KHANALIEV N.U. On Some Features of the US Policy in Central Asia
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2020.34.4.009
N.U. KHANALIEV Candidate of Sciences (political sciences), First Secretary, Department for New Challenges and Threats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Moscow, Russia
ON SOME FEATURES OF THE US POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
An attempt is made in the article to identify and analyze some aspects of the US foreign strategy in Central Asia which, in the author's opinion, although in one form or another are touched upon in the domestic political science, can nevertheless be interpreted from a new angle, subjecting the existing interpretations to a certain re-evaluation and adjustment. Washington's policy in the region is viewed in a broader context, Central Asia is considered an integral part of Eurasia. The main attention is focused on the justification of the thesis that in the 90s of the last century the United States claimed to be the main actor occupying the dominant position in Eurasia as a whole and Central Asia in particular, but due to a number of factors failed to reach that aim. After analyzing the activities of the US administration in using the territory of the five countries as a springboard for the military operations in Afghanistan, it is concluded that from the beginning of the war until recently, the possibilities of achieving goals sought by Washington in the region gradually narrowed. It is shown that the situation was determined both by Russia’s return to the region as a great military and political power and emergence of such a new powerful actor as China, as well as by the mistakes and miscalculations of the US leadership.
Key words: Eurasia, Central Asia, Russia, China, USA, Afghanistan, region, territory, terrorism, war, strategy, politics, etc.
As is known, since the appearance of the paper “The Geopolitical Pivot of History” by the English geographer and politician Halford Mackinder in 1904, Eurasia has a special place in the world science, especially in the theories of international relations and geopolitics. Mackinder initially singled out Central Asia as the pivot of the world history, he called it the "Middle earth" (Heartland). It was from here, that the Tatar-Mongols were able to spread their influence throughout Asia and the vast territories and peoples of Europe. Based on this thesis, Mackinder concluded: “He who dominates the Middle Earth dominates the world.”
A huge incentive to an increase of interest in Eurasia and, consequently, in Central Asia was given by the appearance of the book by the American analyst Zb. Brzezinski "The Grad Chessboard", published in 1997, it became a kind of Bible for the supporters of the idea of a liberal/unipolar world order led by the United States. In his own interpretation of Mackinder’s idea, Brzezinski stressed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eurasia turned into a kind of "The Grand Chessboard" on which “for the first time in history, the Eurasian power became not only the main arbiter of relations between the Eurasian states, but also the most powerful power in the world” [3. P. 12]. He bluntly stated that “the main geopolitical prize for America is Eurasia” [3. P. 44]. In it Brzezinski saw the keystone of American hegemony throughout the world. In a somewhat veiled form, repeating Mackinder’s idea, he concluded that He who controls Eurasia, controls the whole world.
It should be noted that for a long time this region was a bone of contention in the so-called Big Game between Russia and Great Britain. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West in general and the United States in particular gained access to the vast regions of Eurasia, which during the bipolar world order, were almost closed for them. These areas include, of course, Central Asia, which, due to its geopolitical location, has attracted the attention of both regional and world powers. Moreover, the attractiveness of the region for the West was determined by the possible prospects of diversification of sources of hydrocarbon resources and the weakening of dependence in this area on the Middle East and Russia. Moreover, due to the fact that Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are Caspian states, Central Asia is considered part of the vast Caucasus-Caspian region. At the same time, its large territories border China and the States of the Greater Middle East, primarily Iran and Afghanistan, and are geographically close to the two major Asian powers – India and Pakistan.
Initially, the region and its member countries were in the field of close attention of the West in general and Washington in particular since about the mid-90s of the last century, when they began to talk about the allegedly untold hydrocarbon resources of the entire Caucasus-Caspian region. As for the United States, its policy in the region was formed as a part of a common foreign policy strategy aimed at achieving control over hydrocarbon resources and ways of their transportation to the world markets, bypassing the Russian Federation and Iran. In this vein, it is significant that in 1997, the Caucasus and Central Asia were declared by Washington a “zone of the US vital interests.”
A kind of milestone event that sharply increased Washington's interest in the region was the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, as a result of which Washington declared a large-scale struggle against international terrorism, part of which was a military operation Enduring Freedom that began in the same year in Afghanistan. According to the American political scientist L. Brener, until that event, the region “was on the periphery of the global strategy of the United States, and the question of their strategy in this region did not cause open discussions either in political or academic circles, so that the differences did not go beyond a relatively restrained professional polemic” [1]. The interest in Central Asia was primarily determined by the fact that the three countries of the region: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan share borders with Afghanistan, where Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens live on the respective Northern border territories. As for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, although they do not share a border with Afghanistan, because of their geographical proximity to it, they have played an important role as transshipment sites for American troops and civilian military cargo and provided logistical support for the troops stationed in Afghanistan. Washington, not without the help of the Russian Federation, managed to reach an agreement on the establishment of military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and their leadership gave permission, together with Kazakhstan, to open air space for the transportation of goods and personnel of the American army to Afghanistan. As a result, Central Asia has become a kind of "gateway" to Afghanistan for the United States, a kind of rear base for the combat operations in Afghanistan, complementing Pakistan in this direction.
However, though at the beginning the USA has achieved some success in this direction, in the end, due to a combination of factors, primarily the restoration of Russia's geopolitical status and influence of China, formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), awareness of the heads of the Central Asian states of the threat to their regimes from the political strategy of Washington, the space for the realization of the US goals in the region gradually declined. Of particular importance from the perspective of the Washington's political strategy in the region was the fact that, while expanding its ties with the Central Asian states in the military and political sphere, Washington did not forget about its mission to protect human rights and freedoms and other democratic values in these countries. It seemed that the US leadership in assessing the situation in Central Asia proceeded from the belief that all the problems in the region were caused by a lack of democracy. Therefore, the US State Department did not forget to assist new states in promoting human rights and political democracy. Programs were proposed to finance independent media and non-profit public organizations, some of which were focused on rapprochement with the West, often to the detriment of the interests of the Central Asian countries.
It gradually became clear that this flipside of the Washington's strategy of exporting the democratic revolution, which was expressed in the promotion of “color revolutions,” had its flaws and limits. Quite a serious blow to Washington's strategy was caused by the disappointment in it of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, especially in the part that concerned claims to protect human rights and freedoms. One of the results of this strategy was the so-called “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet space in general and in Central Asia in particular. We mean primarily the so-called “Tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the events in Andijan in Uzbekistan in May of the same year. As a result of this “revolution,” which turned into a riot and looting, the President of Kyrgyzstan A. Akayev, who was considered almost an exemplary liberal head of state, was overthrown. The leadership of Uzbekistan, led by President I. Karimov, has demonstrated its ability to resist the strategy of the export of "democratic revolutions" and all kinds of “color revolutions.”
These events demonstrated the incompatibility of the two directions of Washington's political strategy: value and military, Washington was not able to solve the dilemma of “values and interests” and clearly determine which of them has the priority in its political strategy. The question remained open as to what was most valuable to the United States: energy resources or military presence, security cooperation, or election transparency and media freedom. As G. I. Chufrin noted, these events “confirmed that the challenges to stability in the region come not only from the Islamic extremism and international terrorism, but also from the United States, which has embarked on the path of exporting democracy and direct support of the “color revolutions” [5. Pp. 29-30].
The process of reducing the US military presence in the region gradually began, in particular it was expressed in the elimination of the US military base in Khanabad in the Andijan region of Uzbekistan. The issue of the prospects of the American air base in Manas in Kyrgyzstan became urgent.
