Kozmenko V.M., Beresnev R.A. Review of the article by Grishaeva O.N., Popova S.I., Belyaeva V.P., Grishina V.O. “The Fourth Presidential Term of V.V. Putin: New Challenges”
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.012
REVIEW of the article by Grishaeva O.N., Popova S.I., Belyaeva V.P., Grishina V.O. “The Fourth Presidential Term of V.V. Putin: New Challenges”
Reviewers:
V.М. Kozmenko Doctor of Sciences (history), Professor of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia Moscow, Russia
R.А. Beresnev Bachelor of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia Moscow, Russia
The topic of the article “The Fourth Presidential Term of V.V. Putin: New Challenges,” in our opinion, is one of the most important, if not the most important in the study and analysis of the current political process in Russia. One can only welcome the passionate desire of a group of researchers of various scientific and educational statuses - from the candidates of science, associate professors of a university to an employee of a general education institution and a student – to identify, describe, classify and analyze how Russian experts perceive the fourth presidential term of V.V. Putin and how the fourth term of the president corresponds to the real political agenda. And this last task or goal is closely related to the question of the nature and fate of V.V. Putin’s political regime.
We would like to emphasize that aspect in principle and stress primarily not so much the content of the article, the order or logic of the material being submitted and analyzed, as to indicate the uniqueness of the team (group) of researchers. It is rarely, very rarely that one can observe the processes of formation of research teams, which include both experienced and completely young people interested in being in the ranks of the academic researchers. Such examples should be fully supported and conditions should be created to extend such forms of scientific work. Appreciation should be expressed to the editorial board of the journal, which supports the publication of this article providing its pages for it. It is well known what obstacles arise when the research-minded students are cut off from the practical scientific work because of the erroneous policies and bureaucratic procedures according to which unknown, young and still unrecognized researchers lower the ratings of academic journals. In this case, the approach was different. Such different logic of scientific creativity, it seems to us, is capable of inspiring this group of researchers to continue its studies.
It is important to emphasize that the article is about the system of views of the expert and academic community of political scientists from among Russian analysts who want to understand the most complex vicissitudes of the Russian political regime created and managed by such an extraordinary figure in modern politics as V.V. Putin. Perhaps we are somewhat exaggerating the objective and subjective reasons followed by the Russian expert community, analytical and sociological centers in order to deal with such issues. What can we say about this in relation to the expert community! This process still needs to be explained in the right language. But of course, the authors of the article, in their plans and efforts, held to the conviction – “the desire to understand the complex vicissitudes” of Putin’s political regime and Putin's rule during the fourth term of the presidency!
V.V. Putin’s presidential rule since 2000 and especially his fourth term in office, which began in 2018 and is to be completed in six years, and his current state are undoubtedly something peculiar. The fourth term of V.V. Putin is characterized by such changes in external and internal challenges, without the understanding of which it is impossible to take a single step in any field of social, political, economic or public activities. But what objective material for the correct and accurate analysis do we have? If you use the keywords “Putin's regime” in the Yandex search engine, then among the ten top links you will find such texts with obviously determined or predetermined meanings as: “When will Putin's regime fall?”, “ Putin's regime will get stronger, ” “War will sweep away Putin’s regime,” “Next three scenarios of the collapse of Putin’s regime, ” “ Putin's regime: point of no return has been passed.” You can expand the search for connotations of this topic. And there you will find mass signs of negative reflections on the regime and its subject - President V. Putin. The authors of the article under review have a more relaxed and balanced view on the issues of the fourth term in office: the next term of V. Putin’s rule has not surprised either the public or the political science community; on the one hand, the democratic process is shrinking, on the other, there is a lot of positive changes; the numerous votes cast for the president (76.69%) were in some way the result of the media consolidation. With a given selection of material and its interpretation, the authors’ position no longer sounds as an empty phrase from the text of the article: citizens of the Russian Federation mainly voted for V.V. Putin because it is with him that they associate the hashtag “stability;” the Russian Federation during V.V. Putin’s rule has demonstrated a more stable experience in the development of its political system in the post-Soviet space compared to a number of other political systems. In the background of such claims is the legalization of Putin's rule and the recognition of its stability. But is such legalization an impeccable fact?
It is logical, therefore, that the authors of the article focused on the interpretation of the material and such expert assessments, that demonstrate the connection between the strategic tasks that V. Putin pronounced upon taking the office and those steps, actions, and acts that were outlined and undertaken. The article presents three to five steps that in their nature are capable of mobilizing the society and the elite during the fourth term of presidency. Among such actions and steps are: the May Decree and proposal regarding the appointment of the Chairman of the Government, mass rotation of the heads of the Subjects of the Federation (governors) and proposals for plans of social and economic development. It is natural in this regard to ask yourself and the authors of the article how the ideological and political experts that group around the power structures of the state, on the one hand, appreciated and reacted to this design of the presidency, to this direct and clear presentation of the strategy of that presidential term, and on the other hand, examine the reaction of the groups and centers opposing the authorities.
You can find different criteria for evaluating both the experts themselves, and their views and level of understanding of the content, principles, and basic foundations of the fourth term of V. Putin’s presidency. There are more or less accurate characteristics and rationales for problems and challenges that will determine both the style of the presidential rule and its key characteristics. Rather, there is a set of terms and epithets that determine the current and expected state of Putin’s political regime. Let us list this set of definitions that the authors confidently and meticulously use in the article, drawing both the conditions and circumstances in which the political regime found itself at the given time: strong external pressure and a new crisis of the existing economic model; economic modernization and preparation of the state for the transfer of power and upbringing of a new set of managers. No matter how one evaluates and relates to the circle of ideas and judgments concerning the main and secondary characteristics of the fourth presidential rule of V. Putin, one can hardly deny the fact that it is a matter of changing the attitude of the population towards the political regime and towards President V. Putin. And this change, as the authors of the article show, confirmed by sociologists, lays the foundation for the downgrade of V.V. Putin’s rating: "the population is demonstrating less trust in the head of state and it has become to worse treat the president.”
