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GLEBOV V.A., GROSSMAN O.D., GRISHIN V.O. Methods of Countering the Spread of Radical Ideas in Russia: Current Perspective

DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.004

V.А. GLEBOV Candidate of Sciences (law), Assistant Professor at the Chair of political analysis and management, Deputy Head of the Chair, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University), Moscow, Russia

О.D. GROSSMAN Master of Politology, Moscow, Russia

V.О. GRISHIN student at the Faculty of history, politology and law, Moscow State Regional University, Moscow, Russia

METHODS OF COUNTERING THE SPREAD OF RADICAL IDEAS IN RUSSIA: CURRENT PERSPECTIVE

Radicalism is a real threat to the multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation. Radical ideas sometimes enjoy certain popularity and are presented in the programs of political parties and movements in Russia. The authors consider methods for counteracting the spread of radical ideas. They consider the socio-cultural and educational methods that have a direct impact on the population and introduce the ideas of tolerance towards others as effective. They are not intrusive and operate in conditions of the today political processes. The authors cover the gap existing in that area of Russian political science.

Key words: radicalism, socio-cultural method, educational method, idea, Russia, Constitution, mass media, cinema.

Radicalism in the Russian context exists to a greater extent as a reflection of historical reality and of the researchers’ contradictory positions as far as the course of the Russian development is concerned. It is an object of topical research for Russian political scientists [1; 11; 4. P. 522-530].

At the moment, there are a number of methods to combat the spread and development of radical ideas. We can distinguish the following methods that help to prevent the development of radical ideas:

• the legislative method;

• sociocultural method; and

• educational method [3. P. 80-87].

We believe that the above model needs a revision in the light of the political events of the last three years in the Russian Federation.

The legislative method involves a prohibitive policy: it concerns radical nationalism and extremist ideas in general. It is aimed at prohibiting the use of corresponding symbols and waging of relevant propaganda.

Sociocultural method involves the use of various cultural channels of communication for the propaganda of tolerance, such channels include cinema, music, art, TV, mass media, etc. Educational method, like the sociocultural method, envisages the spread of information about the negative nature of political radicalism however it uses different channels of communication, in particular, the educational system.

In our view, an economic method should also be applied. It is new to this classification and it implies an indirect impact on the problem under consideration. This method involves exclusion of such economic means that permitting the emergence of social conditions conducive to the emergence of nationalism and Nazism.

In the Russian Federation, there is a wide range of legislative acts regulating counteraction to the spread of radical ideas. Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (the “Criminal Code”) is applied to the members of nationalistic radical groups. At the moment, there are a number of convicted nationalists, in some cases, repeatedly convicted. One of them is Martsinkevich, better known as “Cleaver,” who positions himself as a neo-Nazi and has been convicted under Article 282 three times.

As part of the activities of the “Restruct” movement [10], M. Martsinkevich carried out illegal violent actions against representatives of national minorities and a number of groups whose behavior in Russia is considered deviant by certain segments of the population. “Restruct” is not a registered movement, it does not have a program of its own or other official signs of a movement, but it had certain popularity, especially at the period when M. Martsinkevich was still at large.

It should be noted that in recent years M. Marcinkevich’s activity was reduced largely to aggressive radicalism. His project “Occupy-pedophile” was aimed at the prosecution of homosexuals and pedophiles or those whom “Restrukt” considered as such. It is noteworthy that such activity started on the radical Nazi soil.

The cult of power and chiefdom as the main signs of radicalism, without its nationalist component, but including only its anti-democratic component, found its application in the activities of “Restruct.” It is assumed that although “Cleaver” ceased to use violent methods against members of national minorities, he has not ceased to be a neo-Nazi.

Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not provide an explanation regarding its wording, it does not say what should be considered “humiliation on a national basis,” this and other elements of the text of the Article allow an extremely wide interpretation of it.

In this connection, in March 2017, the Ministry of Communications and Media made a proposal to mitigate such legislative prohibitions. In particular, it proposed to raise the ban on the use of the image of the Nazi swastika (Nazi cross that was on the German flag in the years from 1933 to 1945) in cinema, education and fiction.

The following explanatory note was attached therewith:

“In accordance with the current legislation, it is an offence to publicly display Nazi symbols or paraphernalia, this legislative norm cannot be effectively applied, since on a formal basis it refers, for example, to any film or television production about the Great Patriotic War [8].”

At the moment, there are many situations in which works of art are subject to a ban on distribution because of the use of the symbols Nazi in nature. The most famous example was the proposal to ban the sale of the graphic novel by A. Spiegelman “Maus [5]” dedicated to the events in the Nazi concentration camp and the post-war consequences for one of the victims of the Holocaust.

However, it is noteworthy that the novel is purely anti-Nazi in character and imbued with sympathy for the victims of the Holocaust, in particular, to the father of the author of the novel, who is the protagonist of the novel. However, according to the current legislation, due to the numerous images of swastika image, the novel was banned for publication.

We believe that the dissemination of images of Nazi symbols and the citation of Nazi slogans for artistic, scientific and educational purposes is not propaganda. Many researchers, including political scientists, historians, sociologists, cultural scientists and other representatives of the academic circles of the humanities spectrum face this problem. Let’s consider the example of the main work by A. Hitler's “My struggle,” prohibited for publication and distribution as an extremist material. Complete edition of the personal diaries of I. Goebbels, Head of the propaganda department of the NSDAP, one of the most prominent representatives of the party elite of the German state in 1933-1945, is banned for publication, as they contain, according to legislators, propaganda of Nazism [14]. In essence, judging by the excerpts from these diaries, available for reading, they do not represent propaganda in the classical sense of the word. Goebbels' diaries describe the everyday life of the Third Reich and the internal order in the NSDAP. These facts are of great scientific interest and without them it is impossible to make a complete and multilateral assessment of the considered historical period.

It is noteworthy that many works permitted in the Russian Federation refer to “My struggle” and Goebbels ' diaries for scientific purposes. Thus, the American historian W. Shearer in his two-volume "Rise and fall of the Third Reich", which according to the researcher, is the most complete and comprehensive scientific work on Nazi Germany, repeatedly quotes both of the above sources. However, for some reason, despite the fact that these quotes contain direct extremist appeals, “Rise and fall of the Third Reich” continues to be sold and actively used in the research work by a majority of researchers of Nazism.

The sociocultural method is widely used in most countries that have set themselves the task of preventing the spread of ideas of the national socialist spectrum. This method involves the promotion of ideas of tolerance through cinema, television, literature and media, as well as any other media channels, including various Internet portals [2. P. 37-48].

When using the sociocultural method, it is necessary to understand that it often does not include an element of institutional and administrative resources – unlike, for example, a group of methods of legislative prohibitions. In this case, it is necessary to form a civil society, which, represented by the authors of various projects, will be ready to create works of culture promoting the idea of tolerance. At the same time, state funding of such works cannot be excluded. As an example of such funding we see a large number of military patriotic films praising the feat of the Soviet people in the fight against the Nazi invaders, that have been shot in recent years.

Speaking about the foreign experience of the sociocultural method application it should be noted that there is a number of such films. “Schindler's List” (it was awarded seven Oscars in 1994) [13] directed by S. Spielberg is the most famous and most awarded feature film dedicated to the history of Nazi Germany. Its appearance on the screens caused a surge of positive reviews, comments and arguments in the media about the problem of neo-Nazism, the heyday of such interest in the United States of America was in the 90-ies of the XX century.

However, in the Russian Federation, films made with the support of the Ministry of Culture carry a more subtle message than the military-patriotic films.

