AVTSINOVA G.I., BURDA M.A. Youth Policy in Modern Russia. Absenteeism and Political Protest

DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.006

G.I. AVTSINOVA Doctor of Sciences (philosophy), Professor at the Chair of political science and international relations, Russian State Social University, Moscow, Russia

М.А. BURDA Candidate of Sciences (political sciences), Associate Professor at the Chair of political science and political management, Faculty "School of Political Studies," Institute of Social Sciences, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia

YOUTH POLICY IN MODERN RUSSIA. ABSENTEEISM AND POLITICAL PROTEST

The article analyzes the features of the current youth policy of the Russian Federation aimed at raising the political culture. Despite the current activities of the government institutions in the field under study, absenteeism, as well as the protest potential of the young people, remains at a fairly high level. In this regard, the government acknowledged the importance of forming a positive image of the state power in the eyes of young people and strengthen its influence in the sphere of forming loyal associations, which is not always positively perceived among the youth. The work focuses on the fact that raising the loyalty of youth organizations is one of the factors of political stability, both in case of internal turbulence and external influence. The authors also focus on the beneficiaries of youth protests. The authors paid special attention to the issue of forming political leadership among the youth and the absence of leaders expressing the opinions of young people in modern Russian politics. At the same time, youth protest as a social phenomenon lack class and in some cases ideological differences. The authors come to the conclusion that despite the steps taken by the government and political parties to involve Russian youth in the political agenda, the young people reject “leaders” of youth opinion imposed by the authorities, either cultivating non-participation in the electoral campagines or demonstrating latent protest voting.

Key words: youth policy, civil society institutions, absenteeism, political protest, political system, political leadership, political culture.

As was rightly noted by one of the most renouned researchers of the Russian youth I.M. Ilyinsky: “Youth is the main value of society, a phenomenon not only demographic, but also economic, social and political [4. P.5-14].”

The above thesis found its logical continuation in the works of V.K. Krivoruchenko [5. P. 33-35], V.A. Lukov [6. P. 44-50] and others.

It should be noted that within the framework of such a humanistic approach, the formation and subsequent implementation of the youth policy aimed at developping the political culture of the youth becomes a strategic task of the government in the new world, where human capital becomes just as important and strategic asset as energy. At the same time, it should be noted that the level of absenteeism in Russian society, resulting from the stagnation of the political system, has a significant impact on the level of political culture of Russian youth. This is the result of the longstanding hegemony of one political party, administrative pressure on the opposition and its representatives during the election campaigns, as well as the absence of real political competition and alternative political leaders. In turn, for certain social groups, including young people, absenteeism is also due to the crisis of ideology and the lack of political power, that they could considere a representative of their interests. It should be noted that one of the factors of youth absenteeism in Russia is an affiliation of the majority of youth movements and projects with the state institutions.

Considering that absenteeism is considerably low in the societies with a high level of political culture, raising this level among the youth is in the sphere of implementation of the state youth policy and is one of the criteria of its effectiveness.

In 2014, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted the Fundamentals of the State’s Youth Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2025 [11]. It was after the approval of the above-mentioned document and the corresponding consolidation in the Russian legal field of the relevant conceptual apparatus that the terms: “youth,” “young specialists,” “young families,” “youth project,” “youth entrepreneurship,” etc., appeared in other regulatory legal acts determining state policy in the field of socio-economic development.

The Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, government authority competent in the field of youth policy, also activated its work as one of the main organizers and curators at the state level of such well-known youth forums as “Seliger,” “Territory of Meanings” and “Tavrida,” and youth projects “You are a businessman,” “Rospatriotsentr”, etc.

The political party dominating in modern Russia also became actively involved in the development of youth political participation within the framework of formation of its youth wing - Young Guard of United Russia (MGER).

Today, MGER is the most mass youth organization in Russia (about 175 thousand people) with representative offices in all 85 regions of the Russian Federation [8].