The observed and recorded changes in this, as in all other areas, do not eliminate the main features of the encumbent political regime, the existing balance of forces and relationships in the structure of politics and state power. This explains the fundamental task of a conscious expert, scientist, specialist, a public figure or a statesman – to take into account these new changes, not to surrender helplessly to the emerging trend, which is gaining strength in flow and movement. The authors of the article formulate this thesis, if you will, in an academic language: “such calls need not only a timely and immediate response from the president, but also a kind of conceptualization.” Subsequent reasoning does not add much to this statement. In it, the key place belongs to the idea of the need for “a kind of conceptualization” of both the institute of the presidency and the role of the President himself. And if we are talking about a kind of conceptualization of topics and issues, then we will express a number of judgments provoked by this acutely polemical article.
First, expert opinions, the experts used in this article, cannot and have not acted as politicians. They reacted and relate to the plots on a given topic as publicists, as a group of ideologically engaged intellectuals. They are sharp in language and condescending in their understanding of what a political regime and its active functionaries are, functionaries who operate in the harsh conditions of political confrontation with their adversaries and opponents, with an active or passive population capable of active actions under certain conditions.
Today, the topic of content and nature of the fourth presidential term of V.V. Putin as the President of the country and his future are widely discussed. The expert community of political scientists and active citizens of all views do not stint in the epithets, in the ways they express their vision of what the Putin regime is already like, what it is leaning to and into what it turns and will turn while responding to new challenges. You can talk about the fact that they write a lot on this topic. This is true and correct. But it is an exaggeration to say that many people think about it and discuss it soberly, that these processes and phenomena are well understood, that many people realize the role and importance of their subjects outside of their engagement in the political and ideological inclinations. This is precisely what is lacking.
Could we have been told something else, for example, by a typical researcher, historian and political scientist of Ukrainian origin, Alexander Motyl, a professor at Rutgers University (USA), when he, comparing Trump and Putin, asserts: “ They eagerly use fake news and they believe that the reality is what they say. What is even worse, both men have a strong paranoid trait. Trump in the first place sees the enemies at home and Putin first of all sees the enemies abroad. Both are also confident of their greatness: Trump regularly claims that he will be the greatest president from time immemorial. While Putin claims that he and Russia are one and the same.” What and how Motyl says and writes, of course, in his opinion, is the truth and a true reflection of reality. By attributing his picture of warped, false and deceptive perception to Trump and Putin, this professor transfers his reflection, his way of thinking to others, including the presidents. And in this way he forms an even more curved reflection and perception of the visible world. In there anything unknown added by his assertion that not the best times have come in Russia and President Vladimir Putin is to be blamed for everything. He adds: “behind the external power of Russia lies the collapse of the economic and political system.” Or that, if not so long ago, Putin was considered invulnerable, then today he and his whole system look frightened and exhausted, and that, according to Western experts, Russia is in a state of crisis and there are no positive changes. Motyl sees nothing strange in this logic of development of the Russian political and economic system. But then we are allowed to say that we, too, see nothing strange in the logic of Motyl's judgment. It would be less strange if he wrote differently and tried to examine and analyze what is happening in the refraction of a new research optics. We would like to see in such judgments and analysis the main thing – the novelty of the approach. Or at least what is required of anyone who takes up this topic is to treat Putin’s regime honestly and professionally and also to his subject. But alas!
Doubts can be twofold. First, it’s not worth to flavour political processes with moral and ethical categories, such as honesty. Politics and politicians are far from these substances. Give us and outline the ways of analysis through the recognition and advocacy of the interests of elites, social classes, political parties and leaders. Second, it is fashionable to speak and analyze the contemporary realities as a conflict of ideologies, in which neoliberalism is still good and worthy. And anything outside that ideology is populism. We still insist that it’s appropriate to analyse the fourth term of V. Putin with application and on the basis of an honest attitude to the regime, processes and persons of this regime. Honest in the sense that if “pro-Putin” political analysts and experts do not recognize honestly possible, potential and real threats to the regime, and insist on their sinlessness, then it is very likely that the question of an honest and fair world order will be put up by the street and the “biomass.”
Secondly, there are no strong grounds for stating at least in the tendency of professional analysis and transmission of quality images of vision and understanding of not only of the role of the instite of presidency in Russia, predetermined by traditions and constitutional norms. But there is still some lightness in judgments as to the differences between the actual institute of the presidency and the personal characteristics of its subjects. We still have to talk about the academic research in this regard. The article under review is an example and a pre-warning. Example and notification – as the topic is relevant and difficult in terms of the methodology, its conceptuality, according to the methods of analysis and cognition.
We talked about the fact that the fourth presidential term of V.V. Putin is something peculiar. What are the main elements of such peculiarity? V.V. Putin’s politics for all periods of his rule shows us that the state system of the country has changed in one particular direction. Russia's political regime is unlike any previous regime: Putin’s regime will not lose its popularity even if revenues from natural resources fall down; in order to defeat the extreme left and extreme right-wing forces in the country, in order to ease the external pressure, the Putin regime will have to compromise between the liberal and conservative ideologies; Putin’s regime in the fourth term will be fueled by patriotic feelings and aspirations of the people to enhance Russia's prestige as a great power and resist the most radical sentiments of Russian patriots who consider Putin’s regime too soft, too pragmatic, too moderate and even “weak” and “indecisive.” It is possible that it is precisely during that term, that the presidency will resolve the dilemma in understanding the Putin regime as the basis of two components: the personal power of V. Putin himself and the growing role of consolidating democratic institutions in Russia in favor of the latter. The consolidation and strengthening of democratic institutions in the country will be initiated and supported in the first place, and this is the main peculiarity of the regime, by V. Putin himself. But the risks of failing both because of the excessive centralization or because of the equally excessive liberalization will not be eliminated in this term either. This is a concern of the new generation of presidents and political regimes with a different content, changed in comparson with the current one.