According to F. Bondarchuk, who directed the fantastic film “Attraction” with the support of the Cinema Fund in 2017, although the film does not directly speak about the problems of nationalism provides the viewers with an appropriate allusion [7]. The main message of “Attraction” is reduced to xenophobia of earthlings in relation to the newcomers who arrive on the Earth by accident. Describing the message of the film, Fyodor Bondarchuk repeatedly mentioned nationalist pogroms (we are talking about the pogroms in the Moscow area of Western Biryulyovo) and said that it’s not by accident that the film takes place in the Moscow area of Chertanovo, that is considered disadvantaged and the population of which, according to a common stereotype, is nationalistically minded.

We believe that works of culture, created without the state participation influence the society more effectively, since their production is not conditioned by a pre-set socio-cultural prerequisite and the willingness of the people to adopt such position.

The state can potentially use such a resource, but due to the need to create such a prerequisite, this method is somewhat losing its political and social effectiveness.

The educational method does not lose its relevance and, in the authors’ opinion, is the most effective.

The methods of this group are supposed to provide for the change of the school curriculum with the view of spreading the ideas of tolerance.

In many Russian cities, such approach requires special attention, as in our multi-ethnic country there are often conflicts between children on the national basis, this is especially true for the cities where people feel their national identity most acutely.

According to a number of studies, nationalist sentiments are extremely rare among children under the age of 7 to 8 years and if they occur, they result from extremely chauvinistic position of their parents. We believe that it is necessary to work with children of preschool age, explaining to them in a simple, accessible and understandable form that our state is multinational and that representatives of all ethnic and social groups are equal.

Formation of older children should be carried in a slightly different direction. Adolescents are developing their own civic position, and it is important not to miss the moment when they may lean towards neo-Nazism and other radical ideas. As a rule, such situations arise in dysfunctional families and against appropriate social background that the school as an important social institution must strive to eliminate.

The educational method can be applied not only in the form of special talks with students during the class hours, but also to be integrated into certain school subjects, in particular, the humanities.

Such subjects as social studies and history should constantly convey to the students the idea of tolerance, but only using specific examples in order not to be perceived by children as an annoying propaganda.

In 2016, a single textbook on the history of Russia was written in the Russian Federation. It was developed with the idea of presenting to the students the image of Russia as a multinational state with a rich history created by representatives of many ethnic groups and cultures [12].

An innovation for the model under consideration is the description of the economic method, which is the most indirect of all the above.

The economic method consists in the creation by the state and the society of a situation in which not only social but also financial prerequisites for the formation of national socialist sentiments will be absent.

In richer societies, the level of social aggression is lower and the level of crime depends on the economic well-being. In countries such as Sweden, where the level of GDP and economic development is recognized by the majority of index-making agencies as the most developed [9], there is currently a minimum level of crime and xenophobia against migrants arriving in the country, despite the difficult situation with migration flow in Europe as a whole.

Despite the fact that this method is very indirect, it inevitably leads to a decrease in the level of nationalist sentiment.

Thus, the described group of methods is quite effective and, if properly implemented, can contribute to the preventing of the spread of radical political ideologies, xenophobia, neo-Nazism, etc. We suggest to consider the educational method as the most effective and the legislative method, at least in the conditions of the Russian Federation, as the one that needs to be revised and updated.

REFERENCES:

1. Avtsinova G.I. Mysliteli Rossii o fenomene radikalizma [Russia’s thinkers on the phenomenon of radicalism] // Socio-political magazine. 1997. No.1 (In Russ.).

2. Grishin O.E., Emanov A.A. Kinematograf kak instrument politicheskoj kommunikacii na postsovetskom prostranstve [Cinema as a tool of political communication in the post-Soviet space]. Problems of the post-Soviet space. 2016. No. 2 (8) (In Russ.).

3. Grossman О.D. Vlijanie nacional-socialisticheskoj ideologii na politicheskuju sferu [Influence of the National Socialist ideology on the Political Sphere] // Youth World Politic. 2015. No. 4 (In Russ.).

4. Grossman О.D., Trifonov N.Т. Politiko-pravovoj analiz protivodejstvija radikal'noj ideologii v grazhdanskom obshhestve [Political and legal analysis of counteraction to radical ideology in the civil society] // Issues of politology. 2018. No. 9 (In Russ.).

5. Izdatel' i perevodchik – o zaprete komiksa «Maus» [Got to the mice: the publisher and translator about the ban of the comic book “Maus”] // The Village. 2015 (In Russ.) // http://www.the-village.ru/village/city/situation/213657-maus.

6. Zalysin I.Yu. Ugroza sovremennomu mirovomu porjadku [Terrorism is a threat to the modern world order] // Issues of National and federative relations. 2018. No. 1 (In Russ.).

7. Nachalsja prokat novoj kartiny Fedora Bondarchuka «Pritjazhenie» [Cinemas began to show “Attraction,” a new film by Fyodor Bondarchuk] // Russia Culture. 2017 (In Russ.) // http://tvkultura.ru/article/show/article_id/165547/.

8. Razreshit' svastiku v kino i uchebnikah [Allow swastika in movies and textbooks] // The Village. 2017 (In Russ.) // http://www.the-village.ru/village/city/city/260394-svastika.

9. Rejting stran po urovnju valovogo vnutrennego produkta [The ranking of countries in terms of gross domestic product] // Humanitarian technologies. 2016 (In Russ.) // http://gtmarket.ru/ratings/rating-countries-gdp/rating-countries-gdp-info.

10. «Restrukt!» [“Restruct!”] // LiveLib. 2017 (In Russ.) // https://www.livelib.ru/book/1000479762/quotes-restrukt-martsinkevich-maksim.

11. Sovremennye ugrozy gosudarstvu i obshhestvu: radikalizm, terrorizm, informacionnye vojny, «cvetnye revoljucii»: uchebnoe posobie [Modern threats to the state and society: radicalism, terrorism, information wars, "color revolutions": textbook] / G.I. Аvtsinova [and others.]; under the editorship of O.E. Grishin, V.N. Davydov. Moscow: RUDN, 2018 (In Russ.).

12. Sozdanie v Rossii novogo uchebnika po istorii // RIA Novosti. – 2017. Jelektronnyj resurs [Creation of a new history textbook in Russia] // RIA Novosti. 2017 (In Russ.) // https://ria.ru/trend/history_book_RF_01072013/.

13. Spisok Shindlera [Schindler's List] // Kinopoisk. 2015 (In Russ.) // http://www.kinopoisk.ru/film/329/.

14. Federal'nyj spisok jekstremistskih materialov. Kniga «Gebbel's Jozef. Dnevniki 1945 goda. Poslednie zapisi» (reshenie Mijakinskogo rajonnogo suda Respubliki Bashkortostan ot 13.01.2011) [Federal List of Extremist Materials. The book: “Goebbels, Joseph. Diaries of 1945. Last records” (decision of the Miyakinsky district court of the Republic of Bashkortostan of 13.01.2011)] // Russian Ministry of Justice. 2017 (In Russ.) // http://minjust.ru/ru/extremist-materials?field_extremist_content_value=%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%B1%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81.

MOROZOV I.L. Left-Wing Extremism in Modern Russia: Definition, Classification, Trends

DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.003

I.L. MOROZOV Doctor of Sciences (political sciences), Assistant Professor, Professor at the Department of public administration and political sciences, Volgograd Institute of Management, branch of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Volgograd, Russia

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN MODERN RUSSIA: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, TRENDS

The article examines the process of activization of the left-wing extremist groups in modern Russia. The author draws attention to the social protest rallies that have unfolded in recent years and coincided with the growing demand for social justice in the mass consciousness of Russians. Modern left-wing extremist groups, according to the author, may be based on on the “orthodox authoritarian”, “new left” or “anarchist” idiological patforms. It is anarchism that will be dangerous as a form of youth radical protest. The only effective way to prevent left-wing extremism is a developped state social policy aimed at equalizing the level of income between the various strata of the economically active population, as well as helping low-income categories of citizens. Special attention should be paid to the development of “social elevators” which open up new prospects for Russian youth.