Naturally, the growth of the US influence in the region especially in light of the “Tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan events have caused significant concern in the region of Russia, China and other neighboring countries, primarily Turkey and Iran. The priorities of the fight against international terrorism made their leaders coordinate their efforts to achieve common goals. Most importantly, with the return of Russia to the geopolitical arena as a great military and political power, capable of ensuring its national security and protecting its vital national interests, and the activation of China's policy, the situation in this area began to change more or less significantly. As K. S. Hajiyev noted, gradually large cracks began to appear on the "Grand Chessboard" as a the result, first of all, of a significant change in the nature and configuration of the geopolitical forces on the entire Eurasian continent as a whole and in Central Asia in particular [6. Pp. 29-42].
From this point of view, two integration associations have become increasingly important for the Central Asian countries: the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), of which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes four of the five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as full members, with the exception of Turkmenistan. In this context, it is necessary to take into account the fact that a significant part of the new Silk Road is expected to pass through the territory of Kazakhstan. The importance of these associations is evidenced by the fact that their participants, first of all, Russia and China demanded to determine the timing of the presence and liquidation of US military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Four Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, except of Turkmenistan, are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), established in 2001.
Beijing is interested in ties with Central Asia because of the factor of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with a predominantly Muslim population.
In addition, as noted by the American researcher L. Bichner, the Central Asian countries, suspecting the United States of aggressive actions, “stated that they intend to firmly and consistently strengthen cooperation with Russia and China. The actions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were highly impressive and successful. The SCO has formed a powerful force to challenge the American strategy in the region” [1]. One of the results of the activation of Russia's policy in the region was the opening of the Russian air base in Kant in the Chui region of Kyrgyzstan and the creation of the SCO anti-Terrorist center in Tashkent.
In this direction, Turkey and Iran, which have their own vital interests here, cannot be excluded. Due to a complex of factors, informal geopolitical triangles China-Russia-Iran and Russia-Turkey-Iran were formed largely in order to counter the policy of President Donald Trump’s administration.
In this direction, the steady growth of China's influence, trade, economic and investment presence in the region over the past two or three decades is becoming increasingly important. Naturally, it is facilitated by the geographical proximity of China with the Central Asian States, three out of five of them: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have common borders with it. If in the Soviet period before the collapse of the USSR, the trade turnover between China and the former Central Asian republics was from US$ 350 to 750 million, now its volume has reached tens of billions of dollars. According to available data, China's investment in the region's economy has reached US$ 100 billion. Naturally, the key factor is the export of hydrocarbon resources to China. Beijing has invested billions of dollars in infrastructural projects in the energy sector. According to A. Dubnov, “in contrast to the straight-forward Americans, the Chinese are taking the CA region into their hands with a quiet SAP, involving these countries in their project of the Silk Road Economic belt and investing a lot of money [4]. As a result of this and similar trends and processes, according to some authors, after some time, the countries of Central Asia “will de facto be under the Chinese protectorate” [4]. In this context, Beijing's efforts to implement the "One belt, One road" project, in which Central Asia is given a key place, are particularly important.
It became obvious that as a result of these and other related events and processes, the United States suffered a serious setback in Central Asia, one might even say a serious strategic defeat. There is an increasing tendency to reduce their ability to actively pursue their foreign policy strategy in the region, especially as far as their efforts to spread democracy are concerned.
These processes and trends, in turn, have caused serious disputes and discussions in American society, among politicians, intellectual and media elite on the issue of American strategy in the region. It has become clear that the consensus on the Central Asian strategy that existed after the September 11, 2001 attacks has become a thing of the past. So naturally, the presidential administration and the State Department made the necessary adjustments to their strategy in the region. An important step in this direction was the Report on “National security strategy of the United States of America" for 2006, which stated that Central Asia is still a priority region for the United States. According to the authors of the Report, various components of the overall US strategy intersect in Central Asia, which is why it is necessary to focus simultaneously on promoting political democracy and market economy, “diversifying energy sources on a global scale; strengthening security and ensuring victory in the war against terrorism” [9].
The report can be considered an evidence of the fact that Washington is not going to stop its activities aimed at continuing and even expanding its presence in the region. As K. S. Hajiyev rightly noted, “the cracks that have formed in the Eurasian space become a serious obstacle to Washington's protection of its interests here. But it would be an unforgivable mistake to believe that the US will simply refuse to protect its interests in Eurasia in general and in Central Asia in particular. We must not forget that the United States as a great military and political power, due to its imperial nature, just can not give up its positions and interests in the region” [6. P. 38].
At a time when the leaders of the Central Asian states became more and more aware of the threat to their regimes emanating from the US policy, Washington strategists got the idea of creating the so-called "Greater Central Asia" as a kind of analogue of the Greater Middle East. It was an attempt to unite the Central Asian states and Afghanistan into a single entity. This project was at first proposed by F. Starr, Chairman of the Institute of Central Asia and the Caucasus at Johns Hopkins University, in his article published in Foreign Affairs magazine in the summer of 2005 [8. Pp. 72-87]. The idea was to strengthen relations with NATO and, above all, with the United States, to select and construct routes for the transportation of hydrocarbons to the world markets, of course, bypassing the territory of Russia; to promote the development of market economy and political democracy; to fight the drug trafficking; to carry out “an offensive against terrorism and create security infrastructure closely connected to the US was declared one of the key tasks” [8. P. 76].
This idea was used by Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State under President of the United States G. W. Bush Jr. As part of the revision of the political strategy in the region, during her visit to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in October 2005, she put forward the idea of a “reform corridor” and a proposal to combine the proposed Greater Central Asia and Greater South Asia. Justifying this idea, Assistant Secretary of State for these two regions, R. A. Boucher argued that Washington has here long-term interests that determine the three main goals of the United States: “strengthening democratic stability and economic reforms; strengthening regional security and cooperation in the war on drugs and terrorism; promoting economic growth and regional cooperation” [2]. To achieve these goals, in 2006, the Central Asian countries were taken from the State Department's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia and transferred to the State Department's Bureau for South Asia [11. P. 96]. The Administration of President Bush, Jr. created the Department of South and Central Asia, the main goal of which was integration of these two regions.
The Administration of President Barack Obama continued attempts to expand and strengthen US cooperation with Central Asian states. During the visit to the region of the then Secretary of State J. Carrie in November 2015, a C5+1 meeting of the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan with the United States was organized in the Uzbek city of Samarkand to discuss the key issues of Washington's policy in the region. As a result of the negotiations, the so-called "Samarkand Declaration" was adopted, which outlined a fairly wide range of areas of cooperation between the United States and the countries of the region.
From this point of view, the results of the visit of the new President of Uzbekistan Sh. Mirziyoyev to the United States in May 2018 are of interest. During the talks with the US President Donald Trump a number of agreements worth US$4.8 billion were concluded between the two countries [7]. The contacts between the representatives of the two countries were continued at the VIII Central Asian Trade Forum, held on October 17-19 in Tashkent and organized on the initiative of the American Agency for International Development (USAID). At the forum, US representatives announced Washington's readiness to provide duty-free access to the American market for several thousand items of goods from the Central Asian states.
Concluding this article of a limited volume, it should be noted that the US foreign policy strategy in Central Asia in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union has gone a difficult way from attempts to establish the US as a leading, even dominant, military-political power to becoming one of the actors inferior in terms of its capabilities and influence to Russia and China. It is a result of a whole range of factors, such as the return of the Russian Federation to the geopolitical arena, including the Eurasian space and the Central Asia, and a number of mistakes and failures in the policy of Washington. An important role in this context seems to have been played by the fact that the US leadership could not, perhaps did not want to overcome the dual nature of its strategy, the essence of which was the contradiction between the military and political goals of conducting combat operations in Afghanistan and the promotion of the values of human rights, political democracy and the rule of law in the region. As a result, Washington ultimately failed to fully achieve its strategic goals. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the US will abandon them. However, time will show exactly how the balance of geopolitical forces of the main actors in the region will develop.