At the same time, under the auspices of the legislative and executive authorities, at both the federal and regional levels, youth political platforms were formed and gained a certain status. The concept of the youth parliament or council was used as a standard model for such platforms. In this case, the aim of youth parliaments is determined by the course of the ruling political class [1. P. 101-112].

It can be said that at the present stage the Russian authorities re-initiated the unused since the 90s of the 20th century mechanism of formation of youth movements and organizations under the patronage of federal and regional authorities aimed at developping a loyal attitude of the young people to the existing political system and political regime. In addition to the above factor, the political aspect of the youth organizations that has emerged in this way is due to the historical imperative tradition in which the government viewed the youth as a separate social group that should be organized and controlled under the auspices of its authority. In this format, the young people become a resource of power, an object of its influence to achieve certain political goals [3. P. 41-54].

The government is interested in strengthening such a construct due to the substantial potential of the young people political activity and mobility [13. P. 254-257].

At the same time, it should be noted that the affiliation of youth movements and the state does not always correspond to the political preferences of the social group considered in the study and, in this regard, the image of such organizations may require improvement [7. P. 9-18].

Today, a number of major Russian opposition political parties also have “youth wings,” among which the most active are: Zhirinovsky’s Falcons, a wing of LDPR, the Leninist Communist Youth Union of the Russian Federation, a wing of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the youth branch of the Yabloko party and others [14 . P. 95-106].

However, the parties view young people only as a certain part of the electorate, returning to the problems of the young people only during the election campaigns, which significantly contributes to the negative perception of this approach by the young people. Considering that traditionally the participation of the young people in the elections is not very high, the relationship between the opposition parties and young people can be described in chess terms as a “stalemate” situation. The parties, not seeing a special electoral potential of the youth, do not properly focus attention on the current youth agenda and the young people, feeling the inert attitude of the political parties and do not participate in the elections.

In contrast to such approach, representatives of the so-called “non-systemic opposition” act differently. A series of color revolutions and resonant anti-government rallies in the countries of the Maghreb, the Middle East and the Balkans, color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, where young people constituted a substantial part of the protesters, demonstrated a necessity for a more critical understanding of the youth absenteeism, being formed in Russia.

Mass participation of young people in political protests is considered by the authorities in the context of such an urgent issue as the maintenance of stability of the existing system [2. P. 9-14].

In this regard, the issue of political leadership among the young people and deficit of such leaders in the Russian political environment gains additional relevance [10. P. 19-28].

As part of the struggle for leadership in the youth environment, two existing concepts confront. One promotes youth leaders from the government, whom the authorities cultivate in the youth organizations, obviously or latently affiliated with the authorities. Such youth leaders become an absolute clientele of the current government, an “official” youth. Meanwhile, such youth organizations in fact do not fulfill one of the main goals of the youth policy, they do not raise the level of political culture among the youth in general. This is due to the fact that such organizations rely on separate, to a certain extent elitist, groups of young people who are already initially set to actively participate in political activities and do not need additional motivation for such participation.

A different case is when an independent leader appers in the youth community, when he has a certain authority and political potential, but is devoid of substantial administrative support, “the leader from the people.”

The unwillingness on the part of some yopung people to accept the imposed “leader from the authorities” is one of the factors behind the growth of latent protest, including among politically inert youth groups. Protest behavior can be expressed in active participation in the political activities, for instance, membership in a political party, participation in rallies, demonstrations, etc., or can be latent and become manifest only during the election campaigns and expressed in the voting against the candidate put forward by the authorities.

As was rightly noted by A.V. Skiperskyh: “Protest behavior during the election period may be either in the form of non-voting or a deliberate reluctance to interact with this institution, or in the form of a protest strategy realized right at the polling station” [12. P. 63].

In fact, we can say that the excessively high level of state participation in the formation of youth organizations has led to a certain consolidation of protests of the skeptically minded young people and the gradual transformation of this social group into one of the elements of the Russian political system, which becaming a surprise for the Russian authorities.