Key words: left-wing extremism, terrorism, Marxism, anarchy, ideology, social justice.

A noticeable, though uneven growth in the standard of living of the majority of the strata of the Russian society, which began in the zero years of the twentieth century against the rise of the global energy market, the individualization of civil consciousness, focus on personal career success as a new vital value of the younger generation – all these factors suggested that the Russian community as a whole has overcome the historical trauma of the socialist experiment and has largely lost an interest in the left political spectrum. Even in the 90-ies of the twentieth century, at the peak of the fall in popularity of the B.N. Yeltsin’s political regime, the parliamentary Communist opposition (the Communist party and its political allies) did not have enough support to take power. The left “street” opposition represented by Trudovaya Rossia (Labour Russia) has not coped with this task, not to mention the several dozen small marginalized ultra-left extremist groups such as New Revolutionary Alternative [10; 11. P. 111].

On October 31, 2018, a suicide bomber exploded an improvised explosive device in the lobby of the FSB building in the Arkhangelsk region, killing himself and injuring three employees of the Russian Federal Security Service. The news was that the crime was committed not by an Islamist or a supporter of neo-fascism, as before, but by an anarchist – M.V. Zhlobitsky, a 17-year-old student of the Arkhangelsk Polytechnic College, who had a pseudonym “Valerian Panov” in social networks, as well as “Sergey Nechaev”, in honor of the organizer of the revolutionary-terrorist group “People's Massacre” active in the Russian Empire in the XIX century. In social networks, M.V. Zhlobitsky called himself a supporter of anarcho-communism and used the emblem of the West German ultra-terrorist group Red Army Faction (RAF) as a self-presentation. His crime M.V. Zhlobitsky motivated by the fact that “the FSB fabricates cases and tortures people [1]”.

Following these events, on November 2, 2018, a 14-year-old student, whom M. V. Zhlobitsky called on the eve of the terrorist attack, was accused of making an explosive device, detained in Moscow and then arrested by a court decision. On February 1, 2019, there was a report about the detention of A. Miftakhov, a graduate student of the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of Moscow State University, who was also accused of making an explosive device to undermine the gas pipeline, it was also reported that the young scientist is interested in the ideas of anarchism and is a member of the capital's anarchist group called "People's Self-defense”.

This chain of events actualizes the question of what social phenomenon we are witnessing: are they separate outbreaks of criminal activity of mentally unbalanced people posing as anarchists or is it the beginning of a new process of formation of the youth left-wing extremist movement inclined to use terrorist methods? At the moment, Russian youth, according to Russian researchers, in terms of socio-political activity is a controversial phenomenon: dissatisfaction with their situation is combined with the fact that “they are not ready to take part in radical actions at the personal or group levels, that is, there is no collective subject of unconventional activity [5. P. 308]”.

In the regulatory field of Russia there is no official definition of “extremism” as a phenomenon, in contract to the concept of “extremist activity” [4. P. 98-110]. Therefore, it is terminologically appropriate to rely on the definition given in the “2001 Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism,” which defines extremism as an act aimed at forcible seizure of power or forcible retention of power, as well as a violent change in the constitutional system of the state, a violent attack on public security, including the organization of illegal armed groups or participation in them [8]. In this case “left extremism” can be defined as a corresponding act motivated by left-wing radical ideology. A distinctive feature of left-wing radicalism is the willingness to implement the idea of social justice by violent, armed means, from popular uprising to acts of individual terror.

The left radicals distinguish their main adversary on an economic basis, being tolerant or even positive in respect of ethnic, religious or gender differences, this trait distinguishes them from other extremist movements. Previously, left-wing extremist movements were defined by comparison with the then official position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. All political forces ready to use more intransigent rhetoric and methods of dealing with capitalist-type political regimes were extremist [12. P. 208]. At the moment, this marker is not working, taking the Communist Party as a point of reference is incorrect due to the de facto social democratic nature of this political party. Therefore, the author of this article proposes to consider the declared readiness to use violence as the main criterion for defining the left-wing extremist movement, especially if such readiness is justified by the motives of social justice. Among the supporters of the left-wing radical ideology are three main branches of followers:

Authoritarian orthodox communists still use the concepts of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, sometimes with modifications that were made by Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh or Fidel Castro. They see social justice in defending the economic and political positions of the proletariat, the peasantry and other oppressed social groups, special attention is being paid to freeing peoples from the colonial oppression of the Great Powers, the main method being a revolution in the form of armed struggle of the people, as it was understood by Che Guevara, Franz Fanon and Regi Debré. This trend was popular abroad in the 50s-60s of the twentieth century, then came into a crisis due to the general disappointment in the Soviet, then Chinese and other orthodoxy, expressed in the policy of the relevant communist parties. In Russia, interest in it was observed in the 90-ies of XX in connection with the collapse of the party ideology of the CPSU and the search for an alternative of irreconcilable character. The most significant representative of this movement was Labor Russia headed by V.I. Anpilov, who took part in armed clashes in Moscow in October 1993, but then lost its political power. To some extent, the following organizations can be included in the above list: “Vanguard of the Red Youth” and “Left Front” that replaced it and was headed by S. S. Udaltsov. The “Left Front” began to disintegrate after the end of the protest wave of 2011-2012, and now this niche is occupied by the “Left Block,” a network organization without a clear hierarchical structure and a recognized leader, conducting from time to time local protests, representatives of which are periodically detained by law enforcement agencies.

New left do not deny the classics of the theory of communism as a whole. The followers of this trend, which goes back to the theorists of the “Situationist international” and the practices of the “student revolution” of 1968, strive to take into account the socio-economic changes that have occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, in particular, the disappearance of the proletariat and the peasantry in their former sense, that is, disappearance of the classical Marxist subject of the revolution. They consider the students as a replacement of this subject and as the social strata most ready for protests, around which all the disgruntled strata of society will be united, including migrants, the unemployed, representatives of oppressed religious, ethnic and sexual minorities, feminists, prisoners and patients of psychiatric clinics. Guy Debord, György Lukács and Herbert Marcuse inspired this movement ideologically. Methods of their struggle are varied from organizing riots up to the creation of the extremist terrorist groups. In Western Europe, this movement developed as a reaction to the defeat of the student revolution of the late 60s and in the early 90-ies of the XXth century it came off the scene. In Russia, the heyday of the movements of this type occurred just at the end of the 90-ies of XXth century and zero years of the XXI century, the main force on this flank of left extremism was represented by the E. Limonov’s “National Bolshevik party”. By the end of the zero years, NBP began to lose influence on the young people and in a weakened form it is now represented by “Other Russia”.

Anarchists represent the third ideological branch of the left-wing extremist movements and they started to be a threat to public safety just in recent years. Now in Russia there are at least a dozen anarchist groups of various size and social composition, disintegrating and reuniting, the most famous of them are “Autonomous action” and “National Self-defence," that has withdrawn from the ranks of “Autonomous action.” “Antifa” movement also largely adheres to the anarchist positions.