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ALIYEV U.S. Prospects for the Development of Military-Political Cooperation of the Countries of the Post-Soviet Space
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2020.34.4.008
U.S. ALIYEV PhD of Law, Master of Psychology, PhD student at the International Security and Russian Foreign Policy Activities Chair, National Security Department, Institute of Law and National Security, Moscow, Russia
PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY-POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
In the context of the formation of a new world order, there is a need to make changes to the development strategy of the Eurasian Economic Union and, even more broadly, integration processes in the post-Soviet space. These changes should take into account the changes taking place in the world, the emergence of new properties of world politics, which are often generically called turbulence. The components of turbulence are conflictness and uncertainty, but this is not the whole list, there are other components. On the example of the Transnistrian conflict settlement, it is shown that success in this process is possible if we are not confined to the conflict itself, but we act on the basis of Russia’s and the European Union’s mutual desire to reduce conflictness in the world and in the European region. Uncertainties can be contrasted with the emergence of military-political factor as the leading one of Eurasian integration in the form of rapprochement and the gradual merger of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Key words: new world order, turbulence, conflict, uncertainty, Eurasian integration, Transnistria conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Eurasian Economic Union, EAEU, Collective Security Treaty Organization, CSTO.
Introduction. The state of interaction with the countries of the former Soviet Union is in the foreground in Russia. This situation is reflected both in practical actions and in Russian strategic documents. For example, article 49 of the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept states: “The development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the further strengthening of integration structures operating in the CIS with Russian participation are the priority areas of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy” [13]. Russian politicians and scientists are constantly studying the possibilities of increasing the efficiency of integration processes between our countries.
It should be emphasized that the works of Russian authors published in recent years highlight a wide range of issues in this subject area [18. S. 37-51; 17; 5. S. 551-561; 6. S. 157-172; 10; 11; 16; 9].
However, the problem cannot be called unequivocally exhausted. Due to many objective circumstances, the study of the designated topic continues to maintain a high level of relevance.
From the point of view of a systematic approach, the situation in the post-Soviet space depends on the general situation in the world. This situation reflects the modern stage of world development, which consists in the transition to a new world order, from mono- and bipolar to some other. It can be a multipolar, polycentric, multilateral, or some other world [7. S. 151-168]. Whatever it is, the transition to it promises to be very tense, because in human history there have already been several transitions from one world order to another, and all of them were very tough or even cruel, accompanied by crusades and bloody wars. Today the situation in the world is very tense, and this tension continues to grow.
In characterizing the complexity and tension of the current state of the world system of politics, scientists use different terms. Among them, the term “turbulence” has become increasingly found in relation to international relations. A search for this word on the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry gives 225 results [15]. It is also used in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation [13]. However, so far this term as a concept is poorly developed. Our study of its content made it possible to suggest that by turbulence in the world system its properties such as conflict, uncertainty, instability, instability and the desire of great powers for hegemony [8].
As a rule, the term “turbulence” is used in a negative connotation, that is, you need to do something with it, or find answers to it, or oppose it. On the whole, responding to or counteracting turbulence is difficult. It is especially difficult to do this taking into account the not too developed conceptual apparatus. Obviously, it would be easier to try to answer each of its constituent properties. In this article, we will offer our vision of what answers can be to the sharply increased conflict in international relations, as well as to the increasing uncertainty of the world environment. As we will see, these areas of Russian foreign policy can not only contribute to the formation of a new world order, but also make a significant contribution to improving the effectiveness of military-political integration processes in the post-Soviet space.
Conflict reduction. One of the most important aspects of tension and turbulence in the world are regional conflicts. Global conflict consists of regional conflicts, which, in turn, consist of specific conflicts within these regions. There are quite a few unresolved conflicts in Europe, and part of them are unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space. These include situations in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, which continue to have a significant impact on the policies of the countries of the region. Consider the issue of conflict resolution in the post-Soviet space on the example of Transnistria.
Despite an active policy towards independence and the desire of the population tested in referenda to join Russia, Transnistria is in a state of balance between Europe and Russia. Experts say that, depending on the circumstances, Transnistria may enter into an alliance with Russia or balance between Moscow and Europe [4; 1. S. 187-197]. On the one hand, Transnistria is often considered almost as a springboard for Russia in Moldova and South-Western Europe. At the same time, Transnistria is closely connected with the European Union. According to the official customs data of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic, the EU share in the export of Transnistria in the first half of 2019 was almost 37 percent, while the EAEU share was only 11 percent, and almost all of this share belongs to Russia [3].
The events of the summer of 2019 in Moldova indicate that both Russia and the EU significantly influence the political situation in this country. The capitulation of the Democratic Party, the flight from the country of V. Plahotniuc, the formation of a coalition government of representatives of seemingly antagonists – the Socialist Party and the ACUM Party, the appointment of M. Sandu as the country's Prime Minister – all this became a reality thanks to a compromise between Russia and the EU. The executive branch, and not just President I. Dodon, has become more attentive to the development of Russian-Moldovan relations. For example, the trade representative of Moldova in Russia V. Darvay says that the time of conflicts and provocations has passed, that it is necessary to use the existing potential to the fullest extent possible in relations between Russia and Moldova [14]. In September 2019, the first meeting in three years of the Moldovan-Russian intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation was held in Chisinau. It confirmed the intention to deepen bilateral economic relations.
It seems that the Transnistrian conflict can also be resolved by coordinating the positions of Russia and the European Union, since external players play an extremely important role in it. Moscow and Brussels can mitigate the trend towards increased conflict in the world and in the European region in the formation of a new world order. To do this, you need to reconsider your attitude to the conflicts existing in the region, including in the post-Soviet space. The first of them could be just the Transnistrian conflict as the most mild and amenable to resolution. In addition, in this case there would be no need to create an additional negotiation format, since both Russia and the EU are members of the 5 + 2 format.
In other words, the Transnistrian conflict could be resolved not as a single unit, but within the framework of the strategy of Russia and the European Union to reduce conflict on the European continent and around the world. This approach could be taken as a methodology for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which should also be resolved on the basis of going beyond the limits of this conflict exclusively, that is, in a wider framework. At the same time, the broader goal of reducing conflict in these countries, the Transcaucasian region and the world as a whole should be pursued.
Decrease in uncertainty. Another component of turbulence, in our opinion, is the high uncertainty in international relations. Its source is the imbalance in the global system. All international interaction consists of cooperation and confrontation. If they are balanced, there is moderate uncertainty in international relations. But when confrontation prevails in the world, the degree of uncertainty rises significantly. The extreme type of confrontation is war, which, as K. Clausewitz wrote, takes place for three quarters in fog, that is, in uncertainty [2. S. 78-79]. Today, as we see, the level of confrontation in international relations is off scale.
What should be the answer to this situation in the post-Soviet countries? It seems to us that it consists in the rapprochement and subsequent unification of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. There are a number of arguments in favor of this decision. In conditions of uncertainty, issues of strategy and security become paramount in relation to issues of economy or culture. Military cadres purposefully prepare for activities in the face of uncertainty, for them it is a familiar environment. But bankers, like their money, love silence, interest clarity, foreign investment does not go into war zones.
The need to increase the importance of the military-political factor is also explained by the fact that today there is no longer a clean economy and a clean policy or strategy. In military affairs, the concept of hybrid war has become widespread, which refers to the use of not only military, but various, including economic, measures to defeat the enemy. And in the economy, power rather than economic competitive measures are increasingly being used. Otherwise, you can’t name the widespread sanctions that Western countries announce almost every day today.
In this hybrid that is emerging before our eyes, the economy is clearly not in the first place. Western Policy Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey V. Lavrov described as follows: “he would like to slow down the objective processes of development of human civilization, he would like to artificially maintain his dominance, without disdaining methods of blackmail, threats, unfair and unscrupulous competition” [12]. That is, in other words, economic viability under the current conditions is fading into the background, since unfair and unscrupulous competition involves forceful, non-economic measures.