KURBONOVA Z.M., IKROMOVA M.N. The Role of Russian Federation in the Preventing of Inter-Tajik Conflict
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.011
Z.M. KURBONOVA Candidate of political sciences, Doctoral candidate of Institute of Philosophy, Political Sciences and Law named after A. Bahouddinov, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, Republic of Tajikistan
M.N. IKROMOVA PhD student, Tajik State University of commerce, Dushanbe, Republic of Tajikistan
THE ROLE OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE PREVENTING OF INTER-TAJIK CONFLICT
Russian peace-keeping activity was one element in a range of contradictory and often dangerous policies and activities in armed conflicts on Russia’s borders in the post-Soviet period. Russia, from the beginning, was deeply involved in all these conflicts both in a political sense, because of the desire of autonomous regions or Russian minorities within other post-Soviet republics to join the Russian Federation, and in a material sense, because of the supply of Russian arms and mercenaries and even the involvement of regular Russian units in these conflicts following the collapse of the Soviet military machine. Moreover, the conflicts threatened Russia’s own security.
Key words: collapse, Russian peace-keeping activity, dangerous policies, own security.
When the Russian Federation declared itself the heir of the former USSR, none of its leaders comprehended the level of responsibility Russia was assuming for events taking place outside its territory. The arsenals of Soviet arms in the former Union states were rapidly being seized by unknown people. While the governments of the new independent republics did not acknowledge any connection with these seizures, they also failed to conduct any serious investigation into them (3).
In one fell swoop, the attack internationalized a civil conflict in Tajikistan which, since April 1992, has claimed over 100,000 lives. Already, it is having three other effects. First, the escalation of the conflict is exerting a decided, and possibly decisive, influence in Russia's inconclusive efforts to define its geopolitical priorities. By the same token, it has given the protagonists of integration in both Russia and Central Asia a renewed determination to transform the CIS into a reconstituted USSR. Finally, it is raising trenchant questions about Russia's ability to match means to ends and is forcing Russian policy makers to consider just what the Russian Federation can and cannot accomplish on its own. If long debated questions are at last being answered, there is little indication as yet that the answers will suit Russia's neighbors, let alone benefit Russia itself.
The third operation which is considered as peace-keeping by the Russian leadership was conducted by Russian forces in Tajikistan within a joint peacekeeping force under the leadership of the CIS (4).
The collective peace-keeping forces in this mountainous Central Asian republic were formed in November 1993, at a joint meeting of the Heads of States of the CIS. The experience of the peace-keeping forces in Transdnestr and Southern Ossetia was taken into consideration in the formulation of their tasks. At that point, the first steps towards analyzing the actions of the Russian forces during military conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union were undertaken. However, the proportionate and successful use of force for the maintenance of peace in the conflict zones gave rise to exaggerated expectations about the possibilities of using peace-keeping forces [1]. The operation in Tajikistan became an illustration of the erroneous nature of this approach. It was envisaged that the collective peace-keeping forces would include Russian forces previously based in Tajikistan as well as units from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan 3 and Kazakhstan. By that time, the Russian and Uzbekistani military were already deeply involved in the conflict in Tajikistan.
The units of the 201st Division were the source of arms for both the warring sides. During the extraordinarily violent war in the summer and autumn of 1992, the Russian Ministry of Interior repeatedly appealed to the warring sides to start negotiations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, made a similar appeal during a special visit in October. Nonetheless, the units of the 201st Division, based in different parts of the republic, were in a difficult situation. Both the groups supporting the Islamic-democratic authorities in Dushanbe and the pro-Communist formations of the National Front tried to entice the Russian military on to their side or to take away their weapons and equipment by every possible means (5).
Some units of the 201st Division were de facto encircled and were forced to assume a circular defense within the borders of their military bases. These bases also became a sanctuary for refugees. In the autumn of 1992, a decision was made to replenish the 201st Division with the addition of specially trained units. The Division, which had suffered from a shortage in manpower, was able to restore its combat readiness. In accordance with an agreement with the authorities, military hardware was positioned on the roads around the capital. The aim of this measure was to prevent the infiltration of small gangs of thieves notorious for their handiwork in the capital city. After the defeat of the Islamic-democratic coalition and the change in power in Dushanbe, the Russian authorities openly supported the new government and agreed, for the sake of maintaining stability, to turn a blind eye to the Communist slogans and the mass violations of human rights through which the National Front came to power. Support was also expressed for the significant economic assistance supplied by Russia to the new government and for active military co-operation (2).
President Boris Yeltsin and the Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, on a number of occasions declared Tajikistan as a zone of special interest to the Russian Federation. Russia signed a special treaty with the new government on ‘Co-operation in Military Issues’. Actual co-operation went much further than was envisaged in the treaty. Cases were registered when the Russian military ensured the security of the Tajiki forces in disarmament operations [2].
The Russian forces had the task of preventing a renewed explosion of the conflict, which threatened to spill over into Central Asia. According to the Russian military, Russia still did not have the economic resources adequately to protect its southern borders. The civil war in Central Asia would have exposed the southern borders of Russia to weapons and drug trafficking from Afghanistan and the Pamirs, where the remaining units of the Islamic opposition took refuge. They therefore prepared new units to return home to Tajikistan.