The anarchist movement is multifaceted, as is the anarchist ideology. Anarcho-communists advocate the socialization of property and the construction of society on the basis of primitive forms of direct democracy. Anarcho-syndicalists are in favor of self-management of the working groups in the workplace, coming to the idea that professional managers are of no need and even harmful to the labor man. Anarchists-individualists appreciate personal freedom. In contrast to the crimes of Islamists and nationalists, which are readily covered and criticized in the media, there is scant information about anarchists or other left-wing radicals in the legal information field. It seems that there are attempts not to notice the anarchists and to stop any public discourse on this issue. An example is the criminal case against journalist S. Prokopieva (public justification of terrorism), who discussed the motives of the M. V. Zhlobitsky’s act. Media resources that published her interviews about the Arkhangelsk events were fined and the materials were removed from free access.

It can be assumed that this tactic is due to the fact that the Russian state and civil society have developed a certain ideological immunity against radical nationalists and Islamists and there is a certain consensus between the society and the government in assessing their actions. There is no such consensus in regard the left-wing radicals. Moreover, there is a serious concern that it is the request for social justice that becomes the key element of protest sentiment among Russians. The state has nothing but tactical maneuvers to oppose the left idea, understood in a simplified “Robinhood” sense, as the struggle of the poor against the rich and the protection of the “little man” from the state repressive apparatus, while terrorist organizations traditionally focus on the recruiting among the youth circles [9. P. 150].

Back in Soviet times, the image of an anarchist was severely distorted by the state propaganda for political reasons. The anarchist was presented as a political subject, completely unrelated to the left ideology and shown either as the leader of bloody gangs, like N. Makhno, or as a deserter sailor in Petrograd who denied any laws and marauded under the guise of revolution. As a result, there are few specialists in real anarchism who understand the essence and possibilities of this phenomenon. But the protest potential of anarchy was shown by the anti-globalists who smashed the streets of the European and American cities in the past decade (the anarchist movement "Black block") and modern "Yellow Vests" in France.

The difference between anarchists and orthodox left-wing revolutionaries is that the anarchists are not clearly tied to one socially structured subject of revolution, unlike the classical leftists, who are focused on the working class or its ersatz, such as the modern precariat. From the point of view of the anarchist, the subject of the revolution is the one who opposes the system of oppression of human freedom and acts in the “here and now” mode. However, it would be a great simplification to assume that anarchists do not recognize any forms of power, laws or restrictions. Anarchists are against government, against a professional government, building a hierarchical society and concentrating in its hands the resources and power.

The anarchists deny even the socialist state, and this is still one marker distinguishing them from the orthodox left. The telegram sent to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee by the French radical left students who had captured the Sorbonne in 1968 is typical in this sense: “Bureaucrats, tremble! The international power of the Workers' Councils will soon sweep you from your tables. Mankind will not live free until the last capitalist has been hanged in the entrails of the last bureaucrat! Long live the struggle of the Kronstadt sailors and the Makhnovshchina against Trotsky and Lenin! Down with the state! [2. P. 29]”.

The strength of anarchist ideology, in contrast to the one offered to the modern society by the ruling elites (to whom the history has already “stopped” and the political game is now reduced to the “keeping the score,” stability or even the turn to the past, to the “traditional values”) is an appeal to the future, the formation of the image of a certain ideal society that is awaiting the humanity ahead. For the state ideologist be it in Russia, in the USA or the EU countries, the “bright today” has already come, the social statuses and roles have been distributed, the elites have formed and the human masses as a whole have finally discovered the “true meaning” of their existence – consumerism, therefore it remains only to work for the sake of improving the level of consumption, changing cars for faster cars and apartments for more spacious ones. For an anarchist, a man in the street who thinks like this is a “pump” useless for society, whose meaning of life is reduced to the egoistic desire to drive out through itself the greatest amount of resources taken from nature, to dissolve themselves in prestigious work, and to spend nonworking time with entertainment, but not self-development, and even more no reflections and principles of the structure and justice of the surrounding being.

As an introduction, it can be stated that anarchist views are not yet widespread among Russian youth and note the psychological unwillingness of the majority of young Russians to personally participate in protest actions. But there is no reason for an optimistic forecast that this will continue, given the growing socio-economic tensions in society [7. P. 100-102; 6. P. 172-182]. It can already be stated that the stake is mainly on information and propaganda methods in the fight against left-wing extremism in the EU [3. P. 57-64], has not justified itself and Russia should not repeat these errors. The only effective way to prevent left-wing extremism is a developed state social policy aimed at equalizing the level of income between the various strata of the economically active population, as well as helping low-income categories of citizens. Particular attention should be paid to the development of “social elevators”, which open up new prospects for Russian youth.

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5. Efanova E.V., Kolotilina A.A., Meshkov N.V. Buntarskiy dukh molodezhi v Rossii: opasnost' ili put' razvitiya? / V sbornike: Sotsial'no-politicheskiye i istoriko-kul'turnyye aspekty sovremennoy geopoliticheskoy situatsii. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii X Nauchno-obrazovatel'nogo foruma [The revolt spirit of the youth in Russia: a danger or a development path? // In the collection: Socio-political, historical and cultural aspects of the modern geopolitical situation. Materials of the international scientific-practical conference of the X Scientific-Educational Forum]. MN Perot Publishing House, 2017 (In Russ.).

6. Kolesnikov V.A. Politicheskiy rezhim v sovremennoy Rossii: aspektnyy potentsial issledovaniya [The political regime in modern Russia: the aspect potential of the research] // Theories and problems of political research. 2018. Volume 7. Number 6A (In Russ.).

7. Matvienko E.A. Ekstremizm v sovremennom obshchestve: prichiny i perspektivy protivodeystviya [Extremism in modern society: causes and prospects of counteraction] // Bulletin of the Barnaul Law Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. 2018. No. 1 (34) (In Russ.).

8. Shankhayskaya konventsiya o bor'be s terrorizmom, separatizmom i ekstremizmom (Zaklyuchena v g. Shankhaye 15.06.2001) [Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (Entered into the city of Shanghai 15.06.2001)] // Reference and legal system "Consultant Plus" // http://www.consultant.ru (In Russ.).

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11. Tarasov A.V. Revolyutsiya ne vser'yez. Shtudii po teorii i istorii kvazirevolyutsionnykh dvizheniy [The revolution is not serious. Studies on the theory and history of quasi-revolutionary movements]. Moscow: Ultra. Culture, 2005 (In Russ.).

12. Vityuk V.V. Pod chuzhimi znamenami. Litsemeriye i samoobman «levogo» terrorizma [Under foreign flags. Hypocrisy and self-deception of “left” terrorism]. M.: Thought, 1985 (In Russ.).

GONCHAROVA L.N. Analysis of Geopolitical and Geo-Economic Interaction of Regional Systems

DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.002

L.N. GONCHAROVA Doctor of Sciences (economics), Associate Professor, Professor at the Chair of Economics, Belgorod University of Cooperative Movement, Economics and Law, Belgorod, Russia

ANALYSIS OF GEOPOLITICAL AND GEO-ECONOMIC INTERACTION OF REGIONAL SYSTEMS

Relations of the countries, which are centers of regional power, and the countries and peoples of the periphery can occur in a format called “associated-dependent development” when the centers of power act as guarantors of independence and development sponsors of the periphery. It should be borne in mind that dependence is not always the result of the policy of the countries which are centers of power. Strictly speaking, there is an interdependence, largely based on the economic and geopolitical interests of both sides – the center and the periphery.

Key words: geopolitics, geoeconomics, “center”, “periphery”, regional space, synergy, regional policy.

When analyzing the process of formation of the Eurasian regional space, it is necessary to fix the process of formation of its contour of regional community as a result of the interaction of internal and external processes.

It is obvious that the neighboring regional formations interact by their peripheries, creating a special geosocial subspace or contact zone of cultures and countries [3]. In other words, the contact area is usually a composite space.