In this regard, the answer to this challenge should have a power component. It is understood that the purely economic EAEU must be supplemented by a force component, that is, the Eurasian Economic Union must become a Eurasian Union. This is required by the logic of the integration process, which manifested itself in the development of the European Union. After all, he was also at first the European Economic Community, but the problems beyond the borders of only a pure economy from a certain point could not remain outside the European integration process.
The same thing is happening now with Eurasian integration, its economic component cannot remain alone, it must be supplemented by the foreign policy, political-military, and, in the future, military-political component. Currently, on the same day, two summits of the same participants, the heads of state, are held in one place, with the exception of one state of Tajikistan, which is a member of the CSTO but is not a member of the EAEU. The strategic course for Tajikistan’s entry into the EAEU and the subsequent merger of the two structures seems strategically justified.
Speaking about the rapprochement and gradual unification of these two integration structures, we have in mind a gradual well-adjusted political work, and not a one-time decision to merge. Both the EAEU and the CSTO have certain successes and shortcomings. The prospect of rapprochement and unification should be associated with increased success and the solution of problems facing organizations. You can use the experience of the European Union, which until some point was a purely economic structure, and military-political cooperation was carried out within the framework of the Western European Union and NATO. Unification should not be a formal measure to save money, but a step towards improving the effectiveness of Eurasian integration. Thanks to this, the Eurasian countries will more confidently move forward in their development in conditions of global uncertainty.
Conclusion. To summarize, in the context of the formation of a new world order, there is a need to make changes to the development strategy of the Eurasian Economic Union and, even more broadly, integration processes in the post-Soviet space. These changes should take into account the changes taking place in the world, the emergence of new properties of world politics, which are often generically called turbulence. The components of turbulence are conflict and uncertainty, but this is not the whole list, there are other components. On the example of the Transnistrian conflict settlement, it is shown that success in this process is possible if the conflict itself is exceeded, and on the basis of the mutual desire of Russia and the European Union to reduce conflict in the world and in the European region. Uncertainties can be contrasted with the emergence of leading positions in the military-political factor of Eurasian integration in the form of rapprochement and the gradual merger of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
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KHOPERSKAYA L.L. Information Aspect of the Formation of the Anti-Terrorist Eurasian Space
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2020.34.4.007
L.L. KHOPERSKAYA Doctor of Sciences (political science), Professor at the Chair of International Relations, Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic
INFORMATION ASPECT OF THE FORMATION OF THE ANTI-TERRORIST EURASIAN SPACE
The article deals with the problem of completeness of information on measures to counter terrorism and extremism taken by the labor-surplus states of Central Asia. With the help of some former labor migrants, a new model of terrorism (“IS 2.0”) is being developed based on the use of “pendulum” migration of radical Islamists to the countries of Central Asia and Russia, such Islamists serve as the core of various extremist organizations.
A serious problem for the Russian experts is that none of the countries (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan) sending labor migrants to Russia publishes complex information; each country publishes mainly statistical or regulatory information or news. For example, not all official documents are available in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan and it is difficult to obtain official statistics in Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, the analysis of the disparate experience of the three countries, among which we can highlight the purposeful work with labor migrants carried out by the representative offices of the Republic of Tajikistan abroad; the courses for imams of mosques and clerics on the prevention of radicalization of the population organized by the State Commission for religious affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic and the system of social rehabilitation of repentant extremists in Uzbekistan prove the need for relevant information in a certain standardized form.
The main sources of information used in the article are documents of the UN, the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center, speeches of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan containing statistical information, news information from the websites of the special services of the Kyrgyz Republic and legal documents of Uzbekistan.
The article substantiates the conclusion about the need to highlight the information aspect in the formation of the anti-terrorist Eurasian space, the relevance of which was discussed at the Council of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly in May 2019.
Key words: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Islamic State (1), counteraction to terrorism and extremism, information, anti-terrorist space.
We should agree with the conclusion of the Russian special services that “international terrorism is becoming a force trying to seize power in a number of countries” [6] and number one in that list of post-Soviet states are Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Since Russia receives millions of migrant workers from these countries, it cannot help but monitor the main trends in the spread of terrorism and extremism, as well as forms of counteraction to them.
The trend of creating new “sleeping” terrorist cells in different regions of the world, but, above all, in the Central Asia countries became actively manifested in 2014-2017 and continued in 2018-2019 [8. Pp. 620-634]. In order to carry out thorough research of this problem a reliable empirical and constantly updated base is needed, and here it is worth noting problems faced by the Russian experts. First, different states provide different types of information (mainly statistical, legal, news, etc.); second, many sources are closed for obvious reasons; and third, it is difficult to compare the results. For example, not all official documents are available in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, and it is difficult to obtain official statistical information in Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan.
Nevertheless, the study of forms of counteraction to terrorism and extremism in individual states on the basis of available sources is an urgent task. The article deals with the forms of counteraction to terrorism and extremism in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
The main sources of information subject to further generalization are documents of the UN, the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center, speeches of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan containing statistical information, news information from the websites of the special services of the Kyrgyz Republic and legal documents of Uzbekistan.
The UN Report in the section Central and South Asia named leaders of the main groups formed after the split of the Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari group. Mostly they are former migrant workers in Russia from Central Asia: a citizen of Tajikistan Ubaydullo Muradoluogly, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan Alisher Tazhibaev, a native of Uzbekistan Sulaymanov. There are also terrorist groups in the region under the auspices of Taliban and ISIL-Khorasan under the leadership of Tajiks Gulmurod Halimov, Asliddin Davlatov and Saivali Shafiev [14].
As early as December 2014, President of Tajikistan E. Rahmon called ISIS “the plague of the century and a serious threat to Tajikistan.” At the beginning of April 2015, a Joint Headquarters was created from among the staff of the Prosecutor General's office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service of Tajikistan to provide unified management in the inquiry and investigation of all existing cases of participation of RT citizens in armed conflicts on the territory of other states.
In 2015, Tajikistan adopted amendments to the Criminal Code giving the authorities an opportunity to exempt from criminal liability persons who voluntarily refused “illegal participation in an armed formation, armed conflict or military actions on the territory of other states before the termination of the armed formation, the end of the armed conflict or military actions,” if their actions do not contain signs of another crime (article 401 of the Criminal Code of Tajikistan).
In 2018, President of Tajikistan E. Rahmon said that over the years, the Internal Affairs Bodies of the Republic of Tajikistan have identified and detained 95 organized criminal groups consisting of more than 500 people involved in more than 900 crimes some of these groups were eliminated. In addition, more than 4,800 extremist and terrorist crimes were identified, resulting in the detention of more than 1,500 members of radical groups and their supporters, criminal charges were brought against them, and 63 terrorist and extremist acts were uncovered. In the last three years alone, 82 cases of financing terrorists have been identified and registered [12].
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan, in 2018, divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan identified and detained 13 organized criminal groups, consisting of 65 people who have committed 71 crimes, registered and solved 873 crimes of a terrorist and extremist nature. As a result of the measures taken, 298 members of terrorist and extremist organizations were detained. 11 terrorist acts were also registered (including four attempted murders). As a result of the explanatory work carried out by the employees of the Internal Affairs bodies, 99 citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan who took part in hostilities abroad were returned to the country [11].
In November 2018, the Center for countering terrorism, extremism and separatism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan was opened. At the end of December 2018, the development of the draft Law of the Republic of Tajikistan "On Countering Extremism" [10] began. At the extended meeting of the government of the Republic of Tajikistan in January 2019 it was noted that it was necessary to strengthen the relations of the Republic's representative offices abroad with labor migrants, which was the responsibility of the Ministries of Labor, Migration and Employment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies and consulates of the country, as well as local government authorities [4].