In conjunction with the Tajik government, Russia initially sent airborne commando units and, later, border guards to the borders between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. On the night of 31 July 1993, one of the Russian border posts was almost completely destroyed by Afghani units of the Islamic opposition. This tragedy elicited a strong response in Russia and illuminated one of the most important issues of this war – the lack of a serious legal basis for the actions of the Russian forces in the CIS countries.
The liberal intellectuals rightly accused the government of attempting to take control over Tajikistan and in essence repeat the failed experience of the Soviet assistance to Afghanistan. At that point, the government promoted the idea of creating a coalition of forces from the CIS to secure stability in the region.
In November 1993, at a meeting of the heads of states of the CIS, an agreement was made to create the Collective Peace-keeping Forces (CPF). In addition to Russia, three countries committed themselves to send one battalion each to participate in the peace-keeping forces. Uzbekistan did not participate in the formation of the CPF, and its forces were virtually autonomous. The participation of the Kyrgyz unit was often called into question. Only Kazakhstan completely met its commitment. The evidence, however, seems to show that the Kazakh battalion based in the mountainous region of Badakhshan, which is partly controlled by opposition forces, is not capable of changing the situation in its area of responsibility [3].
In general, the actions of the CPF bore little resemblance to the actions of peace-keeping forces. Their military power supported the current regime and allowed it to remain passive during negotiations with the representatives of the armed opposition. Moreover, the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS stressed to the commander of the CPF, Lieutenant General Valeri Patrikeev, on 19 April 1995, during the deterioration of the situation in Tajikistan, the necessity to provide ‘assistance to the Tajikistan with forces and equipment in order to bring the size of the Tajiki army to 16 thousand’. This, according to the general, would have allowed the Tajiki forces to secure defense of the main borders. This plan was not adopted, however, and the Russian government continues to push the Tajik government to seek a compromise with the opposition. Stability in the region, moreover, has not increased (1).
NOTES:
(1) From an interview conducted by the author in Moscow in the spring of 1994 with a former fighter of one of these units who escaped from a training camp in Afghanistan.
(2) On 24 October 1994, the Security Council of Southern Ossetia was formed. This was done on the orders of the head of the Southern Ossetian Supreme Soviet, Ludvig Chebirov. The Security Council included the Security Service, the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Internal Affairs. The chief of the Security Council, Vladik Bagaev, the Chief of the Internal Affairs Department, Ruslan Khubulov, and the head of the Security Service, Leonid Kharebov, were removed. It should be noted, however, that by the summer of 1995, the author noticed a checkpoint of the Russian peace-keeping forces at the entrance of the Southern Ossetian Supreme Soviet which had not been there previously.
(3) Small Gali is the provisional name of half of the Gali region closer to the Georgian border and separated from the rest of Abkhazia by a water channel.
(4) This assumption is based on a debate with Russian officers of the collective peace-making forces in Tajikistan in May 1994.
(5) Uzbekistan provided assistance in the formation of the pro-Communist National Front (in Tajikistan), and helped overthrow the coalition of the Islamic-democratic government by supplying military hardware and crews to arm it. Uzbek aircraft bombarded the positions of the retreating forces of the coalition. After the occupation of Dushanbe by the forces of the National Front and the formation of the new government, the author spoke to soldiers from Uzbekistan who were guarding the building of the Ministry of Interior. The Interior Minister Yakub Salima was escorted by two bodyguards dressed in the uniform of Russian airborne forces. The union between Russia and Tajikistan prompted Uzbekistan to change course.
REFERENCES:
1. Kurbonova Z.M. Enclaves in Central Asia: Myths and Realities // “Political Science Issues”. 2017. Volume 7. Issue 1 (25-26).
2. Sokolov A. The drama of Southern Ossetia and human rights’. The Country and the World. 1991. Vol. 63. No. 3, 21-34 (Munich; in Russian).
3. Zhiltsov S., Parkhomchik L., Slisovskiy D., Medvedev N. Central Asia Today: A New Wave of Water and Energy Cooperation and Pipeline Architecture // Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2018. Т. 19. № 2.
RODIONOVA M.E. Image Forming Technologies of the European Politicians (before and after the Election Compaignes)
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.010
М.Е. RODIONOVA Candidate of Sciences (sociology), Deputy Vice Rector for Projects, Associate Professor, Department of sociology, history and philosophy, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia
IMAGE FORMING TECHNOLOGIES OF THE EUROPEAN POLITICIANS (BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTION COMPAIGNES)
The purpose of this article is to examine the peculiarities of image formation of the European politicians using the examples of the recent electorate campaigns, since the general elections of the heads of states are the most demanding from the point of view of the image and technology and most clearly demonstrate the tough rivalry among the individuals and the struggle of images. The article also focuses on the subsequent terms of government and some historical examples. Special attention is paid to the creation of international image of French President Emmanuel Macron, the peculiarities of his communication policy and his interaction with the media. The article cites the politician’s ratings during the term of his presidency.
Key words: image, election campaign, communication strategy, reforms, Internet space.
The image of political leaders of all levels plays a significant role, not to mention the image formation policy during the electoral campaigns of candidates to the post of head of state. Formation and proper use of the image by a political leader is of particular relevance due to the need to position the leader in the political space and to establish various types of communication channels with the society. In order to make a successful political career, the leader must be recognizable and this has become a necessary condition and component of any election campaign. In the European practice, especially during the electorate campaigns and when shaping the leader’s image, the strategy of separating the leader’s personal name from the party’s image and brand is often practiced, as, for example, was done in case of S. Kurz (“Movement – list of Sebastian Kurtz”). A high degree of personification is becoming trendy in many countries, including Europe.