Heterogeneity of the contact zone space implies the presence in it of multiple interactions, requiring the use of a certain synergetic approach [3]. The basic concept of synergy is determination of the state resulting from the multivariate and ambiguous behavior of such multi-element structures or multifactorial media that do not degrade to the state standard for closed-loop systems of the thermodynamic type, but develop as a result of openness, the flow of energy from the outside, the nonlinearity of internal processes, the emergence of special regimes with exacerbation and at the same time the presence of more than one stable state, which can lead to the formation of new structures and systems, including those more complex than the original. The periphery objectively has an important role; it naturally ensures interaction between regions and civilizations, countries and population of the border areas and therefore the development of the global social system as a whole. Reconciling and maintaining the balance of interests and formation of super-group system of values in the contact zones contribute to the sustainability and productivity of interaction of all subjects of international relations. Disruption of such balance causes destabilization of one or more regional systems [4. P. 13-24].

In the periphery space, different cultures, ideologies, social and political systems cross and interact. One example is the sub-region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the place of interaction of the Orthodox, Catholic and Islamic religions that they represent [7]. Another example is the conflicts that broke out after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and then after the collapse of the USSR [16].

A striking example is the well-known protracted Palestinian conflict between the Arab states and Israel in 1967 and 1974 [21. P. 54-59], even conflicts within the Islamic world in the Middle East, when the problem of the crisis of Islamic identity was exposed and the Islamic contradictions aggravated [13].

It should be remembered that contact zones play an important role in geopolitics. They may play the role of sanitary cordons or geopolitical buffers between powers or unions of states. Consideration of the history of empires and colonial powers suggests that buffer zones are created when they serves as obstacles to the expansion of the competitor’s influence or its penetration into the depths of another state.

The contact zones have inter-regional location. For example, such are the territories of Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous region) and Tibet, ethnographic Kurdistan in the Middle East, the Caucasus, Balkans and others.

The way of life and relationships that have developed over many centuries in large regional spaces determine regional identity. According to the Swiss researcher I. Besson the synthesis of a number of components of regional identity “has a dominant power” over the consciousness of all ethnic and religious groups individually and the regional community in general [3. P. 136]. All that diversity must be regarded as a set of interrelated variables that develop independently or in interaction as a “function of time/space.” Any threats to the integrity of the regional community or emergence of an alien element, interference in intraregional relations and restructuring of the structures lead or may lead to a protracted identity crisis.

Thus, during the Ottoman Empire ethnic groups existed in a relative balance of cultures and economic specializations formed in the Middle East over the centuries. The collapse of the Ottoman regional power and expansion of the Western states destroyed the regional identity. The Western model of organization of social and political relations and external control by France and England were imposed on the Middle East peoples.

The uniqueness of the regional space of the Middle East lies in the fact that the energy of the so-called “axial time” accumulated there, at the intersection of the world religions. As noted by the German historian K. Jaspers in his work The Origins of History and its Purpose, this is a turning point in the history of mankind, and according to A. P. Nazaretyan “anthropogenic crises [14]” start to finish in breakthroughs in the new eras. Moreover, the symbols of such “breakthroughs” can be specific personalities, such as Alexander the Great or the first agnostics philosophers and scientists, who have actually formed a pre-modern human worldview. In that era, began to develop a common understanding of good and evil, of the individual as a sovereign carrier of moral choice and reflexive form of individual self-control – conscience as an alternative to the previously dominant religious “fear of God” [5].

This is literally really the Axis around which all of humanity revolves from some time ago. The axis of history gathers around itself and includes in the orbit of its influence a number of civilizations and world centers. As K. Jaspers wrote in his book [6], “the novelty which arose in that era in the three mentioned cultures boiled down to the fact that the man became aware of life as a whole, of himself and his boundaries. The horror of the world and his own helplessness opened before him. Standing over the precipice, he raised radical questions, demanded liberation and salvation. Being aware of his boundaries, he set himself the highest goals, learned the absolute in the depths of his self-consciousness and in the clarity of the transcendental world. All that happened through reflection. The consciousness became aware of the consciousness, thought made thinking its object. The spiritual struggle began during which everyone tried to convince the other telling the other of his goals, justifications and experience. Discussions, formation of various parties, the splitting of the spiritual sphere, which in the inconsistency of its parts retained their interdependence - all that gave rise to the anxiety and movement bordering the spiritual chaos [6. P. 30]”.

The Mediterranean-Middle East regional system is an entity naturally distinguished from other communities by its historical and social culture and its place in the global evolution. At the same time, the algorithm of formation of most regional communities to a certain extent was universal and, if you do not focus on specific features, was common to all geosocial regional spaces [19. P. 131-140]. Focal ancient civilizations (or foci and poles of emerging large regional civilizations), expanding their influence and binding external migrations, created a very dynamic system of the global level of pair categories “we or other”/ “friend or foe”. In the Middle East, this was expressed in the primary relationship in time between “indigenous” and “newcomers” [9. P. 124-178], that is those who came to this region earlier and who came later.

That mobile structure formed the contours of the region and to some extent their primary relations. Directly as a regional geosocial integrity, the Middle East arose in the course of Arab conquests, Islamization and formation of the Arab Caliphate, but as a result of the Mongol invasion in the second half of the XIII century the Caliphate fell. Although the Mongols left, the Arab world of the Middle East disintegrated, fell into a deep crisis and the Arab tribes were conquered by the Turkic-speaking Ottoman Empire [13]. Later on, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it experienced a state of extreme frustration, because hopes for independent development were not justified. The winners of the First World War “divided” the Arabs. The Muslim world, which once owned half of Europe, began to feel cheated and cornered.

During the cold war period, the Muslim world ceased to be self-sufficient. Geopolitical dependence on the West and penetration of the Western mass culture in the civilization of the East caused a wide range of reactions: from the attempts to restructure in the European manner or to find a way out in the socialist orientation to the attempts to completely isolate and be tinned. Often, the reaction is internally contradictory in character from complete ideological rejection to the willing borrowing of technical and social mechanisms. In any case, any reaction continues to have a complex of inferiority and resentment, a sense of threat to their cultural identity and attempts to take revenge and win back the previous dominant position. It gives rise to extremist mood and aggression towards the outside world [8. P. 23-26].

Instead of the hopes for a revival, the Arabs came under the control of France and England. After the Second World War, attempts to resolve the Arab identity crisis in pan-Arabism and socialist orientation failed. And the stake on the nationalist autocracy of artificially created Arab states [1] has led to civil wars. In all Arab countries, tribal, clan and religious structures, to which social groups belonged, have become the main units of self-identification of the population. The population is beginning to return to its historical roots, the loyalty of the residents began to be transferred from the shattered and failed national states to their traditional confessional community [13]. In this regard, the states and their borders have lost their former importance. The centers of solidarity and conflict – especially in Iraq and Syria – have moved from the level of the state to the level of the primary local religious community – Sunnis, Shiites or alawites, etc.

Currently, the Middle East is again a place of fierce rivalry between Russia and the United States affecting the processes of restructuring of the neighboring large Eurasian region.

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14. Nazaretyan А.P. Civilizacionnye krizisy v kontekste Universal'noj istorii (Sinergetika – psihologija – prognozirovanie) [Civilizational crises in the context of universal history (Synergy – psychology – forecasting)]. Moscow, 2004 (In Russ.).

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17. Pryakhin V.F. Recenzija na stat'ju Z.K. Ajupovoj i D.U. Kusainova «Eshhe raz ob osnovnyh mezhdunarodno-pravovyh principah samoopredelenija nacij» [Review of the article by Аyupova Z.К., Kusainov D.U. Once again on the main international and legal principles of self-determination of the Nations] // Eurasian Union: issues of international relations. 2018 (In Russ.).