A curious fact about the oppositionly-minded Russian youth is the formation of the so-called “youth social stratum”, which has special interests and specific problems. It leveled the factor of different social groups to which young people belong, including from the point of belonging to different youth subcultures, or different material situations, erasing the “class” aspect of both youth absenteeism and protest [9. P. 158-168].

At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that the youth protests in modern Russia, as, indeed, in the world practice, are triggered and controlled by the “adults,” who make skepticism about the state power the basis of their protests and present active protests as the only form of influence on the authorities. Such politicians have their well-defined and understandable political goals, or in some cases, material interests and also, for objective reasons, cannot claim the status of all-Russian youth political leaders.

Thus, despite an activation of the mechanisms of the state youth policy, the majority of Russian youth are still outside the Russian political agenda. Russian young people who do not acept excessive state control over youth associations, do not see political parties expressing their interests and do not cultivate political leaders in their midst, are not integrated into the state’s political system, as a real actor influencing state policy formation. In this regard, the level of political culture in the youth environment does not develop and, therefore, absenteeism becomes one of the latent forms of political protest of the Russian youth at the present stage.

A high level of absenteeism in the youth environment is often a precursor to the development of radical ideas and political trends and also distorts the real results in the field of government youth policy.

REFERENCES:

1. Alekseev S.V. Realizatsiya gosudarstvennoy molodezhnoy politiki v Rossii na postsovetskom prostranstve [Implementation of the state youth policy in Russia in the post-Soviet space] // PolitBook. 2014. No. 2 (In Russ.).

2. Burenko V.I. O politicheskoy modernizatsii v sovremennoy Rossii v kontekste osobennostey yeye pravyashchego klassa [On political modernization in today Russia in the context of the features of its ruling class] // University Bulletin (State University of Management). 2012. No. 17 (In Russ.).

3. Davydov A.V., Koryakovtseva O.A. Molodezhnyye organizatsii i dvizheniya v Rossii: istoriya i sovremennost' [Youth organizations and movements in Russia: history and modernity] // PolitBook. 2014. No. 3 (In Russ.).

4. Ilinsky I.M., Lukov V.A. Gosudarstvennaya molodezhnaya politika v Rossii: filosofiya preyemstvennosti i smeny pokoleniy [State youth policy in Russia: philosophy of continuity and change of generations] // Knowledge. Understanding. Skill. 2008. No. 4 (In Russ.).

5. Krivoruchenko V.K. K voprosu teorii o molodezhi budushchego [To the question of the theory of the youth of the future] // Our youth. 2012. No. 5 (In Russ.).

6. Lukov V.A. Uluchsheniye cheloveka kak molodezhnaya problema [Human improvement as a youth problem] // Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 2016. No. 2 (48) (In Russ.).

7. Mikhailova N.V., Tolochko A.V., Grishin O.E. Imidzhevyye aspekty formirovaniya obshchestvenno-politicheskikh molodezhnykh organizatsiy v regional'nom izmerenii (na primere Lipetskoy oblasti) [Image aspects of the formation of socio-political youth organizations in the regional dimension (on the example of the Lipetsk region)] // Ethnosocium and interethnic culture. 2017. No. 10 (112) (In Russ.).

8. Molodaya gvardiya Yedinoy Rossii (MGER) [Young Guard of United Russia (MGER)] // http://www.molgvardia.ru/ (In Russ.).

9. Moskalev A.E., Nazarov A.V. Molodezhnaya oppozitsiya kak sub"yekt politicheskoy sistemy sovremennoy Rossii [Youth opposition as a subject of the political system of modern Russia] // PolitBook. 2014. No. 3 (In Russ.).

10. Myasoedova V.A. Formirovaniye instituta molodezhnykh politicheskikh elit v kontekste politicheskikh preobrazovaniy v rossiyskoy Federatsii [Formation of the institute of youth political elites in the context of political transformations in the Russian Federation] // Bulletin of RUDN. Series: Political Science. 2016. No 4 (In Russ.).

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12. Skiperskih A.V. Protestnoye povedeniye v izbiratel'noy kampanii 2016 g.: osobennosti lipetskogo keysa [Protest behavior in the election campaign of 2016: features of the Lipetsk case] // Power. 2017. No. 1 (In Russ.).