First of all, we will define the concept of an image as “a stereotypical image of a politician or a public figure specially built during the target program of action,” proceeding from S.G. Kara-Murza’s point of view. The purpose of this article is to examine the peculiarities of image formation of the European politicians using the examples of the recent election campaigns, since the general elections of the heads of states are the most demanding from the point of view of the image and technology and most clearly demonstrate the tough rivalry among the individuals and the struggle of images. The article also focuses on the subsequent terms of government and some historical examples.
Successful construction of a politician’s image. It is primarily necessary to establish a certain sequence in shaping the image of a politician, starting with the determination of the audience requirements, relating the candidate’s real qualities with the expectations of the citizens and ending with the translation of selected characteristics into sign systems of various kinds and a series of events.
A politician must inspire sympathy and trust among the people and the image of the leader must be designed in accordance with the expectations of the citizens and the electorate, for example, he/she should look well on the TV, should have an adequate property status, be successful in his/her previous activities and have a reputation of an exemplary family man/woman [5. P. 16-19]. All the more important is the timely appearance of the relevant image at a given time in order to formulate a public demand for a new political leader. For example, when French sociologists recorded a request for an update of the French political elite, Emmanuel Macron became a response to such request.
Successful image of a candidate during an election campaign facilitates and simplifies the solution of such propaganda tasks as: introduction of the candidate’s image into the voters’ consciousness; an increase in the degree of the candidate’s popularity and attention to his person; positioning of the candidate among his/her opponents; gaining of the voters’ sympathy and trust, creating a positive psychological attitude to the perception of any information regarding the course of the election campaign in a way favorable for the candidate; neutralization of the negative information about the candidate; facilitation of the recruitment of supporters to the candidate’s team; formation of confidence that the candidate is the best candidate for the selected post among the candidates running in the same district; formation of an active determination to vote for this candidate.
When constructing an image, it is necessary to follow certain rules, such as, for example, the priority influence of the campaign strategy on the formation of the image, the need to conform the basic features and image requirements to the real qualities of the politician’s personality; the need to take into account electoral preferences in the formation of the image; the need to take into account the images of rivals when designing the image of the candidate.
The election of French President Emmanuel Macron was immediately associated with the expectations of vigorous actions by a young and ambitious politician aimed at strengthening the international influence of his country.
Emmanuel Macron departed from the traditional methods and strategy based on traditional parties and classical programs and preferred the network movement with a populist program in which he combined neoliberal values in the economy with the obligations of the welfare state and social protection of the population.
The need for re-thinking the imageology issues, as well as promoting the image of a politician was caused by the transfer of communication with the citizens from the traditional media to the Internet space, social networks and the blogosphere. For a political, government or business actor, it is important to build their activities and position and promote their image by mastering modern technologies and, above all, information technologies as reflected by the Internet environment and its interactive services system [3. S. 245-248]. It is the Internet environment that assists the creation and promotion of an international image. Image building is possible both for the internal and external environment, in our case, for the international community.
The image of the president with the monarch’s face and the peacemaker’s image. When the international image of E. Macron was created, he was positioned like a monarch, prudent, rational and peace loving, reasonable in conducting dialogues and eager to participate in the resolution of international conflicts; as a person who hears and considers all points of view. This image was also broadcast for the internal positioning of Macron to the French population. Macron was presented as a person who does not neglect the use of social networks.
As for the first steps after the election of Macron President of the Fifth Republic, the word “monarchy” was repeated quite often, although Macron’s image strategy was somewhat corrected since then and the magnitude of the task set before him to return to active foreign policy was felt.
A number of Macron’s meetings in the first few months of his presidency with such heads of states as Putin, Merkel, Trump, Libyan Prime Minister Faiz Saraj, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan were aimed to demonstrate one thing: Paris seeks to occupy a more significant place in the process of settling international conflicts, it strives to be more involved in the global political processes in general.
Meetings with leaders of major world powers such as Putin and Trump in terms of image strategies served as important signals to the international community that France claims a more significant role in the international space, emphasizing the importance of transatlantic unity as considerable element of the French foreign policy and paying greater attention to the European affairs.
It is also interesting that to emphasize the importance and duration of relations with other countries Macron’s team skillfully used historical dates, stressing that the meeting with Putin commemorated 300 years of diplomatic relations between Russia and France, and the meeting with Trump was devoted to the 100th anniversary of US entry into World War I.
Features of Macron’s communication strategy: president recluse. The image of Macron was influenced by such foreign policy events as Donald Trump's election US President and also by massive leaks of classified information in the media that imposed limitations on the behavior pattern of the newly elected French President.
Initially, positioning was built on the readiness for an open dialogue with the society, a greater openness than we saw later. The image makers took into account blunders of the communication strategy of the previous presidents Francois Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy, who had often communicated with the press and allowed reporters to the backstage of the political process, thus partially contributing to their own defeat. In this connection, Macron subsequently abandoned the open model of behavior and acted differently, trying to limit his press communications. Restricted communications with journalists and tight control of relations between high-ranking officials and the media have established a clear distance between the journalistic community and the president. Many experts drew a parallel with Francois Mitterrand, who had also distanced himself from the journalists. Such policy allowed both presidents to adequately hold themselves in public, to prevent the occurrence of uncontrolled or unwanted moments and to avoid large reputational losses, helping to preserve the royal image.
Unlike his predecessors, Macron became a “silent president” after canceling the ritual July 14 interview with journalists and the practice of interviews without a microphone. The experience and communication system of his predecessors made Macron depart from the traditional methods of communication with journalists and employ other methods, such as the use of visual images in most cases through a television frame: Macron shakes hands with Putin, takes a military parade, encourages dialogue of implacable enemies, etc.
The impact of unpopular reforms on the image of Macron. Inside France, Macron faces great difficulties in constructing his image. This is due to the fact that the populist statements made during the election campaign even at that time caused doubts regarding their implementation. However, it is worth noting that some elements of populism were present in the strategy of almost all politicians, who claimed to win the majority of voters.