18. Pyzh V.V., Кorostelev S.V. Uchet geopoliticheskih faktorov v processe vybora sposobov razgranichenija morskih prostranstv v Arktike [The consideration of geopolitical factors in the process of selecting methods of delimitation of maritime spaces in the Arctic] // Issues of National and Federative Relations. 2018. № 2 (In Russ.).

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21. Zadokhin A.G. Samoopredelenie narodov i territorial'naja celostnost' gosudarstv: kategorii, problemy, perspektivy [Self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of states: categories, problems, prospects] // Scientific and analytical journal Obosrevatel-Observer. 2011. № 5 (256) (In Russ.).

BOLTENKOVA L.F., RYABOVA E.I. Territory of the Russian Principalities in the IX-XII Centuries and the Today Importance of this Issue

DOI 10.35775/PSI.2019.31.1.001

L.F. BOLTENKOVA Doctor of Sciences (law), Professor at the Institute of public administration and management, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Moscow, Russia

Е.I. RYABOVA Candidate of Sciences, Assistant Professor at the Academy of Labour and Social Relations in the city Sevastopol, Sevastopol, Russia

TERRITORY OF THE RUSSIAN PRINCIPALITIES IN THE IX-XII CENTURIES AND THE TODAY IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE

On the basis of historical sources and scientific literature the article describes the territory of Russian principalities in the IX-XII centuries (the Old Russian state.) It is shown that in the IX-XII centuries Ukraine as a state did not exist and the Moscow Principality gained strength and became the spiritual and political center of Russia. As the center of Russia, Moscow then provided all assistance to those who formed the Ukrainian state. The part of the Ukrainian political elite is acting counter-historically when it denies the Russianness of their territorial roots.

Key words: state, Russianness, statehood, law, history, politics.

It is historically incorrect to assert, as it often happens, that the Kiev princes in the IX-X centuries collected Russian lands. Russ came from the North-West in small numbers. They formed the military and political elite first in Novgorod, then in Kiev. Other lands lived "on their own" and they were not Russians. For example, the land of the Drevlyans, the land of the Nords, the land of the Vyatichi, the land of Krivichi, the land of Radimichi, etc. There were princes everywhere. Russian princes from Kiev had to fight for power in other lands.

Having established their power in one way or another, they declared such land Russian. That is, when discussing that period, we are not talking about unification of Russian lands, but about the spread of Russian power territorially. In the West, the spread of that power was stopped by poles and other West Slavic and non-Slavic tribes (nationalities). Moreover, they were ready to establish their own power in Kiev. So, naturally, the indigineous tribes made their choice in favour of the Eastern vector of development. That choice was made voluntarily by the Kievan princes and it was strategically correct.

Before showing what areas have become Russian principalities, it is necessary to name the tribes living in the space of the future old Russian state. The following researchers studied the problem: M.V. Lomonosov, N.M. Karamzin, V.O. Klyuchevsky, N.I. Kostomarov, Yu.A. Limonov, A.E. Presnyakov, G.V. Vernadsky, V.T. Pachuco, M.N. Tikhomirov, D.A. Chwolson, A.N. Nasonov, A.V. Cherepnin, L.N. Gumilev, N.S. Kozlov, V.I. Kozlov, M.N. Gromov, A.A. Novoselsky, D.D. Pogorski, L.F. Boltenkova and other.

It is clear from various sources, that in its heyday the Ancient Russia united in its composition 22 non-Slavic peoples, who were at different levels of social development, including: Ugro-Finnish, Baltic and Turkic tribes [6]. Among the Slavic tribes there were: Polyane, Drevlyane, Radimichi, Krivichi, Ulichi, Nords, Volhynians, Tivertsy, Dregovichi, Buzhans, White Croats, Polotsk, Slovene (s) and Vyatichi [7. P. 342; 8. P. 33-34, 39].

The picture of the placement of the Eastern Slavs on the East European Plain was vividly painted by an ancient Russian chronicler Nestor at the end of the 11th-early 12th century, who described the events that had taken place nearly three hundred years before him. Most of the information of the ancient Russian chronicles was confirmed by both other written and archaeological sources. On the right bank in the middle reaches of the Dnieper river lived Polyane and Kiev was the centre of their land; Drevlyane lived to the North and West of the Polyane, between the rivers Ros and Pripyat, Iskorosten was the center of their land; Dregovichi lived to the north of Polyane and Drevlyane, on the left bank of the river Pripyat; Bougains and Volhynians lived to the west of Polyane, along the upper course of the Southern Bug; Ulichi and Tivertsi lived further to the south-west, in the Dniester basin; White Croats lived in Transcarpathia; Northerners inhabited the left bank of the river Dnieper, the basins of the rivers Suly, Seym and Desna, reaching in the east to the river North Donets; Radimichi lived to the north of Northerners, between the upper reaches of the Dnieper and Sozha; Krivichi lived north of Radimichi, in the the upper reaches of the Volga, Dnieper and Dvina, with the center in Smolensk; Polochans inhabited the basin of the Western Dvina along the river Polote; Slovene lived in the area of Lake Ilmen; and finally, Vyatichi lived in the very east of the region occupied by the Eastern Slavs, inhabiting the basin of the upper and middle Oka and Moskva River.

Analyzing the territory inhabited by the Slavs, who then formed the Old Russian state, L. F. Boltenkova writes that “there are no Rus among the listed tribes and their territories [5. P. 36].” In this case, there is no need to prove in detail how “Rus came” to the Slavs or how Rus, Russians turned out among the Slavs. This question has been studied by different sciences for centuries. We are impressed by M.V. Lomonosov’s the position, who considered it true that Novgorodians in alliance with Chud and Kriviches invited Ros Varyags to rule them. Varyags are not an ethnos. The chronicle clarifies that the word “Varyag” has a general meaning and applies to anyone who came from the Baltic shores or, as Lomonosov put it, the Varangian shores. These were: the Swedes, the Danes, the Norse, the Goths, the Angles and the Rus (Ros). V.O. Klyuchevsky believed that “our” Varyags were armed merchants and Western Varyags were pirates or coastal robbers. V.O. Klyuchevsky described it in the following way: “Traces in the language and in the ancient tradition point out to this character of our Varyags. In the regional Russian lexicon, the Varyag (put in bold by V.O.K.) is a peddler, a petty trader and to varyagigate (put in bold by V.O.K.) means to engage in bargaining. It is curious that when a non-commercial armed Varyag needed to hide his identity, he pretended to be a merchant coming from Russia or going to Russia [11. P. 27].”

As for the Varyags and Rus, Solovyov S.M. wrote: “It remains for us to say a few words about the meaning of the names – the Varyags and Rus. Comparing various scientific interpretations, one can deduce the correct conclusion that the word Varyags meant groups of people, who left their homeland and were forced to seek fortune on the seas or in alien countries; that word, apparently, was formed in the West, among the Germanic tribes; in the east, the tribes of Slavs, Finns, Greeks and Arabs had the same common name for such squads, it was Rus, meaning, as you can see, seafarers coming on ships by sea, entering rivers inland of countries living along the coast of the sea. Let us add here that the name “Rus” was much more common in the south than in the north, and that, in all likelihood, Ros was known on the shores of the Black Sea before the first half of the ninth century, before the arrival of Rurik and his brothers. Such, in our opinion, are the most probable conclusions that can be obtained from the numerous discussions about the Varyags and Russia [17. P. 119].”

We will not go into details about the northern or southern location of the Varyags-Rus. In fact, today it is clear from various sources that the Varyags – Rus moved from the North to the South, but in the South they were practically always present.