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GRISHAEVA O.N., NESTERCHUK O.A., BELYAEVA V.P. Scenarios of Stability and Variability of the Russian Institute of Presidency in the Context of Social and Political Transformations

DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.005

О.N. GRISHAEVA Candidate of Sciences (political sciences), Associate Professor of the Department of history and historical and cultural heritage, Yelets State University named after I.A. Bunin, Yelets, Russia

О.А. NESTERCHUK Doctor of Sciences (political sciences), Professor of the Department of political analysis and management, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University), Moscow, Russia

V.P. BELYAEVA Deputy director for educational work of the State budgetary educational institution of the city of Moscow “School number 97”, Moscow, Russia

SCENARIOS OF STABILITY AND VARIABILITY OF THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF PRESIDENCY IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS

In the article, the authors reviewed some scenarios for the development of the institute of presidency in modern Russia. The attention is focused on the fact that in the future the institute of the presidency will strengthen. The expert community explores the prospects for the development of the political system in modern Russia during V.V. Putin’s fourth presidential term and the issue of prospects and possible change in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Key words: Russia, V.V. Putin, president, the institute of presidency, political system, development scenarios, power.

The relevance of the study is due to the fact that the establishment of the institute of presidency in Russia was associated with the internal political and socio-economic situation. The popularly elected president, as the guarantor of the Constitution, was called upon to stabilize the political situation and to restrain the outlined centrifugal tendencies, to promote the development of a multi-party system in the conditions of the formation of ideological pluralism and rejection of political monism. The introduction of the institute of presidency in Russia was aimed at strengthening the legitimation of political power, at contributing to the establishment of a mechanism for coordinating relations between sovereign republics, as well as strengthening Russia's independence in the face of declining authority and influence of the central government.

The works by Russian scholars [4; 8; 9. P. 8-22; 10. P. 501-502] published in recent years cover a wide range of issues in this subject area.

The development of the institute of presidency in modern Russia is mainly associated with the figure of V.V. Putin. According to A.S. Barsenkov and A.I. Vdovin, V.V. Putin spoke at the beginning of the 2000s as a person who was able to morally and psychologically unite Russian society, and it was with him that many pinned their hopes on the restoration of stability, order and gradual improvement in life. V.V. Putin’s popularity was accompanied by the success of the “Unity” political movement supported by him, which took second place in the State Duma elections, gaining 23.3% of the vote.

Years have passed. In 2018, V.V. Putin was re-elected president and researchers began to show interest in the course of development and adaptation of the political system of modern Russia as a whole.

So, Russia is entering a new political cycle, officially V.V. Putin’s fourth term has already begun. He is remaining in power for almost 18 years. We believe that during that period of time not only the structure of the state, but also Russian society has changed dramatically.

What to expect from the next six years? Will the existing political institutions and political forces retain their present day status? What will the socio-political mood be like? Will we then recall the “golden times” when there were no blockers of messengers in Russia, there was a relative freedom of entrepreneurship, an opposition and even big plans for the future?

The expression “expects us” in the social and political context is always hard to understand. You can form a parliamentary republic and that would be optimistic, but as a rule there is no such process. Further implementation of the 1993 Presidential Constitution is possible ... Under V.V. Putin, consent and non-resistance continue.

In the decisions that seem rational to the president, habits, inertia, risks and fears of various kinds are sometimes mixed with the desire to put an end to the painful uncertainty for Russia. G.O. Pavlovsky believes that V.V. Putin’s consent to run for a new presidential term was a mistake, which he himself partially guessed without admitting it. That decision made him finally a slave of his own apparatus and courtiers, drove him into a narrowing corridor of weakness, depriving him of a political maneuver [2]. From the expert’s point of view, a positive strategy would be creation of initial conditions for the implementation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, that is, reanimation of the three branches of power: judicial, representative and executive [2], that are usurped today.