It should be noted that in 2018-2019 it became much more difficult to find open official information on the anti-terrorist and anti-extremist activities in Kyrgyzstan. According to the data for the year 2017, the Internal Affairs bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic, as the result of activities countering the spreading the ideology of religious extremists and international terrorist organizations, initiated 290 criminal cases, detained 232 people seized 9041 materials of an extremist nature, as well as various components for making improvised explosive devices and grenades. Three facts of preparation for terrorist acts in the territory of the Republic have been prevented, during which 17 people have been detained. As a result of the monitoring conducted in social networks, 62 sites of an extremist and terrorist nature have been identified, of which 58 sites have been blocked by court decisions. 20 criminal cases were initiated on the facts of illegal migration [3].
The full report for 2018 could not be found on the official websites of the security services. However, the website of Azattyk radio reports that according to the State Committee for National Security for 8 months of 2018 157 citizens associated with international terrorist groups were identified, of which 34 were “neutralized.” In addition, it indicated that 121 citizens related to extremist groups have been identified and also 34 of them have been “neutralized.” 43 people were brought to criminal responsibility for terrorist and extremist activities. 36 foreign citizens suspected of religious extremism were expelled from the country [16].
24.kg News Agency published data from the state penitentiary service of the Kyrgyz Republic that the number of those convicted of terrorism and extremism serving sentences in correctional institutions is increasing every year. 245 people are serving sentences in closed institutions for extremism and terrorism. 215 convicts live in the colonies-settlements for these crimes. On the account of the Criminal Executive Inspection 86 people sentenced are sentenced to probation for these crimes [5].
On August 6, 2018, the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic adopted the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On counteracting financing of terrorism and legalization (laundering) of criminal proceeds,” and also obliged the Ministry of Internal Affairs jointly with the State Commission on Religious Affairs to conduct additional courses for imams of mosques and clerics on the prophylactic and prevention of radicalization of the population.
Over the past few years, the Kyrgyz authorities have made efforts to combat extremism and strengthen oversight of religious organizations. In 2018, 3,257 religious organizations were registered in Kyrgyzstan, more than 20 of them were banned by the courts for reasons related to extremism. In September 2018, at least 16 websites distributing extremist material were closed.
As part of efforts to combat extremism, the security services have detained dozens of active members of the banned radical groups accused of trying to recruit new members [9]. The information published on the website of the State Committee for National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic in the News section allows us to make the following chronicle for the period from September 2018 to the first half of 2019:
On September 19, 2018, an ITO (international terrorist organization) militant was detained. Since 2013, he was a member of an international terrorist organization, where he received sabotage and terrorist training and took part in combat operations against the Syrian government as part of terrorist groups. On the instructions of the ITO leaders he was engaged in illegal transportation of recruits to Syria. In total, with the direct participation of the detainee, more than 100 recruits from the CIS countries were redirected to the zone of armed conflict.
On September 26, 2018, active members of the banned religious extremist organization Hizbut-Tahrir were detained in the city of Karakol, Issyk-Kul region. It is established that the detainees were actively engaged in recruiting new members to their ranks and called for the creation of a theocratic “Caliphate.” As a result of the authorized searches at the places of residence of the detainees, a significant number of materials in electronic and printed form containing the ideology of the banned Hizbut-Tahrir were found and seized.
On October 14, 2018, a member of an international terrorist organization, a citizen of the Kyrgyz REPUBLIC, was detained in Bishkek. During the inspection, a fake passport of the Kyrgyz Republic was found in the name of another ITO militant who had previously taken part in the fighting in Syria. It is established that the detainee is a member of an underground international group abroad and was engaged in financing and providing various assistance to militants fighting in Syria in the ITO ranks. The detainee sent about US$ 100 thousand to finance ITO fighters in Syria.
On October 23, 2018, members of the ITO underground were identified as having committed armed assaults (Ganimat) on wealthy people with the aim of further financing the activities of the ITO fighting in the war zone in Syria and Iraq. It is established that for a large Ganimat, the leaders of the underground for a long time collected information about the channel of money transfer and committed a robbery using weapons and vehicles, which later were buried in a deserted territory in order to cover up criminal traces. In the Batken region, at a depth of 3 meters from the surface of the earth, a car was found that was used in April 2015 as a crime weapon during a robbery by members of a criminal group.
25 Oct 2018, the activity of ITO “sleeping” cells was suppressed on the territory of Chui oblast, as a result five foreign nationals and four citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic were detained. It is established that since 2017, members of the terrorist cell have been actively engaged in recruiting and involving ordinary citizens of the Republic into the ranks of ITO militants in Syria and Afghanistan, as well as planning of subversive actions in Kyrgyzstan with the use of firearms and improvised explosive devices. The criminal group also included foreign citizens from other CAR/CIS countries wanted on charges of involvement in terrorist activities. On the instructions of the ITO emissaries they were sent to Kyrgyzstan to create a sleeping cell and prepare for the arrival of the most experienced ITO fighters.
On November 22, 2018, authorized searches were conducted at the places of residence of members of the religious extremist organization Hizbut-Tahrir in Issyk-Kul region as a part of the initiated criminal case under Article 299-2 of part 1 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic (acquisition, production, storage, distribution, transportation and transfer of extremist materials, as well as deliberate use of symbols or attributes of extremist or terrorist organizations). As a result of investigative and operational activities, a large volume of banned Hizbut-Tahrir literature was found and seized.
On December 25, 2018, searches were conducted at thirteen addresses in Zheti-Oguz and Tyupsk districts and the city of Karakol in Issyk-Kul region. As a result of operational activities, books, brochures, leaflets, DVDs, notebooks and cell phones belonging to members of a banned extremist organization were found and seized, as well as illegally stored firearms.
On January 29, 2019, a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic who was on the international wanted list was detained. It is established that in 2015the detainee having taken the path of supporting the ideology of Jihadism went to Syria, where he joined the gangs of international terrorists, took part in the armed clashes against the government forces of the Syrian Arab Republic and was subsequently transferred to the territory of one of the SCO member states.
February 1, 2019, as a part of the ongoing counter-terrorism efforts to curb the infiltration of militants from the international terrorist organizations moving from the zones of armed conflict in Syria to commit terrorist or other subversive activities on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, a Kyrgyz citizen was detained who had been previously convicted for committing a crime under article 241 of the Criminal Code. It is established that in February 2014, having illegally produced a fake passport of a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic with wrong data, he flew to Turkey and then to Syria, where he joined the ITO gangs. During a short period of time the detainee became one of the active functionaries of the forces of international terrorism, participated in the fighting against the government forces of Syria. Subsequently, he was transferred to Turkey, where he was responsible for the operation of a major channel for transporting militants to Syria.
On February 5, 2019, a citizen from a Central Asian country, officially wanted in his homeland for committing terrorist crimes, was detained in Jalal-Abad. It is established that the detainee took a special course on the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from improvised materials, as well as tactics of combat from automatic weapons in urban and mountain environment. The detainee has illegally entered the territory of Kyrgyzstan with further plans to settle down and create the necessary conditions for the formation of an underground terrorist cell for the purpose of committing a robbery (the so-called Ganimat).
On February 5, 2019, a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic was detained who turned out to be an ITO emissary engaged in spreading extremist materials in social network resources on the Internet and providing foreign citizens with fake passports of the Kyrgyz Republic. During the operational search, a citizen of one of the Central Asian countries was detained, sought for committing serious and especially serious crimes of a terrorist nature. He was hiding in Kyrgyzstan using forged documents.
On February 9, 2019, a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic was detained who, in 2014 while studying at a religious institution abroad came under the influence of ITO recruiters and went to Syria with his family. The detainee received combat training in one of the ITO camps and took part in an armed conflict against the government forces of the Syrian Arab Republic.