Macron inherited many problems from Francois Hollande (many measures were budgeted for 2017 under President Hollande) and the new administration had an obligation to implement such unpopular reforms as reduction of social support for the population, reduction of army funding and labor law reform that have become a serious test for the young president, triggering a wave of protests in many French cities. The situation is not easy for Macron, since he is faced with challenges and unpopular measures.
Not all of Macron’s actions had a positive impact on his image. For example, when he was supposed to address the armed forces, he put on his military uniform, causing a mixed reaction from the French society. Of course, it is necessary to realize that the adoption of unpopular reforms and measures and the image miscalculations directly affected Macron’s rating and popularity.
Fig. 1. Macron’s rating in 2017
Fig. 2. Emmanuel Macron popularity index
However, it is necessary to note the work of his professional team of PR and communication experts, evidenced by the reasonableness of each statement made by the President, which probably allowed him to avoid large reputational losses.
The results of a survey conducted by the sociological service Ifop show a growing approval of the President’s policy. In early January 2019, Macron’s approval rating was 28%, while in December 2018 only 23% of the French supported the head of state. The level of trust has grown in the age group of 65 years and above and among workers. The survey was conducted on-line on January 3 and 4 among 1.014 people aged 18 years and above.
The nature of the fall of the Macron's rating does not pose serious threats in the short term, since he has a stable majority in the National Assembly and is protected by his cohesive team, while his competitors are weakened. The decline in the rating is explained by Macron’s attempts to systematically implement a long-term modernization program that requires sacrifices from most social groups. Macron understands the challenges facing France in the modern world. In the long term, there are obvious threats connected with the future presidential elections of 2022.
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LEBEDEVA M.L. Power Technologies of the Organizational Model of French Regional Policy
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.009
M.L. LEBEDEVA Candidate of Sciences (political sciences), Associate Professor at the Chair of political sciences, Russian State Agrarian University – MSHA named after K.A. Timiryazev, Moscow, Russia
POWER TECHNOLOGIES OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL OF FRENCH REGIONAL POLICY
The purpose of writing this article is to highlight the features of organization of the regional policy in France on the basis of the theoretical understanding of the concepts of “regional policy,” “model of regional policy” and “policy analogy.” The research topic is the content of the French policy of organizing a regional political space. The object of the research is the power technologies of regional policy.
The system-structural method, which considers political relations as an integral system of interconnections of phenomena and events of the political process, makes it possible to determine the main essential content of this research topic. Institutional approach involves the study of political institutions and their content.
An analysis of Russian and foreign sources suggests that the main issue posed in the article is relevant at the present stage of development. The study is made possible on the basis of existing research. A comprehensive study of the conceptual theoretical characteristics of the regional policy as such allowed the author to identify the model and features of the political toolkit for the organization of the“center-regions” relations in modern French Republic.
Key words: regional policy, model, policy analogy, unitarism, federalism.
The regional policy of each state is unique in its own way. At the same time, it is possible discuss a relatively possible model of organizing regional spatial development. It is quite obvious that any model, as such, is changing in the process of evolution and political challenges, and at the same time, it is a constant, filled with institutional content, with a certain structure, mechanisms and tools for the organization of political power.
The questions of structuring the system of government bodies, the specifics of the relationship of the central government with local territorial units are important and topical issues of the world and Russian political process. No state in the world can shirk the responsibility for the country's territorial integrity. This is the usual policy norm of each state in the relatively quiet phase of its existence. But this rule turns into a priority function of the state during the periods of radical transformation of the existing social relations and formation of new ones. The history teaches that during such periods the states undergoes the strongest territorial changes, and it is the uncontrollable disintegration processes that turn into incalculable disasters and political disasters for the people [9. P. 9]. There is a threshold beyond which the social tension acquires an explosive character [21. P. 51].
Virtually all states involved in the globalization process are subject to internal changes taking place in the system of public authority organization [9. P. 7]. This is expressed in the redistribution of powers within the state itself and the transfer of more powers to the regional level. Transformation of the public administration system and the emergence of the phenomenon of multi-level governance at the present stage require from the states new constitutional legal reforms, the study of the mechanisms and results of such processes [9. P. 7-8].
The state selectively chooses political technologies in the framework of the state structure, procedures and methods that are aimed at achieving the most optimal and effective implementation of the goals and objectives of a particular subject in a particular political situation [16. P. 15]. Political technologies not only streamline the means of achieving this goal, but also fix the sequence of actions, the development of appropriate algorithms for the behavior of each political subject [18. P. 416].
The study of the world experience in organizing regional political process seems to the author to be important and timely from the point of view of the development of political science. The starting point for the understanding of the designated research topic is the notion of “regional policy.” It is possible to single out a certain model of organization of the French regional political space and therefore it is important to show the criteria and grounds for highlighting the main dominant characteristics of the term under consideration.
Various criteria are identified to understand the content of the concept of “regional policy”: the subjects and objects of the regional policy, the scope of regulation and the regional problematic situations [11. P. 101], the goals of such policy, the basic principles and tools for its implementation, “the spatial orientation of regional policy” [20], the search for the optimal system of management of the regional policy pursued, as well as the question of the place of government institutions at all levels of government.
In accordance with the economic approach, regional policy is seen as a solution to regional problems in the economic sphere. The goals, objectives and scope of regional policy differ both by country and the historical period in the same country. Regional policy depends on a number of factors [4. P. 42], such as: the level of socio-economic development, stages of economic development cycles, the views of the ruling political parties and the dominant economic school, the severity of ethnic issues (when the regional policy is to solve national problems) [12. P. 52-53].