V.T. Tretyakov views the situation in the country in a completely different way. His assessments are disappointing: the top of the ruling class is uncontrollable, reforms are either unsuccessful (except for demographic reform) or have become a business, the economy has not become innovative and there are no prospects of such transformation. The population increasingly hates the greedy ruling class [11].

It is the high personal popularity of V.V. Putin among the Russians that formed the basis of the power relations of the current political regime. The head of state today has a significant impact on the legitimation of the political system as a whole and on the prospects of its evolution. At the same time, V.V. Putin, as a pragmatic politician, prefers to work with the structures that are designed to increase the efficiency of public the administration and control and are managed through presidential orders.

The realistic rating of trust in the President can be estimated only by comparing a number of sources. Considering the availability of electronic markups, the biased audience samples, the use of software bots for voting, a figure close to the real one can be obtained only by analyzing a whole array of information.

Let us consider the current V.V. Putin’s rating figures in Russia in 2019. The sample is done in three traditional areas, as well as the internal survey of the sites. V.V. Putin’s rating today is as follows (this is, the percentage of people approving of his activities):

Table 1

Current V.V. Putin’s rating in Russia in 2019.

According to the table, an average level stands at 38,20% (-0.17%) [7].

Conclusions of the experts who have presented their vision of the Russia’s near future are not optimism. In their opinion, Russian political system has less and less economic and public resources, it is not going to change towards greater pluralism or democracy and any ways to survive can be chosen up to the military ones [1].

In our opinion, a “personalistic” regime has emerged in the country, which cannot always contribute to the development of democracy, as it sometimes does not contribute to: creation of equal opportunities for political representation; implementation of the principle of separation of powers; political competition; development and adoption of important state decisions based on the coordination of interests.

As a rule, concentrationof strong power in the hands of one institution-personality, sometimes protected from almost any checks or balances, leads to the devaluation of parliamentarism and creates a bureaucracy that does not allow society to control power. As a result, society is often excluded from the participation in political processes. Political competition is replaced by rivalry of political groups and clans and rotation of political leaders as a rule stops. The retirement of the incumbent political leader can become a big stress for the society.

Although the president is elected by general vote, the electorate is always divided into his supporters and opponents. Thus, he becomes the cause of the radicalization of the opposition, unable to find legal ways for making its views to be taken into account. In the future, there can be a vacuum of power in the country, facilitating transition to authoritarian rule or to the same rule, bypassing the stage of anarchy.

In our opinion, the artificial elevation of the institute of presidency over the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power is away outwardly attractive, but internally contradictory and even dangerous for the social development and structure of the state power. The concentration of supreme power in one body (even collegiate) leads to stagnation, lack of control and appropriation of power by the leader’s inner circle. Therefore, it does not provide sufficient grounds for confirming the advantages of undivided authority of the executive power and sometimes in the entire state power. Unlimited power in the hands of one person can be a threat to the development of democracy in the country.

In order to become a self-regulating and effective democratic political and governmental structure, the political system of Russia needs to ensure real separation of state powers and political competition, independence of the court and the media [5. P. 307-309].

It should be noted that in the expert community the opinion that there is a noticeable split in the Russian authorities is becoming more and more distinct. The experts notice that the government often sabotages execution of certain Presidential orders, as a rule, those relating to the internal social policy. In this way, analysts believe, certain influential groups within the Russian authorities are trying to damage the President’s ratings of trust and redraw the balance of power in the highest echelons of power in their own way. It is difficult to judge how close to the reality such an assessment of what is happening. However, apparently, the next few years will be full of revelations for the overwhelming majority of Russians. It is possible that the first major changes in the structure of the Russian government will become evident even before the end of this year.

Speaking about the scenarios of the development of the institute of presidency in the Russian Federation, we note that many of them proposed by various researchers do not exclude that in one way or another the most important role in that process will be played by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin. For example, Russian political scientist D.A. Yezhov singled out three scenarios for the evolution of the Russian presidency:

1. The first scenario implies a “soft” change of political scenery in the system of state power and administration, implying improvement of the established forms of interaction and cooperation between the president and the prime minister, both according to formal and substantive features.