On February 27, 2019, a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic, a native of Osh region, was detained while illegally crossing the state border. According to the established data, being in the territory of Syria as a part of terrorist gangs, he passed special and diversionary-terrorist training, took part in military operations against the SAR government troops. Subsequently, on the instructions of the ITO leaders he purposefully left the combat zone in order to settle and wait for the instructions on the implementation of terrorist acts in one of the CIS countries/CAR.
On March 7, 2019, a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic, a native of the Batken region, who was recruited by emissaries through social networks while working in one of the CIS countries, after which he underwent primary military training, was detained. Having sworn to the leaders of the ITO, he planned to fly to Turkey and join a group of ITO mercenaries from other countries, illegally cross the Turkish-Syrian border to further participate in Jihad against the Syrian government forces.
On March 8, 2019, a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic, a native of Osh region, who was on the international wanted list, was detained. It is established that in 2015the detainee, while working in one of the CIS countries, came under the influence of ITO emissaries and went to Turkey and then to Syria in order to join the gangs and further participate in Jihad against the government of the Syrian Arab Republic.
On March 15, 2019, an extremist who was on the Interpol wanted list was detained in Bishkek. He was also on an interstate wanted list for illegally involving citizens in armed groups and organizing extremist activities.
On April 20, 2019 GKNB KR detained a citizen of the KR, an ITO militant in Syria wanted for the involvement in terrorist activities. It is established that since 2016 the detainee was a member of international terrorist bands, passed diversionary training and took active part in military operations in the territory of Syria. In November 2018, on the instructions of the ITO leaders he left the territory of Syria to form an underground cell and wait for the arrival of other fighters from Syria to continue the so-called “armed Jihad” in the countries of Central Asia and commit terrorist acts using improvised explosive devices and firearms.
On April 23, 2019, the state security service of the Kyrgyz Republic, in cooperation with foreign partners, detained an ITO militant, a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic. It is established that in 2014 the detainee went to Syria to participate in “armed Jihad,” where he received special subversive and terrorist training from the Arab instructors. He took an active part in the hostilities and later was appointed an instructor in the training of enlisted recruits in the ITO camps. At the direction of the ITO leaders he entered the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic to legalize, create a terrorist underground and carry out “armed Jihad” in the future.
On May 5, 2019, a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic wanted for involvement in terrorist activities was detained. He underwent sabotage and terrorist training in the Syrian-Iraqi zone of the armed conflict and subsequently went to one of the CIS countries with the purpose of settling down and waiting for instructions from the leaders of the terrorist organizations to carry out terrorist activities.
On May 23, 2019, a citizen of Kazakhstan was detained in Kyrgyzstan; he was on the interstate wanted list for promoting terrorism and inciting religious hatred.
On May 25, 2019, citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic were detained on the territory of the Batken district while attempting to illegally enter the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. They came from the Syrian-Iraqi zone of armed conflict and during personal search police found ammunition for Kalashnikov small arms. It is established that in 2015 one of them fell under the influence of ITO emissaries and was transported to the territory of Syria to participate in the fighting. In 2017 he was put on the interstate wanted list by Interpol for committing terrorist crimes, as well as for participating in military operations as an ITO militant on the territory of third countries. Another detainee was also recruited by ITO emissaries and participated in combat clashes against the Syrian government troops.
On June 2, 2019, a citizen of one of the neighboring countries was detained when illegally crossing the state border of the Kyrgyz Republic through the checkpoint Manas Airport on his way to Istanbul; he used a fake passport of a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic. At the same time, the organizer of the criminal group, a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic, who organized a steady channel for the production and sale of fake Kyrgyz passports to foreign citizens in order to transport recruits of international terrorist organizations to the war zone, was detained in the waiting room of the Manas airport.
On June 5, 2019, in Jalal-Abad, police officers detained a 36-year-old M. Zh. on suspicion of robbery. The man entered a branch of the Companion Bank and threatened the cashier with a gun. During the search a gun and extremist literature were found in his possession. In addition, it is established that he communicated with members of terrorist organizations through the Telegram channel.
On June 19, 2019, authorized searches were conducted at the places of residence in the At-bashin district of Naryn region of six members of the Hizbut-Tahrir religious extremist organization banned in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. As a result of the search, Hizbut-Tahrir literature, rifled firearms (without appropriate permits), 5.45 mm casings, a metal container with gunpowder, pistons, shot, laptop, phones and SIM cards were found and seized.
Obviously, this list is not complete, but in general, these facts indicate the formation of a new model of terrorism (“IS 2.0”) [7. Pp. 49-62], based on the use of “pendulum” migration of radical Islamists to the countries of Central Asia and Russia, acting as a core of various extremist organizations.
Therefore, almost all Central Asian states have now focused on taking preventive measures and preventing their citizens from joining terrorist and extremist organizations and movements, as well as on returning to normal life former members and supporters of religious extremist organizations who have sincerely repented of their actions and embarked on the path of correction.
In November 2018, at the sixth International Conference of the Regional anti-terrorist structure of the Shanghai cooperation organization (SCO RATS), V. Norov, Director of the Uzbek Institute of strategic and international studies under the President of Uzbekistan, who is now Secretary General of the SCO, called attention to the Uzbek model of fighting against radicalization and terrorism [15].
The Uzbek model of fighting includes the following components:
– conceptual review of approaches to the implementation of measures to counter terrorism and extremism, which is enshrined in the Law "On countering extremism” adopted in June 2018, which gives clear definitions of the concept of “extremism”, “extremist activity,” “extremist organization”;
– propaganda of the ideas of enlightened Islam, focus on the struggle for the minds of people, especially young people, by raising their legal culture, spiritual and religious enlightenment. “The post of deputy head responsible for social issues, spiritual education and youth was introduced in the system of executive power at the level of regions, cities and districts; the post of deputy head of the department of internal affairs on youth issues was introduced in the system of law enforcement agencies. Councils of youth leaders have been formed at the supreme judicial council and the Supreme Court to protect the rights and interests of the young generation. In addition, each mahalla introduced the post of Deputy chairman of meetings of citizens on youth issues;
– development and dissemination of Uzbek traditional Islamic culture under the motto “Education against ignorance,” education of young people about the true essence of Islam and their acquaintance with the rich heritage of the great theologians and scientists of the past. Center of Islamic culture was established in Tashkent, Islamic Academy was organized in Samarkand, a research center of Imam Bukhari was set up in Surkhandarya region, center of Imam Termizi. A special department has been created at the Committee for religious affairs to promote the country as a historical center of Islam;
– creation of public councils from among the veterans, activists, athletes and cultural figures who are working with distressed families. They are designed to identify the conditions and causes of religious extremist crimes, as well as to correct people who have fallen under the influence of extremists;
– systematic work on social rehabilitation and return to normal life of those who fell under the influence of extremist ideas and then realized their mistakes. In accordance with the decree signed by the President of Uzbekistan Sh. Mirziyoyev on September 19, 2018, a Republican Interdepartmental Commission was established to consider appeals of the Uzbek citizens who were deluded into being members of terrorist, extremist or other prohibited organizations and groups [1]. The Commission has the right to release from criminal liability those who have confessed and sincerely repent what they have done. In addition, former militants have to disclose criminal activities of the organizations in which they participated. The Resolution notes that rehabilitated extremists shall receive assistance in employment, as well as social and legal assistance. Rehabilitation is possible only once in a lifetime, recidivists who violate the law again, cannot undergo rehabilitation;
– targeted work with children whose parents were influenced by extremists. In 2017, ten thousand such children found employment in Uzbekistan. Special attention is paid to their legal and religious education.
The disparate experience of the three countries, including such highlights as the purposeful work with labor migrants abroad by the Representative Offices of the Republic of Tajikistan; special courses for imams of mosques and clergy on prevention of radicalization of the population organized by the State Commission for religious affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic; the system of social rehabilitation of repentant extremists in Uzbekistan have to be better studied. This involves provision of relevant information in a standardized form. In turn, expert work with such information can help to solve the problem of forming an anti-terrorist Eurasian space, the issue of which was raised in May 2019 at the Council of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly [13].