The modern model of integrated regional development of the European Union organizes regional policy in three directions [3. P. 5]. First of all, attention is paid to the economic convergence of regions in order to help less developed territorial spatial formations, thereby reducing their lag behind more developed countries. Secondly, programs are being implemented to improve regional competitiveness and employment. The third direction is the promotion of cooperation between regions and countries in order to reduce the economic value of the national borders [3. P. 5].
Professor D. Yuill, speaking of the tasks of the regional policy of the EU countries, identified four groups, “reflecting the different nature and complexity of the regional problems facing them” [20]. He attributed France to the fourth group of countries, which, according to his point of view, is less affected by the uneven development of various regions, highlighting employment and structural change as the main problems of these countries. The American political scientist emphasized: “The EU regional policy is now a policy that determines and focuses on the possibilities for the future, mobilizing under-used potential, and not paying compensation for the problems of the past” [3. P. 6].
From the point of view of the political science, regional policy is seen as a policy towards the regions, namely, the regional dimension of the political process. The center manages the regional structure, while maintaining its general outline, but at the same time, determines the permissible parameters of regional fragmentation, thereby ensuring state regulation of territorial development.
Regional policy is an integral part of the state policy represented by its political institutions, aimed at the organization of the national space (territory) in accordance with the chosen development strategy; it is also the system of principles, priorities and norms that determine the nature of interaction between the central and regional authorities [9. P. 27-28].
Regional policy is part of the vertical hierarchy in the relations “center – regions”, its subject is the center that develops and implements it. Thus, regional policy is a subject-object relationship between the center and the regions. The central level is its subject and the regional level is the object [19. P. 80-81].
Combining the above definitions of the sought-after concept, a regional policy can be understood as a system of goals and objectives of state authorities for managing the political, economic, and social development of the country's regions, as well as a mechanism for their implementation [10. P. 95]. Regional policy is a legally defined system of state measures, directly aimed at resolving the problems of the integrated development of regions of the country through the redistribution of resources between regions.
Regional policy in the broad sense of the word is a system of management decisions of any political structures of the national level in relation to their territories [19. P. 82]; the policy pursued by public authorities and local authorities with the participation of the regions. In a narrow sense, regional policy is understood as state administration, a policy pursued by federal government bodies, state government bodies of the regions, local governments at the expense of budget funds of all levels of government.
The main goal of the regional policy is to find a compromise between the interests of regional government bodies and local self-government bodies, and in addition: reducing disproportions in the standard of living and business conditions between parts of the state; interregional cooperation; territorial integrity of the state [17. P. 211]; ensuring the economic, social, legal and organizational foundations of federalism in the Russian Federation, the creation of a single economic space; ensuring uniform minimum social standards and equal social protection, guaranteeing the social rights of citizens established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, regardless of the economic opportunities of the regions; prevention of environmental pollution, as well as the elimination of the consequences of its pollution, integrated environmental protection of the regions; priority development of regions of particular strategic importance; maximum use of natural and climatic features of the regions; formation and provision of guarantees of local self-government [2].
According to Musaev R.A. and Reshiyev S.S., it is possible to distinguish as a tool of regional policy restrictive (administrative and financial) and incentive measures (aimed at stimulating economic growth in regions lagging behind in terms of their economic development) [12. P. 57].
The authors of the above classification divide incentive measures into four unequal groups: 1) funding of the population for leaving the problem territories, which helps to resolve the unemployment problems and reduce social or regional spendings from the regional or local budgets; 2) location of state enterprises and institutions; 3) improvement of the territories by measures of regional policy aimed at increasing the investment attractiveness of the territories, but not implying the support of specific enterprises; 4) assistance to individual enterprises. Measures of this kind lead to the decentralization of government agencies [12. P. 58].
In addition to the above-mentioned regional policy instruments, the priority tasks of the Western countries include: 1) development of “problematic” regions and reconstruction of the “depressed regions”; 2) decentralization of agglomerations and territories of superconcentration of the population and industrial production; 3) formation of new industrial hubs outside urban settlements that are not associated with the existing centers of industrial production [13. P. 308].
The most common regional policy measures are financing (budget), administration (bans, permits and benefits) and infrastructure development. In many countries, regional policy is carried out not only by the central authority, but also by the authority of separate administrative parts of the state [17. P. 211].
The political content of the regional policy is determined in several directions: the preservation of the territorial-political system; centralized control over the regions and at the same time an effective balance of powers and resource base of central and regional authorities; harmonization of relations across and between the regions [19. P. 86].
An complex approach to the understanding of the content of regional policy reveals all areas of its regulation. We are talking about the subsystems of the region – political, economic, social, ethno-national and spiritual. The authors of this approach (Shtulberg B. and Vvedensky V.) consider that the task of the regional policy is to comprehensively solve regional problems of various origins, which distinguishes regional policy from the regional aspects of other state policies [19. P. 87].
On the basis of a systemic vision of a regional policy that is broader than an integrated approach, Turovsky R.F. defines it as a system of actions of the national center aimed at regulating political relations with the regions and at the regional level itself [19. P. 87].
In scientific literature, regional policy is often typologized vertically on the basis of three levels of government: federal, subregional and local. By virtue of this circumstance, the state (federal) and regional subsystems are distinguished in the regional policy structure. This is a policy that has the status of the state policy, but is developed by the regions or pursued by the federal authorities [11. P. 104]. The difference between these types of power is in the scale and financial sources [11. P. 104]. The main feature of regional policy in the context of federalism is that the federal government bodies are the coordinating element of regional policy at all levels of government.
