphasized that continuity was not denied when new forms appeared and three branches of the Russian people separated at the level of state policy: Russians (Great Russians), Belarusians, Ukrainians, although much has been done to preserve the existing differences in self-identification according to the features of our common History.

So much has been written that we have common roots that it does not even make sense to list scientific works. The one who does not deny these roots, who preserves and “cherishes” them, is the successor.

A good example of this is the scheme of power transfer “from hand to hand” and the real actions of such power. We verbally show this scheme.

– Gostomysl in Novgorod;

– Rurik in Novgorod;

– Oleg in Novgorod and Kiev;

– Igor Rurikovich – Kiev, the son of Rurik;

– Olga, the wife of Igor in Kiev;

– Svyatoslav Igorevich, their son in Kiev, the grandson of Rurik;

– Yaropolk Svyatoslavich, son of Svyatoslav, great-grandson of Rurik;

– Vladimir Svyatoslavich, the late son of Svyatoslav, the great-great-grandson of Rurik, in Novgorod and Kiev;

– Svyatopolk, as M.V. Lomonosov writes, a dubious son of Vladimir or Yaropolk, in Kiev;

– Yaroslav Vladimirovich, son of Vladimir the Baptist of Russia, Novgorod – Kiev;

– Izyaslav Yaroslavich, son of Yaroslav the Wise, Kiev;

– Svyatoslav Yaroslavich, son of Yaroslav the Wise, Kiev;

– Vsevolod Yaroslavich, son of Yaroslav the Wise, Kiev;

– Svyatopolk – Mikhail Izyaslavich, son of Izyaslav, grandson of Yaroslav the Wise, seventh degree of kinship with Rurik, Kiev;

– Vladimir Vsevolodovich Monomakh, grandson of Yaroslav the Wise, son of Vsevolod, seventh degree of kinship with Rurik, Chernihiv, Kiev;

– Mstislav Vladimirovich, son of Vladimir Monomakh, the eighth degree of kinship with Rurik, Kiev;

– Yaropolk Vladimirovich, son of Vladimir Monomakh, Kiev;

– Vyacheslav Vladimirovich, son of Vladimir Monomakh, Kiev;

– Vsevolod Olegovich, grandson of Svyatoslav II, son of Yaroslav the Wise, eighth degree of kinship with Rurik, Kiev;

– Izyaslav Mstislavovich, grandson of Vladimir Monomakh, eighth degree of kinship with Rurik, Kiev;

– Yuri Dolgoruky, son of Vladimir Monomakh, Suzdal – Moscow – Kiev;

– Andrei Yuryevich Bogolyubsky, son of Yuri Dolgoruky, the ninth degree of kinship with Rurik, the prince of “All Russia” with a center in Vladimir;

– Vsevolod Yuryevich, son of Yuri Dolgoruky, Vladimir;

– Konstantin Vsevolodovich, son of Vsevolod, grandson of Yuri Dolgoruky, Vladimir;

– Yuri Vsevolodovich, grandson of Yuri Dolgoruky, tenth degree of kinship with Rurik, Vladimir;

– Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, grandson of Yuri Dolgoruky, Vladimir;

– Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky, great-grandson of Yuri Dolgoruky, Novgorod, Vladimir;

– Yaroslav Yaroslavich, brother of Alexander Nevsky, eleventh degree of kinship with Rurik, Tver, Novgorod, Vladimir;

– Vasily Yaroslavich, brother of Yaroslav, Novgorod;

– Dmitry Alexandrovich, son of Alexander Nevsky, Vladimir, Novgorod;

– Andrei Alexandrovich, son of Alexander Nevsky, Vladimir;

– Daniil Alexandrovich, the youngest son of Alexander Nevsky, the first Grand Duke of Moscow, Moscow, the twelfth degree of kinship with Rurik;

– Mikhail Yaroslavich, nephew of Alexander Nevsky, Novgorod, Moscow, twelfth degree of kinship with Rurik;

– Yuri Daniilovich Moscow, son of Daniel, grandson of Alexander Nevsky, Moscow;