Table 1
List of terrorist and extremist organizations the activities of which are prohibited on the territory of Central Asian states [2]
NOTES:
(1) Islamic State is an international terrorist organization banned in Russia and other CIS countries.
REFERENCES:
1. About improvement of the procedure of release from criminal liability of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, who by mistake became part of the terrorist, extremist or other forbidden organizations and groups. Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 19.09.2018 [O sovershenstvovanii poryadka osvobozhdeniya ot ugolovnoy otvetstvennosti grazhdan Respubliki Uzbekistan, po zabluzhdeniyu okazavshikhsya v sostave terroristicheskikh, ekstremistskikh ili inykh zapreshchennykh organizatsiy i grupp. Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan. 19.09.2018] // https://mfa.uz/ru/press/library/2018/09/ 16099/ (In Russ.).
2. According to the Anti-Terrorist Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States [Po dannym Antiterroristicheskogo tsentra gosudarstv-uchastnikov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv] // http://www.cisatc.org/ 1289/134/160/1269 (In Russ.).
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ABRAMOV V.L., PROKOFIEV V.A. New Armenia's Foreign Policy in the Development of Integration Processes in the Context of Growing Geopolitical Tensions
DOI 10.35775/PSI.2020.34.4.006
V.L. ABRAMOV Doctor of Sciences (economics), Professor, Chief researcher, Institute for international studies of economic relations, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia
V.A. PROKOFIEV student of the Humanities faculty of the Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain
NEW ARMENIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN THE CONTEXT OF GROWING GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS
The purpose of the article is to analyze the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia after the change of the country's political leadership as a result of the “velvet revolution.” With regard to the development of integration processes in the Eurasian Economic Union, it is considered as one of the most important vectors of the New Armenia's foreign policy in economic cooperation with the EAEU countries in the context of increasing geopolitical tensions. The article shows changes in the foreign policy of the “New Armenia,” as well as the features of their manifestation in a sovereign state within the EEU. They are characterized by practical realism and a pragmatic approach to the development of integration processes in the Eurasian economic space, aimed at protecting the national interests of the country and the national dignity of citizens. Proposals and recommendations for further development of integration processes in the EEU are formulated, taking into account the specifics of member states with “minor economies.”
Key words: foreign policy, the New Armenia, the Eurasian Union, Eurasian integration, “minor economies,” geopolitical tension.
On the official website of the Armenian Foreign Ministry, Armenia's foreign policy vector is designated as “strengthening the country's security, providing favorable conditions for the development of the country, representing and protecting the interests of Armenia and its citizens abroad, increasing the country's authority and role in international organizations, further strengthening partnership relations with friendly countries, and actively participating in resolving global and regional problems. The goals of Armenia's foreign policy are an effective representation of the country's positions on the foreign policy arena and promotion of the peaceful development of the international community, including a peaceful and fair resolution of the Karabakh problem on the principle of self-determination of the people of Artsakh” [1].
Economic Eurasian integration cooperation is singled out as one of the defining economic areas of cooperation, since “the EEU was created for comprehensive modernization, cooperation and increasing the competitiveness of national economies and creating conditions for stable development in order to improve the living standards of the population of the member states in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on the EEU. The Armenian leadership highlighted the implementation of a coordinated macroeconomic policy in relation to the EEU, the main directions of which are: formation of common principles for the functioning of the economies of the member states of the Union, ensuring their effective interaction, as well as development of common principles and guidelines for predicting the socio-economic development of the Parties” [1].
An important milestone in the development of Armenia's foreign policy is cooperation with NATO in the areas of democratic, institutional, and defense reforms, as well as practical interaction, which is considered in the context of peacekeeping operations. The individual partnership action plan (IPAP) sets out the program of cooperation between Armenia and NATO and outlines an extensive roadmap for reforms, which is adjusted and approved every two years. But Armenia, by intensifying practical and political cooperation with NATO, does not actually seek membership in NATO (1).
The “velvet revolution” in Armenia was accompanied by an enhanced information campaign aimed at reducing Russia’s real influence in the country, the need for which was justified by the goals of ensuring the national security of Armenia as an independent state. A number of Western experts emphasize, when assessing the results of the peaceful transition of power in the country, that Armenia has sacrificed the balance between Armenia's multi-vector foreign policy, which is sometimes diplomatically called “complementarity,” and the country’s national security in favor of national security. As a result, the geopolitical orientation has shifted towards Russia [7]. The result was the formation of a space for maneuvering Armenia's foreign policy, limited by the complex neighborhood and disputes between the West and Russia in Eurasia. However, Russia's growing influence in the region changes the essence of the supposed “strategic partnership” between Yerevan and Moscow. As Russia has become closer to Azerbaijan and Turkey, its main role as a guarantor of security and regional balance for Armenia has been compromised. At the same time, Armenia's dependence on Russia has increased [7].
In other words, according to Armenian analysts, all Western institutions of influence have actually accepted Armenia's place in the “Russian orbit.” And this Western detachment explains the growing skepticism of Armenians towards both Russia and the West.
Armenia has confirmed the multi-vector nature of its foreign policy, which has recently been called “Armenia-oriented.” Armenia's foreign policy will be based on the realization of its sovereignty both in its relations with Russia and in strengthening cooperation with the West, including intensification of cooperation with Georgia and Iran [7]. In this regard, since the spring of 2018, the Armenian establishment has been dominated by the view that Armenia should not accept geopolitical determinism, where Russia plays a significant role. Therefore, the decision-making process needs to be reformed. Armenia's security planning must also change, as democratic governance and sound foreign policy are now gradually recognized as important components of security. At the same time, if Western countries want to help Armenia, they need to participate more in reforming the state and creating a more secure environment in the region [7]. In this regard, it is stated that “Armenia's subordination to Russia is a consequence of Russia's imperial power, as before. As an argument, the process of monopolization of the energy sector in Armenia and the country's complete dependence on Russia's Gazprom is cited. The project of a railway route to the main port of Iran, Bandar Abbas, has also not been implemented due to the fact that the Armenian railway company is controlled by Russia. Russia's control is so strong that there is interference in the activities of the Armenian army. In this regard, Pashinyan's visit to Iran is considered a significant event, since Iranian President Rohani called Armenia a transit country for gas supplies from Iran to Georgia [6]. At the same time, by entering into more constructive relations with Iran, Armenia has been subjected to indirect US sanctions in the context of growing geopolitical tensions. The latter's concern about the consequences of deepening Armenian-Iranian relations prompted a visit to Armenia by D. Bolton in 2018, who pointed out that interaction with Iran contradicts Armenia's strategic interests. However, the country's leadership intends to pursue an independent foreign policy that will focus primarily on the interests of Armenia, contradicting the political goals of the United States in the South Caucasus region. It is symptomatic that the New Armenia proclaims the thesis that “true foreign policy embraces morality, one of the aspects of which is the protection of national dignity.” Therefore, Russia's top leadership should perceive New Armenia as a more independent country if Russia has decided to work with it and take into account its pragmatic approach” [6]. Thus, New Armenia will make its own decisions [5]. New Armenia will no longer serve the interests of others if they contradict its national interests. New Armenia will no longer ignore any attempts to humiliate the dignity of the Armenian people, no matter where it comes from. Finally, New Armenia will decide for itself with whom and to what extent it should develop its relations, taking into account the highest national and moral interests of Armenia and the Armenian people throughout the world [6].