The object of regional policy is “various regional (spatial) inequalities” [10. P. 106]. In this regard, the regional policy is a form of government intervention in different regional subsystems. The most important causes of spatial (regional) inequalities are political conditions, forms of general and regional politics; institutional factors; degree of regional autonomy; the history of regional development and others. [5. P. 8]. For example, Russia to a certain extent demonstrates that the process of division of rights between the federal government, the administration of the subjects of the Federation and local authorities has not been completed [9. P. 30].
The main function of regional policy is to ensure the integrated socio-economic development of a particular region and all regions as a certain integrity. State regional policy is the main instrument for the regulation of relations between the center and the regions and creation of a single legal and economic space [11. P. 94]. Strengthening the latent contradictions between the center and the regions and the role of the state make it necessary to clarify and develop a system of regional policy. Accordingly, it is entirely expedient to preserve and rationally use the experience of the state planning that takes place in solving territorial problems.
Within the framework of the regional policy, a regional structure is being formed, which plays a strategic role in the public policy. Such cases are called decentralization policy. Decentralization is the development of self-government in the regions and localities, when the political decision-making process is partially shifted towards the regions. An important component of decentralization is devolution, a transfer of authority from the center to the regions and local government structures [19. P. 162].
The main directions of regional policy abroad are: 1) decentralization of political and administrative authority and economy, ensuring greater independence of the regions; 2) development of joint strategies for the economic development of the center and the regions; 3) alignment of the levels of social and economic development of the territories; 4) coordination of the long-term regional programs and strategic goals of regional policy [11. P. 96-97].
The author draws the attention to the model of regional policy of the French Republic as an existing pattern of spatial political development. The experience of unitarism, namely, the form of organization of power technologies at such levels as: center-regions; region-region is of specific interest.
A political region (spatially organized or historically established territorial community) is a certain level of political relations. The solution of the issue of the format of relations “center-regions” is directly related to the quality of the state.
The balance of relations “center-regions” involves the competition of two institutions the centralized control and regional participation. In France, the concept of the “center” exists in two basic senses. The first sense determines the social center, the opposition of two extremely ideological blocks and the second sense is the political “center” [15. P. 210-211]. The center is a subsystem of state control and management, the role of which is the integrity of the territory of the state, the provision of a unified state policy [19. P. 75]. A region is a subsystem providing regional (local) interest. Its role-playing function is an independent solution of local issues, for which it seeks to create managerial autonomy, its own political subspace independent in certain parameters from the center [19. P. 75].
A true reflection of interests, the search for their coherence and the balancing of powers allows building the following models of “center-regions” relations presented in the following table 1 [22. P. 92].
Table 1
Models of “center-regions” relations
In case of federalism, there is a gradual erosion of regionalism and regional identity, with the result that a number of states have determined the federal path of territorial development acceptable to themselves. France is characterized by regionalism on the verge of federalism.
A political region is a territory with a systemic unity of institutional peculiarities [6. P. 86]. The model of the French regional policy that the author distinguishes is tentatively called the “Model of the French regional policy ‘Subsidiary Integration’ ” (“Modèle de la politique régionale française ‘Intégration subsidiaire’”).
The author uses the term “subsidiarity” in the name of the model not by accident. By analogy as such and because of the close interrelation between the political science and jurisprudence, the concepts of subsidiarity and responsibility are, in the opinion of the author, a single whole.
Based on the content of article 399 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, subsidiary liability is as a type of the civil liability in which additional functions arise, namely, the nature of responsibility in which the requirement transfers from the main debtor to additional persons [1]. So why not allow the possibility of the existence of such a thing as a “policy analogy” and accordingly broaden the understanding of this term by adding the interpretation of a humanitarian nature, which constitutes legal knowledge.
The principle of subsidiarity lies in the fact that the central authority must fulfill a “subsidiary” (auxiliary), non-subordinate, subordinate or dominant role, solving only those tactical tasks that cannot be effectively performed at the regional level [9. P. 120]. Besides, additional technologies should be created to limit the political influence of the central government.
The model of the French regional politics is a kind of hierarchy where political actors of the local level of government actively work for the central authority [7. P. 1067-1069]. In addition, the model presented by the author is characterized by a high degree of centralization of power. At the same time, the regional administration of France is built on the basis of state administration on behalf of appointed officials and self-government represented by elected bodies [14. P. 447], it combines the functions of local government and the functions of local government in state authorities [8. P. 56].
Regional policy must comply with a specific strategy: a single, conceptually elaborated state policy provisions in respect of the regions, a strategy based on a choice of ways to solve two problems: effective integration of territories (here unitarism and federalism collide) and control over geopolitical risk zones [7. P. 72]. The question is facing tactical actions and possible actors of political influence.
The author’s attention is drawn by the political institutions that have developed in the framework of the French regional process, the relations of the central government and political communities of the subnational level. French regional policy appears as an example of spatial development. France was chosen by the author not by chance, it is a state with a unitary form of territorial organization. At the same time, it is characterized by regionalism, bordering federalism, which is important in the framework of the transformation of federal relations in modern Russia.
Models of the “center-regions” level can be built through the ratio of the existing forms of central control and forms of regional participation, which, as a rule, are established by the central authority, that is, the political center. The regional political process appears as a system of interrelated and interdependent elements (balances): forces, interests and relations.
The regional policy of modern France can be described as “a strong center – strong regions (certain relativity of the content).” However, in the model of the French regional policy designated by the author, the central authority should play a supporting role, which is not characteristic of the real political process in France. The degree of centralization of power is high, and the regions are more like political actors performing servile functions.
France is characterized by a targeted, namely, direct, approach to the development of specific regions. At the same time, the peculiarity of the regional policy of France is in the combination of the functions of local government and the functions of regional (local) participation in the central government and national policy. In France, a system of direct relations between the center and the regions has been formed; the political center acts as an organizing principle, with the subordination of various levels of government and significant regional isolation.
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