– Alexander Mikhailovich, son of Mikhail Yaroslavich, the thirteenth degree of kinship with Rurik, Tver, Pskov;

– Ivan Daniilovich (Ivan Kalita), son of Daniel, the thirteenth degree of kinship with Rurik, Vladimir, Pskov, Moscow;

– Semen Ivanovich, son of Ivan Kalita, Vladimir, Moscow, Novgorod;

– Ivan Ivanovich, son of Ivan Kalita, Moscow;

– Dmitry Konstantinovich, uncle of Dmitry Donskoy, fourteenth degree of kinship with Rurik, Suzdal, Vladimir;

– Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy, fifteenth degree of kinship with Rurik, Vladimir, Moscow;

– Vasily Dmitrievich Donskoy, son of Dmitry Donskoy, Moscow;

– Vasily Vasilievich Donskoy, grandson of Dmitry Donskoy, Moscow;

– Ivan Vasilievich III, son of Vasily, the eighteenth degree of kinship with Rurik, Moscow;

– Vasily Ivanovich, son of Ivan III, Moscow;

– Ivan Vasilyevich IV (Grozny), son of Vasily, twentieth degree of kinship with Rurik, Moscow;

– Fedor Ioannovich, son of Ivan the Terrible, twenty-first degree of kinship with Rurik, Moscow.

This interrupted the Rurik dynasty. In 1598, Boris Godunov came to power in Moscow. Fifteen years have passed and as a result of the Time of Troubles, a new dynasty was established – the Romanovs, who continued to build Russia.

What conclusion follows from the foregoing, especially from the scheme of power transfer “from hand to hand”? The historical period of the Rurikovich is one continuous process of building a Russian multi-ethnic statehood, that begun in Novgorod, continued in Kiev, then in Rostov-Suzdal, Vladimir, and Moscow. Moscow is still the center of Russia, the Russian world, but it began and matured in the era of the Rurikovich. For some historical time, part of the Old Russian lands and cities fell out of the general process due to their capture by Lithuania and Poland. But the state, which continued its formation and development in Moscow never abandoned attempts to return the captured lands to the fold of the Fatherland (our fatherland, as the Russian princes and tsars said). This is the natural right of the heirs of their great-great-grandfathers, grandfathers, and fathers. The thought of returning to their way of life did not die out either among those Russians who were in a foreign land. Hence the struggle for independence from the Rzeczpospolita. This struggle would never have been successful without the help of Russia. The Cossack movement understood this. The Cossacks would not be able to live in isolation in the 16th-17th centuries, just as Ukrainians (Malorossy) would not be able to live in isolation in the 19th-20th centuries. By the will of historical destinies, new elements and traits have been interspersed in the general tree of Russianness, allowing us to talk about the ethnic characteristics of northeastern Russians and southwestern Russians. But this difference, if it is not artificially inflated, is so small that there are still reasons to assert the presence of branches of one tree: Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians. All of us are the heirs of Ancient Rus’, in fact. Together we need to develop the Russian world.

NOTES:

(1) The term is borrowed from V. Surkov // Vladislav Surkov: Putin's Long State / Ideas and People // Nezavisimaya Gazeta // http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2019-02-11/5_7503_surkov.html.

REFERENCES:

1. Abdulatipov R.G., Boltenkova L.F. Rossiya, v chem sut' tvoyego bytiya? [Russia, what is the essence of your being?]. M.: "Republic", 1994 (In Russ.).

2. Lenin V.I. Complete collection of works. V. 39, 40 (In Russ.).

3. Nesterov F.F. Svyaz' vremen: Opyt istoricheskoy publitsistiki. 2-ye izd. [The Link of Times: The Experience of Historical Journalism. 2nd ed.]. M.: Mol. Guard, 1984 (In Russ.).