2. The second scenario assumes evolution of the institution of presidency in the direction of strengthening the power of the president against the background of a visible weakening of the functions of the prime minister. As a result, there will be a rejection of the current management model and a transition to a strong presidential power, based on the clearly expressed principle of monocentrism. The presidency will be transformed into autocracy regulated by the constitution, which would entail the rejection of the democratic path of development and transition to authoritarianism.

3. The third scenario is pessimistic. It assumes the self-destruction of the foundations of an established power configuration due to a decrease in public support and the growth of radical movements. In this case, there is a high probability that the current President of the Russian Federation will resign ahead of time, until 2024 [12. P. 32].

It is quite obvious that the institute of presidency in Russia has evolved towards the strengthening of presidential power, as a result, there is a certain dissatisfaction with the political regime built by V.V. Putin among certain groups of the Russian society. On top of this, the socio-economic situation in the country is not easy. The above circumstances can affect the prospects of the institute of presidency in Russia and it is reflected in the scenarios that we are considering below.

The first scenario assumes that there will be a further strengthening of the presidential power. This is most likely to happen if V.V. Putin is re-elected President of Russia in 2024. However, it should be noted that according to the 1993 Constitution, the President can hold his post only two times in a row. Will the head of state amend the basic law? The question remains open ...

Below are V.V. Putin’s comments regarding his fifth term made at a meeting with the heads of news agencies: “I have always strictly adhered to and will adhere to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The Constitution clearly spells out: no more than two terms in a row. It is my second term in a row. As you remember, I was president twice before, then I left the office of president, because the Constitution does not allow to be elected a third time. That's all. I intend to adhere to this rule in the future [6].” It means that the fourth term is V.V. Putin’s last term.

The second potential scenario is a temporary weakening of the position of the President of the Russian Federation and strengthening of the powers of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. This can happen in case of a new castling and an appointment by V.V. Putin of a new “successor.” By the way, it can be said that the nomination of “successors” or “heirs” by the outgoing presidents has become a kind of a political tradition in modern Russia.

Some experts believe that V.V. Putin is preparing to transfer power in the country in the same way that B.N. Yeltsin did in his time when transferring power to him. However, in his plans, the incumbent head of state does not take into account a number of important details.

According to M. Egorov, Russian leader V.V. Putin is not looking for ways of preserving his presidency, on the contrary, he is already preparing a successor to whom he can transfer power closer to the end of his presidential term. The expert is confident that the transfer of power will be similar in the scheme to that which Putin’s predecessor B.N. Yeltsin used as president of Russia. However, until the end of his presidential term, the president may not hold out [3]. V.V. Putin is not going to hold power after the end of his fourth term in office. That is why he is already engaged in the preparation of a successor, to whom he can transfer the ruling of the country before the term of his presidency expires. The expert named an estimated date of the transfer of power, in his opinion, it will happen closer to 2023 [3].

The third scenario implies stabilization of the institute of presidency and possibly the strengthening of its role in the system of state power. This scenario is derived from the second one and implies that in case of castling, prime minister will become president and V.V. Putin will take his place.

The fourth scenario is associated with an early departure of V.V. Putin as President of the Russian Federation, which will lead to the global changes in the entire political system of Russia.

Each scenario presented by us is indicative of the fact that not all of them can preserve the legitimacy of the existing political regime. Moreover, the implementation of the first three scenarios implies certain intraelite castling without serious consequences either the political system or the institute of presidency itself. The fourth scenario implies cardinal changes of the established political regime and, consequently, structural and functional changes of the authority. It should also be noted that all of the above scenarios for the development of the institute of presidency in Russia are directly associated with the name of V.V. Putin and his activities in the situation of an on-going systemic crisis.

Thus, in our opinion, the second scenario is a more likely development scenario. V.V. Putin will not run for the fifth presidential term and during the next five years he will prepare a successor for the transfer of power in 2024.

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