So, Lomonosov, Klyuchevsky, Soloviev did not refute the theory of the arrival in Novgorod, Beloozero, Izborsk of the Varyags-Rus (Ros): Rurik, Sineus and Truvor under agreement. This happened in the year 862. The date is celebrated today as the beginning of Russian statehood. In fact, yes, it was the beginning of Russian statehood. But it is difficult to respond positively to the question: whether the people of Novgorod, the Kryvichi and Chud, that is, the federative tribes, who invited the Varyags-Rus, recognized themselves as Russians during the times of Rurik. On this issue, there is a point of view that the people of Novgorod of the period of Ancient Russia did not call themselves Russians, although they participated in “common life”, but sought to preserve their independence [5. P. 53-67].

Facts confirming this position are the uprisings, first against Rurik, then against Kiev, the establishment of a republican form of government, a federal structure, and subsequent wars with Moscow for independence. Nevertheless, there are historical grounds for considering Novgorod an integral part of the Old Russian state. That is, the Novgorod land is a part of the Old Russian state. It should only be clarified that contemporaries considered Novgorod to be “external Rus”, lying to the north of “internal Rus,” the Russian land. This view belongs to Constantine Bagryanorodny [4. P. 8-10]. Let's enumerate other parts of the Old Russian state.

Kiev land, which the Soviet (including Ukrainian) scientists considered the political and territorial core of the Old Russian state, did not develop, in their opinion, into a separate principality. That land was considered the common dynastic heritage of the ancient Russian princely family [18. P. 5].

“Russian land” between Kiev, Chernigov and Pereyaslavl constituted the territory of Kiev land. Initially (until the XI century), Chernigov and Pereyaslavl were ruled from Kiev, they did not have their own princes. In the XII-XIII centuries, Kiev land was identified with the “Russian land,” but geographically they did not coincide. The main possessions of Kiev were located on the right bank of the Dnieper, including the Drevlyane land and the land of the Dregovichi. The western borders of the Kiev land were located along the Western Bug river line, the southern borders were on the Ros river and the upper course of the Southern Bug [14. P. 30-33]. At the time of Vladimir Monomakh, Vyatka, Volyn, Turov, and Pereyaslavl were parts of the Kiev Grand Throne. In a word, the composition of the grand-ducal possessions changed with a tendency to decrease in size. Specifically, the borders of the Kiev land were described by: A.N. Nasonov, P.P. Tolochko (in Ukrainian), M.V. Dovnyar-Zapolsky, M.N. Tikhomirov, N. Molchanovsky, N.P. Dashkevich, V.I. Dovzhenok, A. Dobrovolsky (in Ukrainian), O.V. Bodyansky (in Ukrainian), A.T. Smilenko (in Ukrainian) and others. Among the authors there are not only Soviet, but also authors of the period of the Empire.

It should be emphasized that the borders of the Kiev land have been scrupulously investigated and maps have been drawn up.

Chernigov principality. This principality and its territory were the objects of research by V.N. Tatishchev, K.M. Borozdin, M.P. Pogodin, M.E. Markov, A.K. Zaitsev, D.Ya. Samokvasov, P.V. Golubovsky, B.A. Rybakov and others. The state territory of the Chernigov principality was formed depending on the general processes of the formation of the Old Russian state. The core of the territory of that principality were the lands of ethnic Nords (Slavs), who acquired the “Polyane” ethnographic appearance in the X-XII centuries. At the end of the ninth century (specifically, in 884) the Nords were still mentioned in Chronicals. In that year, the great Prince of Kiev Oleg laid a “light” tribute on the Nords.

Olga strengthened the statehood of the Nords by establishing a system of graveyards and tributes. Chernigov, as a state entity, is mentioned in the Chronicals in 1024 and in second place after Kiev. But in fact, Chernigov was known in history before that, already in the Russian Treaties with Byzantium of 907 and 945. The specific issue of the boundaries of the Chernigov principality is studied in the works of the above authors, as well as A.A. Spitsyn, I.I. Lyapushkin, I.P. Rusanov, N.I. Nadezhdin, N.V. Kholostenko.

Pereyaslav principality. This principality was the largest and most important (along with Kiev and Chernigov) within the Old Russian state. It occupied the forest-steppe zone on the left bank of the Dnieper. The ethnic composition of the principality was not simple, but mostly included Nords and Polyane. The Nords mostly settled in the eastern part and far to the south, and Polyane – mostly in the western. Nords were incorporated into the Old Russian state at the end of the 9th century by Prince Oleg. In the year 884, there is a record in the Chronicle: “Oleg went on the Nords and won a victory over them and imposed a light tribute on them ...”.

But, as noted above, Nortds were also part of the Chernigov principality, that is, we would say now that Nords were a divided ethnic group. The boundaries of the Nords’ lands were delineated by researchers on the basis of archaeological data [13. P. 217]. We would like to single out one detail: Pereyaslavl appeared on the land of Polyans. Do not forget that Kiev also appeared on their land.

Polotsk land. It should be stressed primarily that the Polotsk land was the first to separate from the Old Russian state, that is, it began the process of disintegration of that state. Polotsk land was studied by I.A. Garizhsky (1819), K.A. Govorsky (1853), A. Yelsky, M. Brodovich, M.V. Dovnar-Zapolsky, V.E. Danilevich, L.V. Alekseeva and others. The term “Polotsk land” was taken by the researchers from the Chronicle. As indicated by L. V. Alekseev, the emergence of the term “Polotsk-Minsk land” on the initiative of researcher V.I. Pichéty is wrong and does not correspond to the historical documents [1. P. 203]. Polotsk land is Northern Belarus. Geographically, it is the Pridvinskaya lowland, from Orsha to Minsk. The main waterway is the Western Dvina. The ethnic nature of the Polotsk land has not yet been precisely determined. It is believed in the sources that the Slavic tribe Krivichi arrived to this land not earlier than the VIIth century [2].

Faced with the Dregovichi, who had settled in the lands south of Minsk, Borisov and Drutsk, the Krivichi stopped. The city of Polotsk was built on the right bank of the Polota, near its mouth. A tribute to the prince flowed here. It is known that the princes of Polotsk fought Novgorod for the “border” lands. It should be noted that the Polotsk princes stood out among others in their desire for independence both from Kiev and anyone else. However, in the first half of the XIII century, the weakened Polotsk land was subordinated to Lithuania. That is, the ancient Russian period of the Polotsk land ended in the middle of the XIIIth century.

Smolensk land. According to archaeologists and historians, the core of the Smolensk land was the branch of the Krivichi, who settled in the upper reaches of the Western Dvina, the Dnieper and the Volga. They are called: “Smolensk Krivichi” or “Dnieper Krivichi” [16. P. 240-242]. Krivichy and their history were studied by: N.I. Nadezhdin, M.P. Pogodin, I.D. Belyaev, M.F. Vladimirsky-Budanov, M.K. Lyubavsky, P.V. Golubovsky, N.P. Barsov, I.M. Krasnoperov, V.V. Sedov, Ya.V. Stankevich, N.N. Usachev and others.

The science concluded that the political territory of the Smolensk land in the XII century coincided with the Krivitch ethnographic land. It is believed that the Krivichy assimilated the Balts, who had lived since antiquity. It is known from history that Oleg left Novgorod, accompanied by Krivichy, allies of Novgorod, as a part of his squad. He arrived in Smolensk, left his deputy there and moved on (then occupied Kiev). That is, Smolensk’s dependence on Oleg came earlier than he arrived in Kiev. Having occupied Kiev, he became the Grand Duke, believing that Novgorod and Smolensk were already in his submission. The beginning of the political isolation of Smolensk from Kiev was laid around 1125-1127, although the prince at that time was the grandson of the Kiev Prince Vladimir Monomakh. In 1137, Rostislav, the grandson of Vladimir Monomakh, established a local bishop in Smolensk [10]. The principality of Smolensk rises and begins to play a significant role in the common Russian affairs. In the middle of the XII century, Smolensk territory was delineated in the boundaries between the Polotsk land (from the headwaters of the Lovat to the mouth of the Toropa river and further to Orsha). In the south-west, the border point was Luchin, in the east – to the middle course of the Bolva river. In the northeast – the upper reaches of the Ugra and to the headwaters of the Moscow river, it wedged between the rivers Moskva and Volga. In the north, the border rose from Rzhev to Lake Seliger [16. P. 257].