Armenia's foreign policy is expected to address a number of important issues in the near future: overcoming uncertainty in relations with the EU, focusing on speeding up the ratification of the Armenia-EU agreement, and overcoming contradictions with its EEU and CSTO partners. It is expected that after overcoming the internal political turmoil, the process of settling the Artsakh conflict will be significantly intensified [4]. Armenia has entered into partnership agreements with the European Union (EU) for two decades, gradually expanding trade relations. In 2017, an agreement was signed on a comprehensive and expanded partnership to expand and deepen economic and political relations, in which Armenia can become a kind of bridge between the EU and the EEU. We can see an ambitious approach that should be further studied and continued by Armenia. In the past, the EU has repeatedly stated that Armenia can join the EU, but its membership in the EEU is a difficult obstacle to overcome on the way to the EU [3].
In the sphere of interaction with the EAEU countries [3], priority is given to building interaction with Russia. It acts as a strategic partner of Armenia in ensuring national security in the region to help protect its borders and those of Artsakh. Russia is called upon to ensure the security of the Armenian population, or at least to ensure that Turkey or other countries do not interfere in the conflict on the side of Azerbaijan. Russia and Armenia are members of the Collective Security Organization (CSTO), a military alliance led by Russia, which is still active and includes a significant Russian military presence in Armenia. Starting from 2019, the Russian-Armenian relations are expected to be reviewed, moving away from the historically established traditional alliance to a more pragmatic approach that provides for a pro-European and pro-Atlantic reorientation of Armenia. This is supported by the personnel policy, when the backbone is made up of people somehow affiliated with the West in the broad sense of the word: either through studies in English or American universities, or through the work for Western structures, including international organizations [2]. This is expected to bring greater pragmatism to the Russian-Armenian relations.
Armenia’s new foreign policy is aimed at changing relations with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which, despite their common membership in the EEU, often evaded or did not support Armenia's position on the issue of territorial ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, the new policy of Armenia with the post-Soviet countries, with the exception of Azerbaijan, can be characterized by the term “optimistic pragmatism,” which assumes a stable improvement of relations, based not only on the traditions of past cooperation, but also on greater materiality and palpability [2].
As for relations with the United States, analysts describe Armenia's policy as a continuation of an idealistic approach. The country's leadership pursues a policy of more active positioning in international processes, strengthening contacts with other states and regions, while maintaining public neutrality in issues where the conflict of interests in the geopolitical plane has already led to an escalation (the Ukrainian crisis, the Syrian civil war, the terrorist threat in the Middle East, the rapidly deteriorating US relations with Iran).
Armenia's relations with China are directly linked to the country's economic interests, as China is one of the Asian countries that continue to increase their influence in Armenia through humanitarian initiatives: opening schools with advanced Chinese language studies and increasing expert and academic mobility programs. Given the immediate intensification of China, Japan and other Asian countries ' interest in Armenia, we can expect that it will try to create exclusively favorable export trade and economic conditions for cooperation [2].
Another option for Armenia in its foreign policy activities is to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes military, economic and cultural cooperation; three countries from the EEU, including Russia, are member states, and India and Pakistan have recently joined. Armenia has been a dialogue partner since 2008 and applied for observer status in 2012. The improvement of relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan's ally in the region, is complicated by the existence of long-term economic relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey regarding the use of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea [3].
U.S. policy towards Armenia is manifested in the following aspects: first, the position of the US State Department on the issue of Armenia’s territorial concessions to Azerbaijan in the interests of peace; secondly, the imposition of sanctions on the accounts of Armenian citizens because of the development of Armenia’s relations with Iran, that were abolished at the insistence of the Armenian Diaspora in the United States; third, provision of information to American tourists traveling to Armenia on the allegedly tense political situation in Armenia and the possibility of terrorist attacks, which is not true. All these unfriendly measures are aimed at ensuring Armenia's departure from the strategic partnership with Russia.
The priority directions of the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia, as a country with a “minor economy,” sufficiently clearly determine the behavior of other EAEU member states in relation to their geopolitical priorities regarding the development of Eurasian integration processes, in economic Eurasian integration cooperation.
Conclusions: The EEU member states are united for economic purposes, as indicated by the provisions of Article 2 of the EEU Treaty. The Union is an international organization of regional economic integration. It has an international legal personality and fully exercises its right to carry out relevant international activities on behalf of and for the purposes of the EEU. Such activities are economic in nature, while the foreign policy of each of the EEU members is carried out on the basis of their sovereign rights as independent actors of international activities.
At the same time, insufficient coordination of the foreign policy of the EAEU member states cannot but affect the development of economic integration. This implies the need to model coordinated approaches to the implementation of foreign and foreign economic policies of the EAEU member states in the context of increasing geopolitical tension, which will contribute to economic and geopolitical stability and will have a favorable impact on the development of the EAEU as an international organization:
1. The priorities of the Armenia’s foreign policy in integration interaction with the EAEU member states are based not only on economic interdependence, but also on political cooperation, strengthened by a common history, culture and deeply intertwined national traditions and customs. The internal growth drivers of the EEU countries in general are used effectively to promote the competitiveness of States in international markets against the background of growing global problems.
2. In the context of growing geopolitical tension, the Republic of Armenia will continue to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy that involves positioning, based on the priority of national interests, ensuring the security of the country's citizens, and promoting the growth of their well-being.
3. The Republic of Armenia, giving priority to the development of Eurasian integration, is stepping up its foreign policy activities through the development of trilateral and multilateral contracts in the form of cooperation with third countries that are not members of the EEU. Armenia's foreign policy within the EEU is linked to Russia's policy as a guarantor of its security, including through the SCO and the CSTO.
4. The EEU member States, especially countries with “minor economies,” occupy an important geopolitical geographical position in the strategic external priorities of the Russian Federation. Their membership in the EEU is not in doubt in public opinion, but is used by foreign countries in propaganda campaigns in the aspect of loss of national sovereignty, subordination to the interests of Russia, insufficient integration effects, lack of benefits and bonuses, paternalistic expectations in market relations.
5. Geopolitical pressure on the EEU members from the US and EU countries is increasing in attempts to reorient their political and economic policy from the development of Eurasian integration and political and economic interaction with Russia to a more in-depth partnership with the US and EU countries.
6. In the conditions of increasing geopolitical tension, the use of soft power tools is becoming more important. Political and economic elites, the population of Armenia and their diasporas are under increased influence of mass media and propaganda trying to falsify and distort integration interaction within the EEU framework, the development of cooperation with Russia, and form myths and idefixes educating young people in the spirit of unified values of Western culture. In this regard, the EEU should strengthen the institutions of mutual influence in the form of “soft power” on the territory of the EEU countries. In the context of growing geopolitical tension, it is advisable to expand the economic and humanitarian component of foreign policy interaction.
7. Russia’s leading position in the integration within the Eurasian Economic Union has to be complemented by the restructuring of the national economy, development of national investment and the real sector, establishing a policy of “soft power” in Eurasia with the consideration for the ethnic and economic specificities of each country.
NOTES:
(1) IPAP (individual partnership action plan) for Armenia is aimed at strengthening the political dialogue between NATO and Armenia, as well as supporting the implementation of democratic and military reform in the country. Due to the broad nature of the IPAP, Armenia cooperates with NATO not only in the defense sphere, but also holds regular consultations with the Alliance member states in the field of the rule of law, transparency of reforms, counter-terrorism and anti-corruption. In the framework of the IPAP, NATO agrees to support Armenia in achieving its reform goals by consulting on specific issues and providing concrete assistance. Armenia also makes an important contribution to the NATO-led operations. The Armenian armed forces contingent joined the contingents of NATO member countries in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo in 2004. In 2008, the number of the Armenian contingent in KFOR doubled to 70. Since February 2010, Armenia has also participated in the International security assistance force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Through the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Armenia also cooperates with NATO and other partner countries in a large number of other areas. Armenia determines its participation in the PFP program by signing up an Individual Partnership Action Plan every year, selecting activities that contribute to the achievement of the goals set out in the IPAP. Source: official website of the Armenian Foreign Ministry // https://www.mfa.am/ru/international-organisations/3.
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