“Political Science Issues” Volume 9, Issue 3 (33), 2019

“Political Science Issues”

Volume 9, Issue 3 (33), 2019

http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Cover Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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CONTENTS

POLITICAL PROCESS IN RUSSIA

http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Boltenkova L.F., Alekhnovich S.O. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Velikaya N.M. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Astvatsaturova M.A. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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PROBLEMS OF EURASIAN AND POST-SOVIET COOPERATION

http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Brusilovskiy D.A., Esipov I.I. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Musaev O.R., Karshiev Sh.C. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Shamarov P.V. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS

http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Sardaryan G.T. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Milka Malfait, Chernyavskiy S.I. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Rustamova L.R. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Dubrovina O.V., Salamov R.R. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Haddad Mohannad Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Jia Yuanpey Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Burda M.A., Horeva E.E., Larkina M.A., Belyaeva V.P. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Rodionova M.E. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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REVIEWS

Slizovskiy D.E., Medvedev N.P. Reflections on the Read

http://voprospolitolog.ru/pdf/PSI № 3-2019/Slizovskiy D.E., Madvedev N.P. Political Science Issues № 3-2019.pdf

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OUR AUTHORS-3-2019

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OUR AUTHORS-2-2019

OUR AUTHORS

BOLTENKOVA L.F. – Doctor of Sciences (law), Professor at the Institute of public administration and management, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia.

CHEMSHIT A.A. – Doctor of Sciences (political sciences), Professor, Chair of political sciences and international relations, Institute of Social Sciences and International Relations, Sevastopol State University, Sevastopol, Russia.

DAVYDOV V.N. – Deputy Director, Institute of modern politics, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia.

FREDDIE AGONNODE – Post-graduate student, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia.

GLEBOV V.A. – Ph.D. in Legal Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of Political Analysis and Management, Deputy Head of the Department, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University), Moscow, Russia.

IDRIS AHMAD – Postgraduate student at the Chair of political analysis and management, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia.

IRKHIN Yu.V. – Doctor of Sciences (philosophy), Professor at the Chair of political science and political management, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Professor at the Chair of theoretical and applied political science, Russian State Humanitarian University, Moscow, Russia.

JORGE AUGUSTO KING – Trainee at the Chair of political analysis and management, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia.

JU ORLINDU – Post-graduate student working for the Master’s degree at the Chair of theory and history of international relations, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Guinea-Bissau.

KARADZE T.V. – Doctor of Sciences (philosophy), Professor, Head of the Chair of political science, Moscow State Pedagogical University, Moscow, Russia.

KONG DEKUN – Post-graduate student at the Chair of political sciences of the Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russiа.

KRUTKO A.A. – Candidate of Sciences (political sciences), working for the doctoral degree at the Chair of international relations, Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic.

MARTYNENKO E.V. – Doctor of Sciences (political sciences), Professor at the Chair of theory and history of journalism, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia.

MEDVEDEV N.P. – Doctor of Sciences(political sciences), Professor of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia.

OLIVIER VÉDRINE – Professor (h.c.), Journalist, political scientist, Paris, France.

PASHCHENKO L.V. – Candidate of Sciences (philosophy), Associate Professor at the Chair of history and law, Murmansk Arctic State University, Murmansk, Russia.

PENZINA A.I. – Post-graduate working for the Master’s degree at the Chair of theory and history of journalism, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia.

PRYAKHIN V.F. – Doctor of Sciences(political sciences), Professor of the Chair of foreign regional studies and foreign policy of the Russian state Humanitarian University, Moscow, Russia.

SHIR AKA NAJIBULLAH – Post-graduate student, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Kabul, Afghanistan.

SLIZOVSKIY D.E. – Doctor of sciences (history), Professor, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia.

SOMAR GANEM – Post-graduate student at the Chair of theory and history of international relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Latakia, Syria.

STATSENKO O.S. – Candidate of Sciences (political sciences), Associate Professor, Head of the Chair of theory and history of state and law, Institute of Law, Sevastopol State University, Sevastopol, Russia.

TOMBU D.V. – Candidate of Sciences (political sciences), Assistant Professor at the Chair of political science, Moscow State Pedagogical University, Moscow, Russia.

ZALYSIN I.Yu. – Doctor of Sciences (political sciences), Head of the Chair of political sciences, Moscow Timiryazev Agricultural Academy (MSHA), Moscow, Russia.

   
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