Polovtsy land. The fates of Polovtsy and Russians merged at the beginning of the XI century. It was a complex, controversial, tragic and at the same time a close-alliance interrelation of nationalities. P. V. Golubovsky devoted much time to the study of 350 years of life of these nationalities. In 1883, his work “Pechenegs, Turks and Polovtsy before the Tatar invasion” was published. In 1889, he published a book “Polovtsy in Hungary” [15. P. 260]. The history of the Polovtsy in the context of the Old Russian state was studied by: D.A. Rasovsky, B.D. Grekov, M.N. Tikhomirov, A.N. Nasonov, I. Berezin, P.M. Melioransky, V.A. Parkhomenko, A.I. Popov and others. Pletneva S.A. believes that the history of the Polovtsy has been studied quite fully [16. P. 257].

The borders of the Polovtsy land were unstable: they were nomads, attacked the settled population, robbed, burned, and could remain in the conquered territory or go to other places. The task of the Russians was to ensure their own security. But gradually, gaining strength, the Russian princes began to oust the Polovtsy or to become related with a part of them. Some major victories over the Polovtsy are mentioned in “The Legend of Igor's Regiment”. Under the blows of the Russian princes, part of the Polovtsy moved to Byzantine, part to Georgia. Z. V. Anchabadze wrote a serious work about Polovtsy in the North Caucasus [3]. In the late 90s of the XII th century, skirmishes between Polovtsy and Russians almost ceased. On the contrary, Polovtsy participated in the political life of Russia. However, such participation was selective. For example, when the principality of Galicia-Volyn was the scene of fratricidal wars, Polovtsy together with Russian princes went there in 1202, 1208, 1226 and 1235, that is, almost until the arrival of the Mongol-Tatars.

The Polovtsy participated in the campaign of Izyaslav against Kiev in 1234. The Polovtsy, as well as the Russians, were the object of the Tatar conquests. Moreover, they fled, dissolving in the Russian territories of the Old Russian state. In short, for about 200 years the Polovtsy were in close relations with Russia, exerting mutual influence on each other, but with the advantage of Russia.

Galitsko-Volyn lands. The history of these lands is full of dramatic changes. In ancient times, Dulebsky tribal alliance existed here, and in the 6th century AD that union was broken by avars. Volyn, a former tribal union center, faded and Vladimir Volyn rose. A rich layer of boyars was formed, the following cities grew: Peremyshl, Danilov, Lutsk, Terebovl, Lviv, Cherven, Kholm, Berestye, Drogichin. In the XII century, Galich rose. The Galician principality was formed on the lands of the Slavs: White Croats, Tivertsy, Ulichi. In the XII-XIII centuries, Prince Roman Mstislavich Volynsky united the Galician land and Volyn. This principality existed until the XIV century, having survived the Tatar-Mongol invasion. Relations between Kiev and Galicia-Volyn principality were complex. Having become part of the Old Russian state in the Xth century, these south-western lands demonstrated a tendency to separation already from the XIth century. The rich local nobility did not want to submit to Kiev. On this basis, there were constant “external” and internal conflicts. Some princes replaced others, but there was no peace. The Principality fell into districts: Galitsky, Zvenigorod and Vladimir. This enabled Hungary (King Andrew) to occupy the Western Russian lands. Prince Daniel took the royal title from Pope Innocent IV. The process of catholization began. After the death of Daniel (in 1264), the Galician-Volyn principality disintegrated into four parts. In this form, in the XIV century Galicia was captured by Poland, and Volyn – by Lithuania. After the Union of Lublin (1569), the Galician and Volyn lands became part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Vladimir-Suzdal principality. The territory of this principality is between the river Oka and the upper reaches of the Volga. The original name of the principality is Rostov-Suzdal because of the ancient cities – Rostov and Suzdal. By decision of the feudal congress in 1097 Suzdal land came into the possession of Vladimir Monomakh. He has transferred this land to the management of his son Yuri Dolgoruky (1125-1157), who became the first prince independent from Kiev. Note that his independence was guaranteed by his father, Vladimir Monomakh. Yuri Dolgoruky, as you know, built Moscow, which later became the center of an independent Moscow principality. The son of Yuri Dolgoruky, Andrew Bogolyubsky did not seek to be in Kiev, unlike his father, who for a few years was the Great Prince in Kiev and died there. Andrei Bogolyubsky transferred the capital of “his” principality to Vladimir. From history it is clear that Kiev – Suzdal – Vladimir – Moscow are in a historically vital relationship, that is, in essence, they are one family. But, as you know, large families tend to live apart, “living in their own homes – apartments,” but it is impossible to tear out their blood and kinship ties, even if the family members have leave for different countries.

The land-principalities considered above, except for Novgorod, which was a republic, were not the only ones in the composition of the Old Russian state. Other lands were less state-organized, but they also created the history of the Old Russian state. Specific tribes, tribal alliances have been named above. Let’s name the lands: Turov-Pinsk, Murom and Tmutarakan.

The foregoing, based on the analysis of various sources, suggests that Ukraine did not exist as a state in the period from the 9th to the 14th centuries. Moscow principality was gaining momentum at the period. O. I. Chistyakov and I. D. Martysevich wrote that “The ancient Russian state did not coincide with the present-day Ukraine either in territory or in population, they have only one common trait – their capital – Kiev. One can’t talk about specifically Ukrainian culture, language, etc in the IXth and even in the XIIth centuries [9. P. 26].”

Although the further history of a part of the Russian lands intersects with the history of Ukraine (it is not the subject of this article), but we specifically note that without the Moscow principality, the Russian state, the Russian empire or the USSR, the Ukrainian statehood would not have taken place, the territorial basis of which contains the Russian principalities of the IXthe to the XII centuries.

With regard to the modern value of the territorial structure of the Old Russian state, the relevance of the issue we see in the events taking place in Ukraine. Part of the political elite inadequately perceives the territorial basis of the Ukrainian statehood. This problem can be resolved, if we turn to the history of the formation of Ukraine. Since modern Ukrainian political figures, on the one hand, consider Old Russian princes and princesses as “their own”, and on the other hand, they are trying to prove in every way that they are not Russians, but Ukrainians, there is a doubt about the legality of historical “succession”. The Ukrainian political elite by deniaing their “Russianness” put themselve outside the historical roots, creating difficulties for themselves and the people.

In reality, while remaining Ukrainians, it is possible to maintain a kinship with the Russians.

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2. Alekseev L.V. Arheologicheskie pamjatniki jepohi zheleza v srednem techenii Zapadnoj Dviny [Archaeological sites of the Iron Age in the middle reaches of the Western Dvina]. – Proceedings of the Baltic Expedition. Moscow, 1959. Vo l. 1 (In Russ.).

3. Anchabadze Z.V. Kipchaki Severnogo Kavkaza po dannym gruzinskih letopisej XI-XIV vv. [Kipchaks of the North Caucasus according to the Georgian chronicles of the XI-XIV centuries] // Materials of the session on the problem of the origin of the Balkar and Karachai peoples. Nalchik, 1960 (In Russ.).

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